1. Contemporaneous video’s and photos can provide vital evidence for both sides.

Nixon said he remembered Hasan because of “his stature and just how he composed himself — stoic.”

A video of this may have aided both sides. Was he stoic, or was that something else which might be relevant to a forensic health examiner. The demeanor certainly sounds damning. But could it be evidence or reflective of some other mental health disease or defect. For cases that happen on base or at a party or other event there is the potential for video and still photo evidence. Generally law enforcement doesn’t bother to collect it in most cases. As a defense counsel I’ve been able to use these contemporaneous photos to good effect. Defense counsel should always ask witnesses if there were photographs taken at an event. For example in the standard sexual assault case the event often starts at a party or a club. Digital cameras are ubiquitous and party-goers often take pictures. Those pictures may show the complaining witness or the accused at various times during the evening. If the issue is incapacitation, the complaining witness’ demeanor and actions, especially later in the evening, may be relevant. Or perhaps there’s a picture of the complaining witness kissing and cuddling with the accused on the couch, an event she denies, because it goes to a mistake or consent defense.

2. Eyewitness testimony is not as reliable as we believe. This is not a new topic. But we can see how eyewitnesses in stressful situations may not have an accurate, complete, or same memory of events. This raises a concern about post-event interviews of witnesses. The concern is how witnesses who are improperly interviewed may alter their memory to conform to facts learned from others. This is not necessarily deliberate but a psychological effect of being interviewed together with other witnesses or having their statement challenged by the investigator or being shown other statements by the investigator. There’s plenty of research on this. But here are the points from the AP article by Brown & Cracyk.

They have given similar accounts of how the rampage began, saying Hasan fired into a crowded waiting area and then walked around the building, shooting people as they hid under chairs and tables, pausing only to reload.

But have they? Later in the article the writers tell us that:

Only one witness has testified he saw two weapons. Others have said they saw one weapon, but descriptions about the gun have varied.

News reports on this have also varied. A minor difference you say. Maybe.

I’m not convinced as is Mr. McCarthy that this was a deliberate cover-up by the Army. Rather a silly mistake. That Soldier should have been ordered to turn over his cellphone as potential evidence. Once that is done the evidence can be put on an ECD by CID and retained as evidence. Sure the Soldier will be inconvenienced for a short while. But there are very good software programs and tools available to forensic computer examiners to quickly retrieve and preserve such “computer” evidence from the cellphone sim-card or SD card.

Our clients convicted of child pornography offenses and certain other offenses in which the internet is case related are restricted in computer access post-release. I mention Quon because of an interesting comment at Sentencing Law & Policy.

I recently had to deal with the Federal Probation Service and the Air Force Clemency & Parole Board about a former now paroled client alleged to have improperly used computers to search for employment. Employment is necessary for parole, and most state funded employment offices, and many employers require applicants to use computers to search for a job or to apply for a job. We resolved the case in the client’s favor and parole was not revoked. The parole and FPS rules do allow computer use in limited circumstances related to seeking employment. The rules are bureaucratic and subject to misunderstanding. Basically the rules require a new “permission” to use a computer each time. So going to Home Depot in the AM and Lowes in the PM requires two permissions. So, here is the SL&P comment on an aspect of Quon.

Though Quon will be of greatest interest to those involved in traditional debates over privacy and police-practices, the opinion for the Court by Justice Kennedy has this notable flourish that could have some broader impact: Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. Relatedly, in a rich and spot-on solo concurrence that takes a variety of swipes at the majority, Justice Scalia concludes by lamenting the legal challenge presented if and when the Court embraces a legal ruling “that requires evaluating whether a given gadget is a necessary instrument for self-expression, even self-identification.” So, what does this have to do with sentencing law and policy in general or sex offender restrictions in particular? Well, I do not think it is much of a stretch for persons to contend in these modern technological times that access to the internet (and maybe even access to a Facebook or Twitter account) is now “essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.” But, as regular readers know, a fair number of sex offenders these days are facing release conditions that fully or at least significantly restrict their rights to access the internet and/or social networking websites. I suspect that this line from Quon might find its way into a few effort in lower courts to strike down limits placed on some offenders’ use of modern means of digital communication.

CAAF has previously decided some cases about post-release restrictions on military prisoners, but none on this specific restriction. I doubt CAAF would decide an issue of post-release restrictions on the use of computers or the internet. See e.g. United States v. Pena, 64 M.J. 259 (C.A.A.F. 2007)(review of post-trial confinement and release conditions on direct appeal is limited to the impact of such conditions on the findings and the sentence. . . . As a general matter, the collateral administrative consequences of a sentence, such as early release programs, do not constitute punishment for purposes of the criminal law.).

At about 11 a.m. Monday, the Supreme Court will hear one hour of oral argument in City of Ontario, et al., v. Quon, et al. (08-1332). Arguing for the California city and its police department will be Kent L. Richland of Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland in Los Angeles. The federal government, represented by Deputy Solicitor General Neal K. Katyal, will have 10 minutes as amicus urging reversal of the Ninth Circuit Court decision. Representing four individuals who sued the city will be Dieter C. Dammeier of Lackie, Dammeier & McGill in Upland, CA. The ubiquitous personal electronic device — pager, cellphone, “smart phone,” PDA — is emerging as a centerpiece in Digital Age legal controversy, including constitutional disputes when a government agency gets involved in regulating the use of these convenient computer-assisted, hand-held items. The Supreme Court has taken on a case to lay down some basic constitutional ground rules on when the users of those devices — at least in government workplaces — can claim a right of privacy, and sue to enforce the right

We live in a digital age and the police and prosecutors are taking the broadest approach possible to gain access to digital communications. As we move away from a paper based society, where you could expect some privacy from government’s prying eyes, the government’s attitude is that communication in the “clouds” waives all expectations of privacy. The only restrictions, and none enforceable by suppression motion in a criminal case, are those imposed by statutes such as the, ancient, ECPA, and the Stored Communications Act.

