An Article 32 investigation is intended to establish if “probable-cause” exists before a charge can be referred to a court-martial. The “old” Article 32 hearing was an adversarial hearing where the accused could produce evidence, be represented by counsel, could remain silent, give an unsworn statement, or testify, and counsel could cross-examine witnesses.

Some of the benefits for the accused and military defense counsel included:

1. Early Case-theory testing
   By exposing factual weaknesses at Article 32, defense counsel gains insight into the government’s trial strategy and can refine their own from the outset.
2. Leverage for pretrial negotiations
   A strong Article 32 showing may induce the convening authority to offer a pretrial agreement or to dismiss marginal charges.
3. Preservation of key issues
   Objections or challenges raised at Article 32 (e.g., to evidence or jurisdiction) may bolster later motions or appellate claims.
4. Resource for trial preparation
   Transcripts, exhibits, and witness lists generated at Article 32 form a ready investigative roadmap for the defense team.

That investigation benefited the prosecution as well as the defense. Sadly, those who decided to change Article 32 failed to understand the basics and how the prosecution team (and alleged victims) could benefit from it. Congress enacted the change to Article 32 because of political pressure.

Sure enough, what many of us military defense counsel said has come true.

The Military Justice Review Panel, established by Congress in Article 146 reported in 2024 how useless Article 32 has become.[1] [2]

The 2023 MJRP Interim Assessment of Preliminary Hearings and Prosecution Standards, concluded that Article 32 hearings are currently of limited utility to the prosecution, defense, and referral authority. On the related issue of the standard by which a convening authority or special trial counsel should refer a case to trial, the Panel recommended adopting a standard for prosecution consistent with the United States Attorney General’s Justice Manual.

The MJRP also assessed and recommended that Congress amend Article 32 with a package of reforms that would “(1) allow for a reasonable level of discovery at the preliminary hearing while retaining victim protections, (2) require a certification process for the preliminary hearing officer, and (3) preclude referral if the preliminary hearing officer determines that a charge lacks probable cause, subject to a right of appeal to a military judge and without prejudice to the government referring the charge anew.”

So how does all of this compare?

1. Historical “Full-Inquiry” Article 32 (Pre-FY14/NDAA 2014 – and thus pre-2019)

Before Congress’s sweeping reforms in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, Article 32 hearings functioned as evidence-rich, adversarial investigations akin to civilian preliminary hearings or grand juries. Under the Manual for Courts-Martial:

• Broad discovery and fact-finding: The hearing officer could compel production of documents and live testimony from both prosecution and defense witnesses, and the parties could conduct “searching investigations” into every contested fact JAG Legal Center and School.
• Robust adversarial testing: Both counsel examined witnesses under oath, argued evidentiary questions under the Military Rules of Evidence, and developed the theory of the case in real time Dacipad.
• Screening function: A no-probable-cause finding by the preliminary hearing officer would almost always prevent referral to a general court-martial, protecting the accused from baseless charges JAG Legal Center and School.

2. Modern “Probable-Cause-Only” Article 32 (Post-FY14/NDAA 2014 – and post-2019)
Since the FY 2014 amendments took effect (and remain largely in force today), Article 32 hearings have been narrowed to a paper-based probable-cause check:

• Elimination of discovery: Congress expressly removed “discovery” as a purpose of the hearing, limiting evidence to what the government chooses to present by summary or affidavit MJRP.
• Advisory, non-binding recommendations: Even if the preliminary hearing officer finds no probable cause, the convening authority may still refer charges, rendering the hearing’s factual findings largely moot MJRP.
• Decline of live testimony: Empirical data show that live witness appearances plummeted from nearly 98 % of hearings in FY 2014 to about 36 % by FY 2018, as summaries replaced in-person examination JAG Legal Center and School.

