He had been convicted and sentenced to 14 years of confinement.

We raised many issues during his appeal. The Army Court found a serious error by the military judge in denying the defense presenting evidence of other sexual acts of the alleged victim. This issue usually comes up in a Military Rule of Evidence 412 motion. Here, the military judge botched it.

Basically the rule prohibits witnesses or cross-examination about prior sexual behavior of the alleged victim. However, there are exceptions: (1) the evidence shows someone else did it or caused physical injuries. For example, consensual sex–any sexual penetration–can cause physical injury to the vagina, so the alleged victim having had sex with another person the day before the alleged assault could be admissible as an exception; (2) because the conduct is what is called res gestae (all part of the same acts or events); (3) when the Constitution requires it. For example, to present evidence of mistake of fact as to consent, or significant attacks on the credibility of the alleged victim. As military defense lawyers, we have a lot of experience litigating these issues and also have experts who can assist in presenting the case.

The Army court touched on other issues in connection with how the prosecutor and special victim’s counsel conducted the case.

Because the error was so prejudicial, the charges have been dismissed. The next step is whether the prosecution will appeal or whether there will be a new trial.

Retrials are difficult. As military defense counsel, we have done retrials. All the prior discovery, evidence, and witnesses have to be gathered up so that both sides can prepare for trial. Because retrials are difficult, the Army has created a specialized organization at Fort Leavenworth to work on these cases.

1. If a victim testifies on sentencing–the rules of evidence apply the same as any other witness. Article 6b does not waive the rules of evidence when a victim testifies in sentencing. (Note, the victim gave both sworn and unsworn statements.) Failure to follow the rules (even without defense objection) gets the defense and government, and court to agree there was an error and to get a new sentencing hearing.[1]

2. It is NEVER EVER a good idea for an accused (or one of his witnesses)[2] to impeach the verdict. Gone are the days when we could legally seek reconsideration of the findings, even through sentencing. The legitimate tactic at the time was to present the accused’s version of events through his unsworn and then argue that the members may wish to reconsider the findings.

While impeaching the verdict is prohibited it is usually not a good idea to poke a finger in the eye of the members who have just convicted you and now are giving a sentence.

Although an accused is provided a wide berth in the content of his unsworn statement, there are certain limits in what matters he may raise before the sentencing authority. United States v. Grill, 48 M.J. 131 (C.A.A.F. 1998). Specifically, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has recognized that an accused is generally prohibited from impeaching the findings of the factfinder.

United States v. Porter, No. ARMY 20110470, 2013 CCA LEXIS 946, at *8 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2013). Note, Porter arose from TC arguing that the accused had failed to impeach the verdict, “Appellant now complains that trial counsel’s repeated comments during a sentencing argument that appellant never denied the assault during his unsworn statement was improper argument. We agree.”

[1] There may have been a get-out for the prosecution, but it was likely not raised at trial or on appeal–else the court would have addressed it.

[2] See, e.g., United States v. Westcott, ACM 39936, 2022 CCA LEXIS 156 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2022) (unpub.) rev. denied 82 M.J. 438 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

The defense requests disclosure of the following items in advance of any UCMJ art. 32, preliminary hearing. The request is a continuing one in accordance with UCMJ arts. 32((a)(2)(D) and46; Rules 701, 703, 405(a), (e), (1), (f)(7), (h)(3)(A), Rules for Courts-Martial, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019),; Mil. R. Evid. 304(d)(1), 404(b), 705; United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Briggs, 48 M.J. 143, 144 (C.A.A.F. 1999); and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also, Uniform Rules of Practice before Air Force Courts-Martial, dated 1 October 2020; Rules 3.2 & 3.3; AFI 51‑201; AFGM2020-02, Administration of Military Justice, dated 5 October 2020, paragraph 5.12; AFI 51-110, Professional Responsibility Program, dated 11 December 2018, Attachment 2 (Air Force Rules of Professional Conduct); Rules 3.3, 3.4, 3.8 & 4.2 and Attachment 7 (Air Force Standards for Criminal Justice), Chapter 5. These items are relevant under UCMJ art. 32(a)(2)(D) and which calls upon the preliminary hearing officer to make a referral recommendation. NOTE: In the event charges are referred to trial, this disclosure request immediately becomes the FIRST defense discovery request.

Interestingly, in Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009) the Supreme Court court suggests that the duty to provide Brayd[-plus] disclosures may be broader under a prosecutors ethical obligations. The military prosecutor’s ethical rules are:

• Rule 3.8(d), Air Force Instruction 51-110, Professional Responsibility Program.
• Rule 3.8.d, Army Regulation 27-26, Rules of Professional Conduct.
• U. S. Coast Guard, Legal Professional Responsibility Program, COMDTINST M5800.1.
• Rule 3.8.a(4), Judge Advocate General Instruction 5803.1, Professional Conduct of Attorney’s, applicable to both Navy and Marine Corps judge advocates.

