Unfortunately there are only nine state jurisdictions and federal filled in – a ways to go on a useful project.

Another place to look is SentencingProject.org. (Note, it will be necessary to “sherardize.”) , or

A Practitioner’s Guide to Collateral Consequences of Conviction, or

The Office of (Federal) Defenders, for Padilla related information.

And here is an item on the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, model legislation for the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act.

As always, one of the questions to ask the client is where they intend going/living upon release from active duty or confinement. Most states now have some sort of central resource through the AG’s office, typically related to pardons, expungement, or claw-backs. (And no, the military does not have expungement – a frequent question.)

Q: I’m 18 years active duty with the US Navy. I was an E-6 from 2000–2009 but got busted for UCMJ violation to E-5. I fall under the High-3 plan for retirement and a lot of my friends are saying that when I retire, I will get the E-6 retirement pay, but then again, some of my friends are saying I will not — which is true?

The answer given is:

A: Okay, so here’s the deal: your retirement under the high-three plan is cal­culated by multiplying 2.5% by the number of years served and then taking that number and multiplying it by the aver age of the highest 36 months of active duty pay received. Rank, doesn’t actually factor into the calculation. So, depending on when you retire, your years as an E-6 may be included in the calculation. Get promoted again and you can make sure it is!

Is this a correct answer. [I think answer is partly correct.] The answer is partly correct if in fact the person successfully gets promoted back to E-6. But otherwise I think the answer is not correct. That depends on how you apply the facts above to the applicable statute.

10 U. S. Code 1407(f).

United States v. Parker and Woodruff

In these consolidated appeals, the Government challenged the district court’s orders dismissing its 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006) petitions for civil commitment of Lonnie Parker and James Woodruff, who were both convicted of various sex offenses and sentenced in military court-martial proceedings, but are currently housed within a Bureau of Prisons facility. The district court dismissed the Government’s petitions because it found that “§ 4248 does not apply to military prisoners [since] they are not `in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons’ pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a).” In so holding, the district court relied on its order in a related case, United States v. Joshua, No. 5:09-hc-02035-BR (E.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2010), which was recently affirmed by this court. See United States v. Joshua, 607 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that an individual convicted and sentenced by United States Army court-martial but housed within a facility operated by the Bureau of Prisons is not “in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons” under § 4248(a)). The Government concedes that these appeals present the same issue addressed in, and that the disposition of the appeals is controlled by Joshua.

Because we agree that Joshua controls the outcome of these appeals, we affirm the district court’s orders dismissing the Government’s petitions.

Long term prisoners at the USDB can end up in a federal prison near their family. There are various ways this can happen, sometimes at the prisoners request. See Para. 6.15, DODI 1325.7, Adminstration of Military Correctional Facilities and Clemency and Parole Authority.

Prisoners with approved sentences to confinement may be transferred to Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) facilities with the concurrence or by direction of the appropriate Secretary of a Military Department or designee. Authority to transfer prisoners to the FBOP confers no right on prisoners to request transfer. 6.15.3. A prisoner’s desire to be or not to be transferred to a Federal institution need not be considered in making the transfer decision.

However, the above case illustrates a potential issue if the person is a sex offender. Right now the Fourth Circuit holds that military prisoners in federal prisons are not subject to civil commitment based on United States v. Joshua. That could change, and that holding is only applicable so far within the Fourth Circuit.

A doctor who is being expelled from the Navy was charged by Kitsap County prosecutors Thursday with failing to register as a sex offender, according to attorneys familiar with the case. State law requires people convicted of certain sex crimes to register as sex offenders within three days of arriving in a new state. But Velasquez, who arrived in Kitsap County in early July, was convicted in a court martial at Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan and it was unclear at first if his conviction required registration, lawyers involved in the case say. The lieutenant commander pleaded guilty to two counts of wrongful sexual contact with patients and two counts of conduct unbecoming an officer in May, serving seven days in a Yokosuka brig, according to Stars and Stripes newspaper. He was sentenced to two years in prison, a $28,000 fine and forfeiture of all pay and allowances, but those punishments will be waived if he doesn’t commit a crime in the next year, the publication said.