3. Core Deficiencies of the Current Article 32 Regime

1. Erodes Fairness and Fundamental Rights
   Without meaningful discovery or live testimony, defense counsel cannot test the government’s case before referral, undermining both due-process and the accused’s “bulwark” against unfounded charges DacipadJAG Legal Center and School.
2. Fails to Screen Baseless Charges
   Advisory findings mean that specifications lacking probable cause routinely proceed to trial, clogging dockets and subjecting servicemembers to unwarranted stress and expense MJRP.
   Reduces Utility to Convening Authorities
3. Referral authorities receive little more than a one-page recommendation, often based on untested summaries, hampering informed disposition decisions MJRP.
4. Creates Systemic Inefficiency
   The “paper drill” format shifts fact-finding into the trial phase, prompting last-minute motions, evidentiary hearings, and potential appellate issues—delaying justice and increasing costs

[1] As of the end of April 2025, it appears the Secretary of Defense has put the Congressionally mandated MJRP in hiatus.

[2] 21 June 2023 Report; 8 December 2023 Report.

When deciding what a word or term in a statute means, the rule of statutory interpretation is to give the word or term its plain and ordinary meaning. This is known as the plain meaning rule. If the word or term is clear and unambiguous, then the court will not look beyond the text of the statute to determine its meaning. The principal rule is well known to military defense counsel as they prepare a case for trial.

If a word or term is ambiguous, then the court may use other tools of statutory interpretation to determine its meaning. These tools include:

• Looking at the context of the word or term in the statute. This means considering the other words and phrases in the statute, as well as the overall purpose of the statute.
• Considering the legislative history of the statute. This includes looking at the bill drafts, committee reports, and other materials that were created during the legislative process.
• Considering relevant case law. This includes looking at how other courts have interpreted similar words and terms in other statutes.

The court will use these tools to interpret the ambiguous word or term in a way consistent with the statute’s overall purpose. Readers should also be aware of Scalia & Garner’s excellent book–Reading the Law, for deep dives into the rules and their complexities. As military defense counsel, we have a copy handy on our bookshelf.

It is important to note that the rules of statutory interpretation are complex and no single rule can be applied to all cases. Courts will often weigh different factors when interpreting a statute, including the plain meaning of the text, the context of the statute, the legislative history of the statute, and relevant case law.

A specific case-–United States v. Cabuhat

Over the last few years, Congress has made life difficult for military defense counsel, actually all lawyers practicting military justice, because of the numerous changes to the definition of what is or is not a crime.

Before a description of Cabuhat, what does (Google) Bard say The phrase “in the presence of” means in the same place as and close enough to be seen or heard. It can be used to describe a physical presence, such as when you are sitting in a room with someone.’

Cabuhat, assigned to the 86th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Ramstein, Germany, was sentenced to 30 years confinement in June 2021. He plead guilty to SA of a child, wrongfully photographing the child, and viewing and possessing CP.

Cabuhat was arrested in 2021 after an Air Force Office OSI investigation. Cabuhat SA a child on many times and had photographed the person during the abuse. He also had a large collection of CP.

Cabuhat pleaded guilty to all charges in June 2021. The military judge sentenced him to 30 years (to be served at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, KS), a dishonorable discharge, reduction to E-1, and mandatory SOR.

The central issue in the case is the meaning of “in the prescence of.” This can be important when the parties are separated and are communicating via Skype, WhatsApp, FaceTime or similar application.

The update is that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has decided United States v. Anderson. The unanimous court decided that there was still no constitutional requirement for a unanimous court-martial verdict, despite the Supreme Court decision in Ramos v. Louisiana.

That means we must now wait until the issue gets presented to the Supreme Court for a final ruling on the issue. It can take time for the Supreme Court to decide to take on an issue. That was our experience as appellate military defense counsel in United States v. Weiss, 36 M.J.224 (C.M.A. 1992) aff’d Weiss v. United States. 510 U.S. 163 (1994). So,

Unanimous verdicts at court-martial are not currently required by law. Under UCMJ, a guilty verdict in a general court-martial, which is the most serious type of court-martial, can be reached by a two-thirds majority of the members of the panel. This means that a defendant can be convicted of a crime even if one-third of the panel members do not believe that they are guilty.

However, there is a growing movement to require unanimous verdicts in courts-martial. In 2023, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would have required unanimous verdicts in courts-martial. However, the bill was not passed by the Senate.

There are several arguments in favor of requiring unanimous verdicts in courts-martial. One argument is that it would protect the rights of service members and ensure that they are not convicted of a crime unless all members of the jury agree that they are guilty. Another argument is that it would promote fairness and accuracy in the military justice system.