We think an early Request is especially important in speedy trial situations–the client is in pretrial confinement or has been placed on restriction. The point is to make the prosecution either respond (thus showing some forward movement) or do nothing, in which case you may have an argument for a lack of reasonable diligence if the discovery comes much later. Remember,

“[O]nce an appellant is placed in pretrial confinement the Government is required to exercise “reasonable diligence” in bringing the accused to trial.” United States v. Danylo, 73 M.J. 183, 186 (C.A.A.F. 2014) citing United States v. Kossman, 38 M.J. 258, 262 (C.M.A. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Keep in mind that “The prosecution is deemed to have knowledge of information that is readily available to it. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437; Williams v. Whitley, 940 F.2d 132, 133 (5th Cir. 1991); see Smith, 50 F.3d at 831. See generally United States v. Combs, 267 F.3d 1167, 1172-75 (10th Cir. 2001). Knowledge by any member of the prosecutor’s office is, and must be, imputed to any individual prosecutor responding to this demand, and because of the unusual role of a convening authority and staff judge advocate in the prosecutorial process this would include the convening authority and the SJA. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Martinez v. Wainwright, 621 F.2d 184, 186-87 (5^th Cir. 1980). Additionally, and along the same line, the knowledge of governmental agencies connected with the investigation at bar is also imputed to any prosecutor responding to this demand. Gibbs v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 253, 256 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2nd Cir. 1998); Fero v. Kirby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1472 n. 12 (10th Cir. 1994) cert. denied 515 U.S. 1122 (1995). Indeed, the prosecution is the only government agency with a Kyles duty to the accused. Mowbray v. Cameron County, 274 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 2001).”

The question in the title of this post is prompted by a new student note by Amanda Harris, which is titled “Surpassing Sentencing: The Controversial Next Step in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence” and is available here via the Florida Law Review. Here is the abstract: After Crawford v. Washington opened the door to a Confrontation Clause debate in 2004, the United States Supreme Court has consistently confronted confrontation issues arising out of the Crawford interpretation. One issue that the Supreme Court has not yet tackled is whether the Confrontation Clause applies during non-capital and capital sentencing. While many states and federal courts continue to hold that no right of confrontation during sentencing exists, many other courts have chosen to apply a right of confrontation in both capital and non-capital sentencing. This Note takes two new approaches to the Confrontation Clause at sentencing debate. First, this Note addresses both the text of the Sixth Amendment and the history surrounding the Confrontation Clause to conclude that the right of confrontation should apply during sentencing, or at least during capital sentencing. Second, this Note rejects the rationale that Williams v. New York is the controlling precedent in the confrontation at sentencing debate. Under this approach, applying the Confrontation Clause at sentencing may be the next logical step in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.

Quoting Prof. Berman TG.

AS THE NOTE POINTS OUT, THIS IS AN ISSUE UNDECIDED BY THE SUPREMES, but that there is a split among some courts.

Object. You will have to cite to McDonald and George. Unless that is done the client won’t get a (an admittedly difficult to get) shot at the Supremes.

For an example of a case in which the government forfeited its right to object to the defendant’s admission of hearsay from a declarant whom the government rendered unavailable, consider the recent opinion of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Leal-Del Carmen, 2012 WL 4040253 (9th Cir. 2012).

Prof. Miller concludes:

Because the court thus found that the government caused Garcia-Garcia to be unavailable for trial and had the intent to render her unavailable for trial, it concluded that forfeiture by wrongdoing applied: “Because the government was responsible for rendering Garcia–Garcia unavailable as a witness, admission of the videotape would prevent it from benefiting from its own wrongdoing.” This conclusion is also consistent with another part of the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which states that “[t]he wrongdoing need not consist of a criminal act.”

See e.g., United States v. Jones, ARMY 20090401 (A. Ct. Crim. App. December 14, 2011), Appellant was accused of effectively “Equating MOS trainees to permanent party – grandmothers to toads” The court cites to Wikipedia for the proposition that the expression “WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apples_and_oranges (a Serbian expression akin to the familiar “apples to oranges” idiom in English) (last visited Dec. 1, 2011); in United States v. Magalhaes, NMCCA 200602480 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. February 21, 2008), the court cites to Wikipedia for the definition of the Pythagorean Theorem; in United States v. Ober, ACCA again resorts to Wikipedia for discussion of Kazza one of the early “programs” used to exchange many things over the internet, but for our purposes CP (which was also done in State v. Ballard, 2012-NMCA-043, ¶ 19 n.1, 276 P.3d 976 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012)(citing Wikipedia to define “peer-to-peer file sharing”).).

But the Fire Insurance Exchange court cites to these several cases and there is an interesting discussion of Wikipedia.