Methinks he is in danger of some part of his confinement being vacated? This is a case which gained some notoriety because of the sentence and publically upset victims. Here is a link to my earlier post on this court-martial in May 2010.

Up until, oh I don’t remember the date now, but quite a number of years ago, a military prisoner who reached his minimum release date (MRD) was released without any restrictions on liberty post release. That lead to a bit of gamesmanship before the clemency and parole boards. If a prisoner was up for parole consideration and he had less than a year to go for his MRD the prisoner would usually waive parole consideration. They were willing to serve the months rather than be paroled. That was because a paroled prisoner would waive all of their good time. But more importantly be subject to many onerous conditions of parole.

(Note to trial practitioners. Before advising your client about post-trial matters I would recommend you consult and you review with the client DODI 1325.7. This regulation has a number of important rules you can educate your client about (including, yes, sex offenders). Although it does not contain Rule No. 1 for obtaining parole: that you “have taken responsibility for your confining offenses.” Words to that effect must show up somewhere in confinement evaluations and recommendations. That works pretty well in a GP case. If you are a defense counsel and have NG but found guilty case give me a call, all is not lost. [Having sat as a voting member of the Navy C&PB, albeit some years ago, I’d venture that no other rule is as important to parole than Rule No. 1. You may have good scores on the points based classification system and good reports and no discipline reports, but . . . you clearly haven’t learned any lessons.] Anyway. Upon entry to confinement the facility calculates the full term date (FTD), that’s day for day service of sentence, minus credit for pretrial confinement or an Article 13, UCMJ, violation, or effect of a PTA. Then they calculate automatic good time credit based on the length of approved sentence, which becomes the minimum release date (MRD). Absent loss of good-time or clemency or parole that’s when the prisoner can normally expect to be released.)

Once the rule changed it no longer matters much about release on MSR or parole because of mandatory supervised release conditions. These conditions can be as onerous as parole conditions administered by the federal probation and parole personnel. In particular mandated sex offender or other counseling, no computer access, etc.

As Dwight points out that rule was challenged in United States v. Pena, 61 M.J. 776 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2005), aff’d, 64 M.J. 259 (C.A.A.F. 2007). The petitioner in Pena was unsuccessful.

The district court judge in Moultrie denied the petition. So now several courts have independently ruled against a petitioner wanted a ruling against application of MSR, as well as CAAF. It would seem that the issue doesn’t really become ripe until such time as the prisoner is about to be or is released on MSR?

The results are consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence as those ordered into supervision by state or federal civilian courts. No federal circuit court has ruled on this issue yet. But Dwight points to the one case from the federal jurisdiction in which the USDB sits — Huschak v. Gray, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Kan 2009). It was assumed that all MSR’s would have to be litigated in Kansas. But if Moultrie is followed, a MSR’ee can seek relief in the federal district court-house building in which (usually) his probation officer has her office. A similar type of petition has been denied in Clayton v. United States Army, 20091119, 0000827 (W.D. Ky. November 19, 2009).

Here is a link to the U.S. Sentencing Commission report on Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release, July 2010.

On appeal, Eyster argues that the District Court erred by increasing his criminal history from Category II to Category V, because his 1988 conviction under the UCMJ was not a qualifying prior “sex offense conviction” as defined by § 4B1.5.. . . The Government concedes, and we agree, that Eyster’s 1988 conviction under the UCMJ was not a qualifying “sex offense conviction” for purposes of § 4B1.5. Therefore, Eyster’s advisory Guidelines range should have been calculated using criminal history Category II, not Category V. This was error[.]As explained, however, the applicable Guidelines range was the same—360 to 840 months—under either criminal history Category. Because this mistake did not result in the calculation of an incorrect Guidelines range, we conclude that it did not affect Eyster’s substantial rights.

It appears this would be related to United States v. Eyster, NMCM 88 1339, 1988 CMR LEXIS 761 (N-M C.M.R. October 27, 1988). The court affirmed the conviction in a straight-legal review. There does not appear to have been a petition to CAAF.

