The former Coast Guard Sector Anchorage Commander was awarded the maximum allowable punishment at an Admiral’s Mast Friday and will retire on July 1 in the grade of lieutenant with a general discharge in lieu of trial by a general court-martial. Capt. Herbert M. Hamilton, III, was relieved of command in May 2009. An investigation conducted by the Coast Guard Investigative Service revealed that Hamilton had inappropriate relationships with several women, including officer and enlisted Coast Guard members, and civilians, over a period of more than 13 years. Hamilton also was charged with misusing government computers and cell phones; making false official statements; and soliciting an enlisted member to destroy evidence. His retirement as a lieutenant in lieu of trial by a general court-martial is the result of a pretrial agreement and Hamilton’s unsatisfactory service in the grades of captain, commander, and lieutenant commander.

Thanks to cgblog.org.

2. Hennis. I’m sure you are now aware that Hennis was convicted of three premeditated murder charges in less than three hours of deliberation. The sentencing part of the trial began today.

Military jurors began sentencing hearings Friday to determine if a soldier convicted of murder in the slayings of a North Carolina mother and her two children will get the death penalty or life in prison.

Here’s another interesting take on the prosecution of Hennis by an editor who believes he’s guilty.

WRAL.com has this “victim impact” information about the Hennis case.

3. Hasan has now arrived at Belton County Jail where he will likely stay until he is sentenced.

Maj. Nidal Hasan was airlifted from a San Antonio military hospital to the Bell County Jail in Belton about 4 a.m. Friday. He had been at the military hospital since shortly after the Nov. 5 shooting spree that left him paralyzed.

4. A fraud through faked service:

A man who falsely claimed a chestful of military medals was sentenced to a year in prison and was ordered to repay $11,098 in veterans benefits he shouldn’t have received. Thomas Barnhart, 59, had 21 years of legitimate Navy and Coast Guard service, including offshore duty in Vietnam. But starting in 1979, he began inflating his experience in claims for promotions and benefits, Assistant U.S. Attorney Jake Jacobsen told U.S. District Judge James Turk today in Roanoke.

5. You may have been following the issue of DoD wanting to shut down WikiLeaks, and in particular the issue of a recently released video of an Apache helicopter attack. Political Theatrics has this post.

Wikileaks released a 17-minute video on April 5th which depicted an Apache helicopter opening fire on a group of innocent Iraqi’s in New Baghdad in 2007; two of those killed were Reuters Journalists carrying their camera bags over their shoulders – Namir Noor-Eldeen, 22 and Saeed Chmagh, 40. On Monday evening, the Pentagon acknowledged and verified the legitimacy of the video.

Consortiumnews.com has another article on this subject.

Not only did a U.S. military helicopter gunship mow them down amid macho jokes and chuckling – after mistaking a couple of cameras for weapons – but the American attackers then blew away several Iraqis who arrived in a van and tried to take one of the wounded newsmen to a hospital. Two children in the van were badly wounded. “Well, it’s their fault for bringing their kids into a battle,” one American remarked.

6. Capital Flyer has more dire warnings on the career impact of a DUI.

7. FayObserver has this piece on the Pernell Article 32, UCMJ, hearing ongoing at Fort Bragg.

A Fort Bragg soldier accused of a rape and break-ins on post told an investigator he heard a voice in his head called Jason that told him to do “bad things,” according to testimony at an Article 32 hearing.

Appellant’s prior crime, the crime of housebreaking, occurs when “[a]ny person subject to [the Uniform Code of Military Justice] . . . unlawfully enters the building or structure of another with intent to commit a criminal offense therein. . . .” 10 U.S.C. § 930. . . . Appellant’s primary argument against this conclusion is that the district court improperly referenced the military court’s discussion of the underlying facts of his conviction. Generally, a court is only to consider “the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. But the district court’s reference in this case to the underlying facts of Appellant’s housebreaking conviction, as articulated in the military court’s opinion, does not change the fact that the elements of housebreaking constitute a generic burglary crime, a crime of violence under our precedents. Further, and contrary to Appellant’s argument, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), did not alter our decisions in regard to generic burglary and does not provide reason for reversal.

See, United States v. Whetzell, No. 09-1463 (8th Cir. February 10, 2010). I have linked to the SCOTUSWiki version of Begay because it has some interesting information about what constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The act defines “violent felony” to include any adult crime punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” This last clause is referred to as the “otherwise” or “residual” clause. The ACCA also defines “serious drug offense” to include offenses under state law “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” Begay v. United States asks whether a felony conviction for driving while intoxicated counts as a “violent felony” under the ACCA.

Sorry, for a headnote cite:

Held: New Mexico’s felony DUI crime falls outside the scope of the Act’s clause (ii) “violent felony” definition. Pp. 3–10. (a) Whether a crime is a violent felony is determined by how the law defines it and not how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion. Pp. 3–4. (b) Even assuming that DUI involves conduct that “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” under clause (ii), the crime falls outside the clause’s scope because it is simply too unlike clause (ii)’s example crimes to indicate that Congress intended that provision to cover it. Pp. 4–10.