The Navy’s largest overseas installation has seen a significant drop in incidents of drinking and driving over the last two years, thanks in part, to a persistent sobriety checkpoint program, according to base officials.

Stars & Stripes reports.

The answer to alcohol related incidents, including deaths, injury, and property damage is simple. Treat alcohol as the drug that it is. Treat alcohol the same way any other drug use is treated in the military. Alcohol is considered the number one drug of abuse is it not. Ban alcohol use unless it is prescribed.

The Army needs to double its staff of substance-abuse counselors to handle the soaring numbers of soldiers seeking alcohol treatment, said Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the Army’s No. 2 officer.

Army Times reports.

Drugs are prohibited to military members unless they are prescribed. (And interestingly there are thousands of people on duty taking prescription medications provided to them at no expense to the member. These medications have warning labels about potential adverse affects, such as drowsiness, yet the member is not placed SIQ or otherwise restricted, except aircrew.)

Drugs are considered dangerous – there are detailed metrics showing how dangerous alcohol is. There are few, if any, metrics showing that drugs have an impact on military service compared to those showing the adverse affect of alcohol.

Remove alcohol from base facilities.

Prohibit alcohol use to anyone, regardless of age.

Ergo, there will be a significant reduction in death, injury, time lost, or damaged property. Over time the need for more counselors will be reduced thus causing a budget saving.

Or continue the current hypocritical approach to drug use.

Appellant’s prior crime, the crime of housebreaking, occurs when “[a]ny person subject to [the Uniform Code of Military Justice] . . . unlawfully enters the building or structure of another with intent to commit a criminal offense therein. . . .” 10 U.S.C. § 930. . . . Appellant’s primary argument against this conclusion is that the district court improperly referenced the military court’s discussion of the underlying facts of his conviction. Generally, a court is only to consider “the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. But the district court’s reference in this case to the underlying facts of Appellant’s housebreaking conviction, as articulated in the military court’s opinion, does not change the fact that the elements of housebreaking constitute a generic burglary crime, a crime of violence under our precedents. Further, and contrary to Appellant’s argument, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), did not alter our decisions in regard to generic burglary and does not provide reason for reversal.

See, United States v. Whetzell, No. 09-1463 (8th Cir. February 10, 2010). I have linked to the SCOTUSWiki version of Begay because it has some interesting information about what constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The act defines “violent felony” to include any adult crime punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” This last clause is referred to as the “otherwise” or “residual” clause. The ACCA also defines “serious drug offense” to include offenses under state law “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” Begay v. United States asks whether a felony conviction for driving while intoxicated counts as a “violent felony” under the ACCA.

Sorry, for a headnote cite:

Held: New Mexico’s felony DUI crime falls outside the scope of the Act’s clause (ii) “violent felony” definition. Pp. 3–10. (a) Whether a crime is a violent felony is determined by how the law defines it and not how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion. Pp. 3–4. (b) Even assuming that DUI involves conduct that “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” under clause (ii), the crime falls outside the clause’s scope because it is simply too unlike clause (ii)’s example crimes to indicate that Congress intended that provision to cover it. Pp. 4–10.

A new order from Marine Corps Forces Command explicitly prohibits Marines from using a number of legal substances, including the herbal blend Spice, to achieve an altered state of consciousness or a druglike “high.” . . . The order, dated Jan. 27, bars Marines from using, possessing, attempting to possess, manufacturing or introducing onto military installations any of 10 substances that cause “legal highs.” Spice and salvia divinorum, including their many aliases, are at the top of the list.

JDNews.com reports.

According to MARFORPAC Order 5355.2, the substances known as Spice and Salvia Divinorum, while not listed as a controlled substance and highly accessible by service members, are hereby prohibited to all service members assigned within the MARFORPAC chain of command.

USMC website.

A woman had a blood-alcohol level of .708 percent, possibly a state record, when she was found earlier this month behind the wheel of a stolen vehicle parked on Interstate 90. A state chemist recalled a sample that tested .53, but nothing higher, in his more than 30 years on the job. Dr. Robert Looyenga, who recently retired from the Rapid City Police Department’s forensic laboratory, told Sondreal that the highest blood-alcohol sample he tested measured .56 percent. Sondreal’s research indicates that a blood-alcohol level of .40 is considered a lethal dose for about 50 percent of the population.

reports the Rapid City Journal.