I. WHETHER APPELLANT’S TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL INFORMED HIM HIS GUILTY PLEA MIGHT RESULT IN DEPORTATION. II. WHETHER COUNSEL’S ADVICE REGARDING DEPORTATION WAS INEFFECTIVE. SEE PADILLA V. KENTUCKY, 08-651 (2010); STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); HILL V. LOCKHART, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). III. IF APPELLANT’S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, WHAT RELIEF, IF ANY, IS APPROPRIATE.

Remember Denedo?

From the headnotes in Hill:

In the present case it is unnecessary to determine whether there may be circumstances under which erroneous advice by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, because petitioner’s allegations were insufficient to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement. He did not allege in his habeas petition that, had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility [474 U.S. 52, 53] date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial. Nor did he allege any special circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether to plead guilty.

And from Padilla:

To satisfy Strickland ’s two-prong inquiry, counsel’s representation must fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 466 U. S., at 688, and there must be “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. , at 694. The first, constitutional deficiency, is necessarily linked to the legal community’s practice and expectations. Id. , at 688. The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the deportation risk. And this Court has recognized the importance to the client of “ ‘[p]reserving the … right to remain in the United States’ ” and “preserving the possibility of” discretionary relief from deportation. INS v. St. Cyr , 533 U. S. 289 . Thus, this is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was incorrect. There will, however, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a plea are unclear. In those cases, a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was here, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. Accepting Padilla’s allegations as true, he has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy Strickland ’s first prong. Whether he can satisfy the second prong, prejudice, is left for the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance.

Our clients convicted of child pornography offenses and certain other offenses in which the internet is case related are restricted in computer access post-release. I mention Quon because of an interesting comment at Sentencing Law & Policy.

I recently had to deal with the Federal Probation Service and the Air Force Clemency & Parole Board about a former now paroled client alleged to have improperly used computers to search for employment. Employment is necessary for parole, and most state funded employment offices, and many employers require applicants to use computers to search for a job or to apply for a job. We resolved the case in the client’s favor and parole was not revoked. The parole and FPS rules do allow computer use in limited circumstances related to seeking employment. The rules are bureaucratic and subject to misunderstanding. Basically the rules require a new “permission” to use a computer each time. So going to Home Depot in the AM and Lowes in the PM requires two permissions. So, here is the SL&P comment on an aspect of Quon.

Though Quon will be of greatest interest to those involved in traditional debates over privacy and police-practices, the opinion for the Court by Justice Kennedy has this notable flourish that could have some broader impact: Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. Relatedly, in a rich and spot-on solo concurrence that takes a variety of swipes at the majority, Justice Scalia concludes by lamenting the legal challenge presented if and when the Court embraces a legal ruling “that requires evaluating whether a given gadget is a necessary instrument for self-expression, even self-identification.” So, what does this have to do with sentencing law and policy in general or sex offender restrictions in particular? Well, I do not think it is much of a stretch for persons to contend in these modern technological times that access to the internet (and maybe even access to a Facebook or Twitter account) is now “essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.” But, as regular readers know, a fair number of sex offenders these days are facing release conditions that fully or at least significantly restrict their rights to access the internet and/or social networking websites. I suspect that this line from Quon might find its way into a few effort in lower courts to strike down limits placed on some offenders’ use of modern means of digital communication.

CAAF has previously decided some cases about post-release restrictions on military prisoners, but none on this specific restriction. I doubt CAAF would decide an issue of post-release restrictions on the use of computers or the internet. See e.g. United States v. Pena, 64 M.J. 259 (C.A.A.F. 2007)(review of post-trial confinement and release conditions on direct appeal is limited to the impact of such conditions on the findings and the sentence. . . . As a general matter, the collateral administrative consequences of a sentence, such as early release programs, do not constitute punishment for purposes of the criminal law.).

The statements of the appellant’s civilian defense counsel clearly attempt to minimize the seriousness of the indecent assault charges and assure the appellant that he would not have to register as a sex offender. In his testimony at the DuBay hearing, Mr. NC, the appellant’s civilian defense counsel, repeatedly used such phrases as “fairly innocuous” and “just foolery” to describe the sexual assault offenses. Mr. NC claimed lack of memory on many points but, in response to questions from the military judge, did recall concluding that sex offender registration was “not really a credible concern.” Consistent with this testimony, the appellant testified that when he directly asked Mr. NC if sex offender registration would be required Mr. NC told him: “I don’t see why it would be with the allegations that were brought against you. I don’t see why that would be a registerable offense.”