There are also some arguments against requiring unanimous verdicts in courts-martial. One argument is that it would make it more difficult to convict service members of crimes. Another argument is that it would be more difficult to reach a verdict in some cases, which could lead to hung juries. If the principle of innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is to be maintained, then appropriate “difficulties” in getting a conviction ought to be followed.

The debate over unanimous verdicts in courts-martial is likely to continue. It is an important issue that has implications for the rights of service members and the fairness of the military justice system. Unfortunately, there is betting that the Supreme Court will give deference to Congress as it usually does when Congress acts under its “Make Rules” authority to govern military discipline and justice.

Congress is subject to the Due Process Clause when legislating in the area of military affairs, and that Clause provides some measure of protection to defendants in military proceedings. But in determining what process is due, courts “must give particular deference to the determination of Congress, made under its authority to regulate the land and naval forces, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8.”

In the meantime, Congress has been paying some attention to the issue, as noted by the bloggers at Save Our Heroes.

Rebecca Kheel reported that Court-Martial Convictions Would Need Unanimous Jury Verdicts Under a Measure Added to Defense Bill. Military.com, 17 July 2023. Indications are that proposal won’t be adopted. UCMJ, court-martial, air force court, navy court, army court

Exploitation is a separate and distinct offense from a sexual assault, and both the exploitation and the consummated offense that was its object may be charged, tried, and punished. The commission of the intended offense may satisfy the intent element of the exploitation charge.

He does not address whether the offense should be labeled a lesser included offense, the potential for multiplicity questions, or whether the acts of the new offense are res gestae acts that may be separately punished. This will be an area of litigation for military defense counsel.

Likewise, given the victim’s subsequent testimony that the “price [she] had to pay” to attend the football game was submitting to sodomy [*13] by appellant, her statements were res gestae to the admissible Mil. R. Evid. 413 post-football game sexual assault evidence. See United States v. Metz, 34 M.J. 349, 351 (C.M.A 1992) (holding that res gestae evidence is admissible to place evidence in context); United States v. Gaddy, ARMY 21050227, 2017 CCA LEXIS 179, at *5 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 20 Mar. 2017) (summ. disp.) (“When conduct is inexorably intertwined with the alleged offense itself, it is not ‘other sexual behavior,’ but rather becomes part of the res gestae of the offense. That is, the testimony ‘was admissible as part of the same transaction as the assault.”) (citing United States v. Peel, 29 M.J. 235, 239 (C.A.A.F. 1989)).

United States v. Moore, No. ARMY 20140875, 2022 CCA LEXIS 140, at *12-13 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2022).

Res gestae evidence is vitally important in many trials. * Id. at 393. See also United States v. Peel, 29 M.J. 235, 239 (CMA 1989). It enables the factfinder to see the full picture so that the evidence will not be confusing and prevents gaps in a narrative of occurrences which might induce unwarranted speculation: Indeed, a rule limiting the admissibility of testimony like that of [victim] would provide an inducement to prefer more charges in order to avoid lack of continuity in the evidence received. At a time when multiple charges for a single transaction are already common place as a means for meeting the exigencies of proof, we are not anxious to provide an added inducement for overcharging.

United States v. Metz, 34 M.J. 349, 351 (C.A.A.F. 1992).

He does, in his proposal, make the offense a specific intent one (to which an accused’s level of intoxication may be a defense), and he does acknowledge “there will likely be constitutional challenges to the proposed crime (e.g., void for vagueness, notice, or overbreadth).”

Currently, a military jury (called a Panel of Members) must have eight members in a general court-martial (12 if it’s a death penalty case) and four in a special court-martial. Article 29. Three-fourths of the members must vote for a finding of guilty. Article 52.

That is the current law in the military, but it is being challenged. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has several cases on the issue of unanimous verdicts, which will be decided this term. If the court decides in favor of unanimous verdicts, then the Government will likely appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court (or vice-versa).

What should the military defense counsel being doing now at trial? One step is easy, but there may be other steps that should be considered.