SCOTUSBlog has an excellent summary of the case.

Monday the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in City of Ontario v. Quon, No. 08-1332. (Linked to SCOTUSWiki).

Issues: (1) Whether a SWAT team member has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages transmitted on his SWAT pager, where the police department has an official no-privacy policy but a non-policymaking lieutenant announced an informal policy of allowing some personal use of the pagers; (2) Whether individuals who send text messages to a SWAT team member’s SWAT pager have a reasonable expectation that their messages will be free from review by the recipient’s government employer. The petition tests whether there is a constitutionally-based right of privacy in text messages for employees of a government agency and, if there is such a right, whether it is less extensive for city employees using government-owned electronic pagers. The case involved the city’s review of text messages that a member of a police SWAT, or emergency response, team had sent to another officer with whom he was having a romantic affair, and also messages he had sent to his wife. The Supreme Court’s final decision in the case is expected to amplify or modify a 1987 decision, O’Connor v. Ortega, recognizing some workplace privacy for public employees, but counseling that courts should take into account the “operational realties of the workplace.” Although the Court agreed to hear the city’s petition, it denied review of a separate appeal by the provider of the city’s pager service, seeking to test the scope of the federal Stored Communications Act as it applied to disclosure of the context of text messages (USA Mobility Wireless v. Quon, et al., 08-1472).

O’Connor is a workplace search case and the scope of a reasonable expectation of privacy at work. Here’s some headnote law:

Searches and seizures by government employers or supervisors of the private property of their employees are subject to Fourth Amendment restraints. An expectation of privacy in one’s place of work is based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment. However, the operational realities of the workplace may make some public employees’ expectations of privacy unreasonable [480 U.S. 709, 710] when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official. Some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. Given the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Because the record does not reveal the extent to which hospital officials may have had work-related reasons to enter respondent’s office, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the matter to the District Court for its further determination. However, a majority of this Court agrees with the determination of the Court of Appeals that respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. Regardless of any expectation of privacy in the office itself, the undisputed evidence supports the conclusion that respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets. Pp. 714-719. In determining the appropriate standard for a search conducted by a public employer in areas in which an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy, what is a reasonable search depends on the context within which the search takes place, and requires balancing the employee’s legitimate expectation of privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. Requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wishes to enter an employee’s office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unreasonable. Moreover, requiring a probable cause standard for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. Their intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable.

CAAF has already developed some approaches to cloud communications. It will be interesting to see whether the Roberts’ court upholds privacy protections or a no-hands-holds-or scanner barred approach to modern day communications.

An Army prosecutor Tuesday opened the trial of an Iraq war veteran by accusing him of the “ultimate betrayal” — raping a comrade’s wife. Spc. Philip C. Vermeiren, 28, is accused of assaulting the woman early Oct. 31 during an alcohol-fueled party at the Fort Carson apartment she shared with her husband. Defense attorneys countered that Vermeiren is guilty only of poor judgment — sharing a brief, consensual sexual encounter with the woman after other revelers had passed out drunk and her husband had stepped out to buy cigarettes.

tdtnews.com reports that:

A Fort Hood soldier who failed to deploy with his unit to Iraq in December 2007 will spend at least 27 days in the Bell County jail.

Navy Times reports that:

A senior chief from Carrier Strike Group 8 will serve 18 months in the brig after pleading guilty to possessing child pornography.

[W]e find that Stengart had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mails she exchanged with her attorney on Loving Care’s laptop. Stengart plainly took steps to protect the privacy of those e-mails and shield them from her employer. She used a personal, password-protected e-mail account instead of her company e-mail address and did not save the account’s password on her computer. In other words, she had a subjective expectation of privacy in messages to and from her lawyer discussing the subject of a future lawsuit. In light of the language of the Policy and the attorney-client nature of the communications, her expectation of privacy was also objectively reasonable. As noted earlier, the Policy does not address the use of personal, web-based e-mail accounts accessed through company equipment. It does not address personal accounts at all. Nor does it warn employees that the contents of e-mails sent via personal accounts can be forensically retrieved and read by the company. Indeed, in acknowledging that occasional personal use of e-mail is permitted, the Policy created doubt about whether those e-mails are company or private property.

Here is a case from Massachusetts of some interest, Commonwealth v. Williams, 2010 Mass. App. LEXIS 384 (March 31, 2010).

Seizure of defendant’s clothing from a hospital ER was without exigent circumstances and violated his expectation of privacy. “Nor does the record reflect that obtaining a warrant before the police seized the clothes was impracticable. The detective’s generic testimony that ‘sooner [is] better’ is insufficient to establish the exigency.”

Thanks to fourthamendment.com

So, what are the limits on computer and technology use for those convicted of sex offenses? Although rules may vary, many state lawmakers have begun to advocate for ways to limit sex offenders’ use of technology to find more victims.

And here:

Tracking sex offenders is a complex process. To do it, many states have rolled out tough comprehensive plans. For example, in California, Jessica’s Law has been enacted as a way to provide sex offender management. But with so many people on the sex offender registry list, it has become challenging for law enforcement to effectively track them all. So what is sex offender monitoring?

Findlaw Blotter reports.

Ohio holds today (4-3) that a cell phone search requires a warrant without exigent circumstances. Therefore, it was not subject to a search incident. Today’s cell phones are analogous to a computer. State v. Smith, 2009 Ohio 6426 (December 15, 2009).

FourthAmendment blog reports. Seems there ought to be similar results for a military search and that the fruits of a warrantless search should similarly be excluded at court-martial.