Bottom line it appears AFCCA believes the defense counsel considered the statements as “affirmative misrepresentations . . . concerning significant collateral consequences.” Slip op. at 5. Rose was tried in 2005.

The effect of Padilla v. Kentucky is that counsel have at least three choices when asked about sex offender registration: say nothing, say “I don’t know, you need to ask a lawyer,” give correct or reasonably correct advice. As I’ve posted before, the various states and federal rules on SOR are differing and complex. However, reference to the DoD regulation may be sufficient. See United States v. Miller, 63 M.J. 452 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

Given the plethora of sexual offender registration laws enacted in each state, it is not necessary for trial defense counsel to become knowledgeable about the sex offender registration statutes of every state. However, we do expect trial defense counsel to be aware of the federal statute addressing mandatory reporting and registration for those who are convicted of offenses within the scope of this statute. 28 Also, we expect counsel to be aware of DoD Instr. 1325.7, which identifies offenses that trigger mandatory sex offender reporting. The operation of this statute and instruction may have an impact on an accused’s decisions both before and at trial, and on an accused’s legal obligations after conviction.

63 M.J. at 459.

It’s a pretty sure reality that a sexual assault allegation is going to be a registration offense – for how long and under what terms is going to vary. I would suspect the brooding omnipresence of registration is what’s driving an increase in NG pleas, contested cases, and potentially a lot more acquittals.

Here is the DoD regulation, DODI 1325.7 — see Enclosure 27.

Here is an excellent article, MAJ Andrew D. Flor, Sex Offender Registration Laws and the Uniform Code of Military Justice: A Primer, 2009 ARMY LAW., 1.

Both the Montgomery and Post 9/11 GI Bills are worth over $49,000. This money is not a loan and will help you cover the costs of getting a degree. Full-time students receive up to $1,368 a month no matter how much tuition costs. The Post 9/11 GI Bill may even give you a monthly housing stipend of $1,200.

Joseph Allen served in the United States Air Force (Air Force) for more than twenty years, from January 14, 1985, until September 30, 2006, when he voluntarily retired and received an Honorable Discharge. During his service, on February 18, 2004, the Air Force initiated general court-martial proceedings against Allen, alleging that he took indecent liberties with a minor child and contributed to the delinquency of two minor children. The general court-martial trial began more than two years later, on March 21, 2006. Allen was convicted, and his sentence included a reduction in grade from Master Sergeant (E-7) to Senior Airman (E-4), significantly reducing his retirement benefits. Following the conviction, Allen filed a complaint against the Air Force and nineteen individuals in the District Court for the District of North Dakota, claiming that his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights were violated. The district court[ 2 ] granted the Air Force’s motion for summary judgment. Allen appeals, and for the following reasons, we affirm. Allen also moves to supplement the record, and we deny his motion.

Following his conviction, Allen requested that the court-martial’s findings and sentence be set aside and that the charge and specifications be dismissed because the military judge should have granted Allen’s motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial or due process rights. In a memorandum, the Director of the Air Force Judiciary, Colonel Roberta Moro, acting pursuant to Article 69 of the UCMJ, reviewed the record of the court-martial, determined that no relief was warranted and declined to send the case to the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals because the court-martial’s findings and sentence were supported by law. On September 30, 2006, Allen voluntarily retired from the Air Force and received an Honorable Discharge.

This weekend’s must-read comes via this link at SSRN to a new piece by Margaret Colgate Love and Gabriel Chin concerning the Supreme Court’s important decision late last month in Padilla v. Kentucky. “Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right to Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction.” Here is the abstract: In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. (March 31, 2010), the Supreme Court broke new ground in holding in a 7-2 decision that a criminal defense lawyer had failed to provide his noncitizen client effective assistance of counsel when he did not tell him that he was almost certain to be deported if he plead guilty. It is the first time that the Court has applied the 1984 Strickland v. Washington standard to a lawyer’s failure to advise the client about a “collateral” consequence of conviction – something other than imprisonment, fine, probation and the like, that the court imposes at sentencing. While Padilla’s implications for cases involving deportation are clear, it may also require lawyers to consider many other legal implications of the plea.