Step One: file a motion with the trial judge that the members should be instructed that they must have a unanimous vote for any finding of guilty. Most military are already doing this. The military judge will almost certainly deny the motion, but you have put the issue on the record for appeal. Because the voting is a constitutional issue, an Appellant whose case is still under review might benefit from a favorable change in the law while the case is still on appeal.

The Supreme Court has previously held that an appellant might benefit from the change in the law. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) has followed that rule in, for example, United States v. Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154 (C.A.A.F. 2008). There is some suggestion that the retroactivity principle need not always apply–this is fact specific and adds uncertainty. Your military appellate defense lawyer is able to help navigate this problem. CAAF has looked at the issue in United States v. St. Blanc, 70 M.J. 424 (C.A.A.F. 2012) in relation to what remedy to apply.

But,

Step Two. It seems to me that there is an earlier point in the trial where the military defense lawyer needs to object to the nonunanimous verdict rule. At the arraignment, the judge advises the accused of their forum rights–officer members, officer-enlisted members, or judge alone. Here the judge tells the accused about the voting requirement. Perhaps, at this stage, the military defense counsel should object and ask the accused to be advised that the voting will be unanimous. The judge will not do that because, again, under current law, she doesn’t have to.

Why Step Two?

Forum choice is always difficult–some cases are usually best tried by a judge alone most others should be a jury (members) trial. What we don’t know is whether a case that might be best by judge alone would be better as a jury (members) trial if a unanimous verdict is required. It’s a combination of numbers and intuition about who the members are. Some of us more experienced military defense counsel are familiar with the old numbers game of how many members to have on the jury.

So, one of the new issues we’ve been raising has been the denial of a proper forum choice based on the judge’s initial forum and voting advice. This becomes important on appeal where the accused has elected trial by judge alone but would have elected members if the voting had to be unanimous for guilt. It’s rather simple–it might be easier to convince one member to vote not guilty than three.

At Cave & Freeburg, LLP, we try to be creative and thoughtful about your defense and consider all options that might work in your favor.

AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE: RETAINING THE COMMANDER’S AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE DISCIPLINE AND JUSTICE.

[https://www.court-martial-ucmj.com/white-paper-on-military-justice-reforms-2020-w-app/]

In summary, [they] believe that:

• Commanders play a critical and necessary role in the American military justice system; • Transferring prosecutorial discretion from commanders to judge advocates will undermine commanders’ authority to maintain good order and discipline; • Transferring the decision to prosecute and refer charges to a court-martial will create unintended consequences; • Changing the American military justice system to emulate the systems of other countries is not warranted or advisable. Comparison of sexual assault prosecution rates of the United States military with four United States allies in 2013 (see Appendix) and with three allies more recently do not support adopting their systems of removal of command responsibility for prosecuting serious sex crimes; • The Proposed Amendments Will Adversely Affect the Delicate Balance Between Justice and Discipline; • Recent Studies of Command Decisions to Prosecute Sexual Assaults Demonstrate that the Current System is Working; • Congress Should Await Implementation of the Reforms Outlined in the Military Justice Act of 2016 for Oversight and Accountability; and • Congress should reaffirm the role of the commander to enforce good order and discipline.

• A draft Executive Order indicating an effective date for the MJA of January 1, 2019.
• Annex 1 to the draft Executive Order, making changes effective immediately once the Order is signed. Of note, are changes to regulate the sealing of all or parts of the record, changes to MRE 311, which adds, “that the evidence was obtained by officials in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute or on binding precedent later held violative of the Fourth Amendment[.]” And,

(a) Paragraph 45c, Article 120c—Other sexual misconduct, subsections b-f, are amended[.]

• Annex 2 to the draft Executive Order, making changes incorporating the MJA. Annex 2 is 619 pages and reproduces Parts I-V of the MCM in their entirety.
• A most interesting item includes an Appendix 2.1 (PDF page 605) containing non-binding disposition guidance for charges.
• There is also an Appendix 12A (PDF page 611) listing Presidentially-prescribed lesser included offenses, which may help to address some of the fairly recent litigation about what is or isn’t a lesser included offense.