Within the military we have seen this issue applied to sex offender registration.

The Padilla decision clearly governs cases where a noncitizen is threatened with deportation on the basis of conviction. But if that were all, it would not “mark a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law,” as the concurring Justices warned. While Padilla’s effects will be felt most immediately in the tens of thousands of criminal cases involving noncitizen defendants, defense lawyers must now concern themselves more generally with the broader legal effects of a criminal conviction on their clients. The systemic impact of this new obligation cannot be underestimated. Padilla may turn out to be the most important right to counsel case since Gideon, and the “Padilla advisory” may become as familiar a fixture of a criminal case as the Miranda warning.

Because counsel must inform a client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation, Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter not addressed here.

So, to what extent does Padilla impact Denedo? Here is the SCOTUSWiki link to the Supreme Court litigation in Denedo. Here is a link to Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2008). Here is a link to United States v. Denedo, in which N-MCCA denied Denedo relief again.

Justice Stevens writes for the court, with Justice Alito writing in concurrence with the judgment for himself and Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Scalia writes in dissent for himself and Justice Thomas.

In this post conviction proceeding, Padilla claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but also told him that he“‘did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.’” 253 S. W. 3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). Padilla relied on his counsel’s erroneous ad-vice when he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made his deportation virtually mandatory. He alleges that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had not received incorrect advice from his attorney. We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. ___ (2009), to decide whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla’s counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country. We agree with Padilla that constitutionally competent counsel would have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter that we do not address. . . [C]hanges to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, some-times the most important part7—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes. . . The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.

Slip op. at 9.

So, what else shall we see in the opinion? That if the advice is given it must be right? More later.

In principle, we accept that certain “wholly unconstitutional” convictions can be collaterally attacked and disqualified for consideration during sentencing. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). But, when available, the collateral attack remedy would not be offered on the ground that the invalid UCMJ conviction rested on something other than the “laws of … the United States” as that phrase appears in Code § 19.2-295.1. Instead, the invalid UCMJ conviction would be excluded from trial, if at all, because it violated a higher law of the United States: the Federal Constitution. In any event, we need not address Oliver’s hypothesis further. He does not raise on appeal any constitutional objections in contest of his UCMJ convictions.

Or, can an OTH in lieu of trial by court-martial (Chapter 10) be a basis to revoke a state probation, as in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Lopez, No. 2008-SC-000308-DG (Ky. 27 August 2009).

While serving in the United States Army in Iraq, the Army charged Tommy Lopez with violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by viewing child pornography on a computer. At that time, Lopez was also on probation imposed by a Kentucky circuit court for the offense of criminal attempt to commit first-degree sexual abuse. In lieu of trial by court-martial for the child pornography charge, Lopez sought and received a voluntary discharge from the Army. Following the voluntary discharge and his return to Kentucky, the circuit court revoked Lopez’s probation for the pornography charges. The main question before us, which is a matter of first impression in Kentucky, is whether a violation of the UCMJ is an “offense” for which a Kentucky court may revoke probation. We hold that revocation is permissible if the violation of military law subjects the violator to a fine or imprisonment.

The Kentucky Supreme Court says yes, because all the court need know for a probation revocation is that additional misconduct happened. The “admission” of guilt inherent in a Chapter 10 request is sufficient to establish a basis for misconduct. Interestingly the subject was charged under Article 92, UCMJ, even though the underlying offenses involved CP.

Our holding should not be construed to mean that a trial court must revoke probation each time a person on probation serving in the armed forces violates a military law. Rather, we simply hold that under Kentucky law, a trial court may revoke probation if a person on probation serving in the armed forces violates military law and the possible punishment for that violation includes a fine or imprisonment. We are confident that trial courts of this Commonwealth will exercise properly their inherent discretion to determine when revocation is appropriate. Any rare instances in which a trial court abuses its discretion may be corrected on appeal. Given the nature of Lopez’s military offense in this case and the close relationship that offense bears to the Kentucky offense for which he was placed on probation, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Lopez’s probation.

So, would Kentucky also include punishment imposed at an Article 15, UCMJ, hearing? Or by summary court-martial?

Or how about this case, also from Virginia – Turner v. Commonwealth, 568 S.E. 2d 468 (2002). We are frequently asked whether a special or general conviction is a felony.

Barry Turner (defendant) was convicted by a jury for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. In proof of the predicate prior felony, the Commonwealth relied upon the earlier conviction of defendant by general court-martial for “Housebreaking,” in violation of Article 130, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 930. Finding the prior offense constituted a felony, we affirm the conviction. However, because the crime was not a “violent felony” contemplated by statute, we reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing. Testifying for the Commonwealth at the related hearing, Thomas J. Lambert, “legal and hearing services officer for the Virginia Department of State Police,” explained, without objection, that military “offenses,” “rules of evidence” and “the like” are “set out” in the “Rules of Courts-Martial,” “the regulatory authority based upon Title 10 of the United States Code,” the UCMJ. Lambert noted that military justice does not identify offenses as felonies or misdemeanors, but jurisdictional distinctions between a “general” and “special” court-martial differentiate crimes by tribunal. A general court-martial, “the … military equivalent of a jury,” “may award any punishment … up to and including the death penalty” and “dishonorable discharge,” while penalties before a “special court-martial” are limited to “[s]ix months confinement,” loss of pay, and “bad conduct discharge.”

Note that the conviction happened before the increase from six to 12 months confinement potential at special court-martial.

Defendant next contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Because his purchase of the offending weapon . . . and “the term `felony’ was never discussed throughout the Army Court Martial,” defendant maintains “there was reasonable doubt as to whether or not [he] was a convicted felon.” We find his argument without merit.

Or how about, In re Inquiry Concerning Judge Robertson, 596 S.E. 2d. 2 (2004).

This matter comes before the Court on the recommendation of the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) that Charles T. Robertson II, Chief Magistrate Judge for the Magistrate Court of Cherokee County, be removed from office because Judge Robertson is ineligible to hold any elected judicial position as a result of his statutory disqualification and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Having reviewed the record of the JQC inquiry, we conclude that Judge Charles T. Robertson II has acted in a manner detrimental to the judiciary and order that he be immediately removed from the bench.

in February 2001, a complaint was filed with the JQC alleging that Judge Robertson’s two general court martials and convictions under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) constituted felony convictions involving crimes of moral turpitude affecting his eligibility to hold public office. See OCGA § 21-2-8. After conducting an investigation the JQC determined that the factual allegations of the complaint were correct and brought formal charges against Judge Robertson on November 12, 2002 to “determine whether he has violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in that he has been previously convicted of crimes that would constitute felonies under Georgia law and thus render Judge Robertson unqualified to serve as Chief Magistrate of the Magistrate Court of Cherokee County.” At the formal hearing held in August of 2003, the JQC and Judge Robertson stipulated, inter alia, that he engaged in the alleged conduct and been subject to military convictions and discipline but that he never received notification that lost his right to vote, to serve on a jury, or to own a firearm, and that he exercised some or all of these rights. He also stipulated that in 1994, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records denied his request for a review of his bad conduct discharge and reaffirmed that the gravity of the charged offenses warranted trial by court-martial and authorized dishonorable discharge, confinement for two years and total pay forfeiture. The JQC issued its findings and recommendations in which it determined by clear and convincing evidence that although the UCMJ does not specifically categorize crimes as felony or misdemeanor, and regardless of the actual sentence imposed, Judge Robertson’s two general court-martial convictions that could have been punished for imprisonment for at least 12 months constituted offenses that are analogous to a felony. See United States v. Moore, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 687, 695-696 (1955) (“[w]e entertain no doubt that an offense serious enough to bear the stigma of a dishonorable discharge possesses the seriousness of felony, and as well bears a heavy content of moral turpitude. We cannot approve of any sort of view which minimizes the gravity of offenses merely because they are of `a military nature’ “). The JQC also found that under Georgia law the military offenses at issue met the statutory definition of a felony as “a crime punishable by death, imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for more than 12 months.” OCGA § 16-1-3(5). It further determined that Judge Robertson’s conviction for the wrongful sale of military property and his conviction for wrongful possession of methamphetamines amounted to crimes involving moral turpitude.