Rep. Martha McSally (R-Ariz.) this week will introduce legislation meant to fight nonconsensual sharing of “private, intimate media” in the military, following outcry over the Marine Corps’ nude-photo-sharing scandal. The Protecting the Rights of IndiViduals Against Technological Exploitation, or PRIVATE Act, “defines when photo sharing is a crime, which is not clear in current law, and addresses questions related to freedom of speech and intent,” McSally said in a letter seeking cosponsors for the bill.

The Hill.

Several bills . . . are among a number of bill filings this week at the State Capitol in preparation for the 91st General Assembly regular session.

They include:

• House Bill 1059, by Rep. House, would criminalize the violation of a military order of protection to allow state prosecution of such an order, in addition to any penalties that may be prescribed by military authorities.
• House Bill 1060, by Rep. House, would raise the maximum fine for contempt of a military court to $500, from the current maximum of $100.
• House Bill 1061, by Rep. House, would extend the statute of limitations for military justice from the current three years to five years.
• House Bill 1062, by Rep. House, would amend the law concerning the issuance of process, mandates, and subpoenas issued by military courts martial to include those issued by a military judge to be directed to and enforced by local law enforcement.
• House Bill 1063, by Rep. House, would amend the law regarding procedures used by military courts to give the governor executive authority over military courts of the organized militia.
• House Bill 1064, by Rep. House, would extend the offense of second degree criminal impersonation to anyone who fraudulently claims to be a member of the armed forces or National Guard.

New York County Surrogate Gideon J. Tucker wrote 150 years ago: “No man’s life, liberty or property are safe while the Legislature is in session.” Here’s a thought about Congress at work in 2016.

His note is in relation to major (and minor) suggestions for change in military justice practice. In his blog post he observes:

Legislative consideration of the proposed UCMJ changes has been conducted in secret in both chambers. There has been one closed briefing, that we know of. Presumably, there has been a good deal of back-and-forth between House and Senate Armed Services Committee staffs, on the one hand, and the Defense Department, on the other. And we know of stray correspondence that the Hill has received (from the ABA, of all places) objecting to parts of the legislation. What’s missing is hearings that are open to the public, and in which competing viewpoints can be heard and tested.

Assuming this to be the current practice, it departs substantially from the robust set of open and lengthy hearings and inputs when the “UCMJ” was birthed in 1950. You can read some of the public history here at the Library of Congress. I have to agree with him:

Shame on Congress for conducting the public’s business in this fashion on an issue as important as military justice. “Public Law” is not a figure of speech. It is difficult to think of a more effective — or more profoundly scandalous — way to erode public confidence in the administration of military justice than to frame legislation, effectively, in secret.

This not to say there aren’t some good offers, but they ought to be open and openly discussed. For example, there is a suggestion to change the voting percentage for guilty from two-thirds to three-quarters (and–I have read elsewhere–to increase the minimum required number of members on a panel–this doesn’t appear in either report).

He is right on.

Of course this is nothing new. I came on active duty as a navy judge advocate in January 1908. The topics Cully talks were a topic then and have been a frequent topic all of the years of my active duty service through today in a civilian military law practice.

Sen. Ernst is wrong in one respect–the pilot program is unnecessary.

No wonder so many Americans on the left and right are disgusted and fed up with career Washington bureaucrats and insiders. Common sense ideas which folks outside the beltway understand and take for granted are hard to come by inside the beltway. Exhibit A is the novel idea—to the Army, Air Force, and some key Senate staffers who don’t know better—that military prosecutors and defense lawyers should be experienced litigators, just like their civilian counterparts in every district attorney and public defender office in the country. Give credit to Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, for proposing an amendment that would have required the services to establish career litigation tracks for select few JAGs so that they could deliver first-class justice to crime victims and defendants alike in the military. But behind closed doors, outside the view of the public, her amendment was knee capped by professional bureaucrats in true Washington fashion. What emerged is an amendment that requires the services to carry out a “pilot program” on military justice to study the “feasibility and advisability of a military justice career track for judge advocates” (read: Conduct studies indefinitely).

Read more at Daily Signal.