Or how about Disalvatore v. Police Officers’ Education & Training Commission, 753 A. 2d 309 (2000).

Paul F. DiSalvatore petitions for review of the July 1, 1999 order of the Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Commission (Commission) that adopted Hearing Examiner John M. Shugars’ decision denying DiSalvatore certification and revoking his approval to attend police recruit training with the Philadelphia Police Department due to his April 8, 1992 conviction of aggravated assault under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The key issue before us is whether the Commission erred in determining that DiSalvatore’s conviction constituted a “disqualifying criminal offense” such that he is precluded from becoming a municipal police officer. A “disqualifying criminal offense” is defined as “[a] criminal offense for which more than 1 year in prison can be imposed as punishment”. For the reasons that follow, we are compelled to affirm the Commission’s order.

The point of reporting these few cases is to reinforce the complexity of answering a clients questions about the consequences or collateral effects of his or her conviction at court-martial, or in Kentucky, of an OTHIL.

Appellant’s prior crime, the crime of housebreaking, occurs when “[a]ny person subject to [the Uniform Code of Military Justice] . . . unlawfully enters the building or structure of another with intent to commit a criminal offense therein. . . .” 10 U.S.C. § 930. . . . Appellant’s primary argument against this conclusion is that the district court improperly referenced the military court’s discussion of the underlying facts of his conviction. Generally, a court is only to consider “the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. But the district court’s reference in this case to the underlying facts of Appellant’s housebreaking conviction, as articulated in the military court’s opinion, does not change the fact that the elements of housebreaking constitute a generic burglary crime, a crime of violence under our precedents. Further, and contrary to Appellant’s argument, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), did not alter our decisions in regard to generic burglary and does not provide reason for reversal.

See, United States v. Whetzell, No. 09-1463 (8th Cir. February 10, 2010). I have linked to the SCOTUSWiki version of Begay because it has some interesting information about what constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The act defines “violent felony” to include any adult crime punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” This last clause is referred to as the “otherwise” or “residual” clause. The ACCA also defines “serious drug offense” to include offenses under state law “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” Begay v. United States asks whether a felony conviction for driving while intoxicated counts as a “violent felony” under the ACCA.

Sorry, for a headnote cite:

Held: New Mexico’s felony DUI crime falls outside the scope of the Act’s clause (ii) “violent felony” definition. Pp. 3–10. (a) Whether a crime is a violent felony is determined by how the law defines it and not how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion. Pp. 3–4. (b) Even assuming that DUI involves conduct that “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” under clause (ii), the crime falls outside the clause’s scope because it is simply too unlike clause (ii)’s example crimes to indicate that Congress intended that provision to cover it. Pp. 4–10.

So, what are the limits on computer and technology use for those convicted of sex offenses? Although rules may vary, many state lawmakers have begun to advocate for ways to limit sex offenders’ use of technology to find more victims.

And here:

Tracking sex offenders is a complex process. To do it, many states have rolled out tough comprehensive plans. For example, in California, Jessica’s Law has been enacted as a way to provide sex offender management. But with so many people on the sex offender registry list, it has become challenging for law enforcement to effectively track them all. So what is sex offender monitoring?

Findlaw Blotter reports.

Brenda V. Smith American University – Washington College of Law; American University – NIC/WCL Project on Addressing Prison Rape August 1, 2009 Abstract: This publication is part of a larger scholarly project and one in a series that aims to create a “legal toolkit” for addressing sexual violence in custody. This chart catalogues statutes that address adult sex offender registration requirements in all fifty states, as well as surrounding territories. This chart provides a list of all registrable offenses; indicates whether sex offender registration is required for staff sexual misconduct; details the type of information maintained in the sex offender registry, community notification and other websites; identifies limitations on residency or employment; and identifies the duration of registration.

Note, the survey will be accurate only as of publication. Check the statute.