The 2015 Report of the Military Justice Review Group: Reasonable Next Steps in the Ongoing Professionalization of the Military Justice System By Paul Larkin and Charles “Cully” Stimson

Recently I posted at Global Military Justice Reform about a Military Law Review article by a Ghanaian lawyer who deals with military justice in Ghana, and reforms there. I’ll quote again from her article about change in Ghanaian military justice:

Indeed, the AFA must be reformed. However, changes within the military are usually slow due to the perceived fear of their future effects on the military objective of having well-disciplined soldiers. “However, if change is inevitable, what changes should be made? Why should change occur?” Any considered changes must be critically assessed before change is implemented.

This would seem to be a perfect opportunity to take up, again, two suggested improvements to military law practice.

Let’s have the President issue an Executive Order. The Attorney General of the United States issues several manuals for U. S. Attorneys. This is guidance from HQ intended to assure some measure of uniformity among the U. S. Attorney offices throughout the nation. It is time to impose something akin to the U. S. Attorney’s Manual by executive order (in particular, 9-27.000 – Principles Of Federal Prosecution)?

https://www.justice.gov/usam/title-9-criminal

The probable cause standard is the same standard as that required for the issuance of an arrest warrant or a summons upon a complaint (See Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a)), for a magistrate’ s decision to hold a defendant to answer in the district court (See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(a)), and is the minimal requirement for indictment by a grand jury. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972). This is, of course, a threshold consideration only. Merely because this requirement can be met in a given case does not automatically warrant prosecution; further investigation may be warranted, and the prosecutor should still take into account all relevant considerations, including those described in the following provis ions, in deciding upon his/her course of action. On the other hand, failure to meet the minimal requirement of probable cause is an absolute bar to initiating a Federal prosecution, and in some circumstances may preclude reference to other prosecuting authorities or recourse to non-criminal sanctions as well.

And the Criminal Resource Manual.

There seems much in them that could be copied almost word for word.

And perhaps now it is time to adopt Rule 5.1, Fed. R. Crim. Pro., either by statute or executive order? IMHO, the President can amend R.C.M. 405, through the UCMJ art. 36 power, and adopt a rule similar to that found in federal district court.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_5.1

(f) Discharging the Defendant. If the magistrate judge finds no probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or the defendant committed it, the magistrate judge must dismiss the complaint and discharge the defendant. A discharge does not preclude the government from later prosecuting the defendant for the same offense.

Under federal practice, a USA can still prosecute by restarting with new evidence should it arrive later and the prosecution not being barred by the statute of limitations.

Confinement to Bread & Water

Currently, a person can be confined for up to three days on bread and water rations, under certain circumstances. The MJRG recommends removing this as a punishment. They do not say why, other than to suggest that:

This proposal reflects confidence in the ability of commanders in a modern era to administer effective discipline through the utilization of the wide range of punishments otherwise available under Article 15 and other non-punitive measures.

My experience with bread and water as a punishment:

it can be an effective rehabilitative tool with some defaulters; but

it would likely be of no significant rehabilitative effect for the vast majority of defaulters.

As the command judge advocate in USS JOHN F. KENNEDY, I observed the imposition and effects of bread and water on the occasional defaulter as a punishment for almost three years.

We had an onboard Brig, but could only use it while underway. That meant defaulters given bread and water while we were pier side had to be transported to the base Brig. By the time the defaulter arrived at the Brig and by the time the Brig released the defaulter (usually before their going home time on the “third” day), the defaulter might have done one day of actual bread and water. Not effective and administratively and logistically burdensome–so we didn’t use it while pier side.

When at sea the CO did at times assign bread and water as a Mast punishment. However, it was used sparingly for those who needed a short kick in the backside to get them straight. It was considered a remedial tool rather than a punishment. If the defaulter’s chain of command thought the person worth saving, a short visit to the Brig might be enough to reorient the person–and it often was sufficient.

To ensure the full three days of confinement, we would hold Mast very early in the AM, sometimes shortly after midnight. The defaulter would then be escorted to Medical several decks below the bridge for an appropriate physical examination, and assuming the person to be fit for bread and water, they’d be escorted several more decks below into the bowels of the ship to the Brig. Once there, they received one loaf of sliced bread per day and as much water as desired. They were of course constantly monitored for adverse physical reactions.

An interesting observation is that by the second day the defaulter stopped eating the bread. That’s the effect of bread and water–they’d become full.