Citing Wikipedia is as controversial as it is common.2 Some courts approve it, others condemn it. Compare United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 650 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that the court is “troubled by Wikipedia’s lack of reliability”), Bing Shun Li v. Holder, 400 Fed. App’x 854, 857-58 (5th Cir. 2010) (expressing “disapproval of the [immigration judge]’s reliance on Wikipedia and [warning] against any improper reliance on it or similarly unreliable internet sources in the future”), Badasa v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 909, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting Wikipedia’s acknowledgment that, “at any given moment,” an entry “could be in the middle of a large edit or it could have been recently vandalized” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), and In re Marriage of Lamoure, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“We do not consider Wikipedia a sufficiently reliable source” for defining the term “noncustodial.”), with Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Wikipedia entry, in the context of an Eighth Amendment challenge, for the proposition that an anal fissure “is no fun at all”), United States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 18 & n.12 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Wikipedia for its definition of “sovereign citizen movement,” one of a criminal defendant’s “atypical legal beliefs”), Murdock v. Astrue, 458 Fed. App’x 702, 705 n.3 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Wikipedia for “some examples of block lengths from cities in this country”), and State v. Ballard, 2012-NMCA-043, ¶ 19 n.1, 276 P.3d 976 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012)(citing Wikipedia to define “peer-to-peer file sharing”).

Mil. R. Evid. 609(b) issues of impeachment with a prior conviction rarely come up at court-martial. But if there were to be a prior conviction there may be some interpretation necessary. So parsing several posts of Prof. Colin Miller the Great at Evidence Prof Blog, here we go.

If you want to find an especially terrible analysis of Rule 609(b), you need to look no further than the recent opinion of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Colon, 2012 WL 1368162 (11th Cir. 2012). Even worse, that terrible analysis meant that the Eleventh Circuit sidestepped the most interesting issue in the case.

So, today’s post:

So, what constitutes “confinement” for Rule 609(b)? This was an issue that the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida did not need to address in its recent opinion in United States v. Sararo, 2012 WL 3041182 (M.D.Fla. 2012). But that didn’t stop the court from implying that a period of probation constituted “confinement” for Rule 609(b) purposes. . . . . I’m not sure what import to give to the court’s statement on probation as “confinement.” Was the court simply saying that even if probation is confinement, Meehan’s convictions were still more than ten years’ old? Or was the court implying that probation does constitute “confinement” for Rule 609(b) purposes? I don’t know, but the issue already could have been resolved when the Eleventh Circuit recently should have, but did not, address the issue.

In Colon the most interesting issue was whether a suspended sentence is “confinement” for Mil. R. Evid. 609(b) purposes, and the issue in Sararo related to probation after a conviction.

Supreme Court Watch: Williams v. Illinois: Confrontation Clause – Pending Decisions Confrontation Clause: More Notice and Demand Rules? Supreme Court Watch Open Issue: Confrontation Clause – Resolving An Open Issue on the Scope Of Dying Declarations Circuit Split: Waiving An Objection to a Stipulation Under the Confrontation Clause Circuit Split: Admission Of Pre-Miranda Silence Circuit Split: Whether the Rule of Completeness Allows Inadmissible Evidence to be Admitted? More Judicial Criticism of the “Inextricable Intertwinement” Theory Rule Amendments: “Restyling” Federal Rules of Evidence Pending Rule Amendment: FRE 803(10) – Absence of Public Record Cameras In The Courtroom: Increasing Requests for Televising Supreme Court Proceedings

On item 8., which will depend on how the President “adopts” the restyling. Interesting that there may be issues surrounding implementation of the restyled rules.

The FRE were “restyled” by amendments effective December 1, 2011. The amendments were intended to make the rules easier to use and were not intended to result in substantive changes. As the restyled rules are applied, one question will be whether language differences in the new version result over time in substantive modifications.

On item 7., on how 404(b) is applied. This is an issue I frequently raise when the prosecution makes was is termed a ‘talismanic incantation,’ which lacks specificity to the offenses charged argument for admissibility.

Nearly every circuit has recognized the “inextricable intertwinement” theory (or “inextricably intertwined” doctrine). Several circuits have cautioned about admission of uncharged evidence in a case as part of the “inextricably intertwined” exception to FRE 404(b). Recently, this doctrine has come under increasing judicial criticism. . . . SeeUnited States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he inextricable intertwinement doctrine has since become overused, vague, and quite unhelpful. To ensure that there are no more doubts about the court’s position on this issue — the inextricable intertwinement doctrine has outlived its usefulness. Henceforth, resort to inextricable intertwinement is unavailable when determining a theory of admissibility.”)[.] Saltzburg, Martin and Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, Paragraph 404.02[12] (10th ed. 2012) (discussing issue at length and concluding, “The ‘inextricably intertwined’ exception substitutes a careful analysis with boilerplate jargon.”).

See e.g., United States v. Peterson, 20 M.J. 806 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985)(We abhor the “shotgun” application of rule 404(b) and will not accept the “talismanic incantation” of the words motive, intent, plan or design, modus operandi, etc., with nothing more.); United States v. Jenkins, 48 M.J. 594 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1998)(It is not necessary “that relevant evidence fit snugly into a pigeon hole provided by Mil. R. Evid. 404(b).” Nevertheless, the profferer should delineate the theories of admissibility, as occurred here, and not simply render a talismanic incantation of all the bases listed in the rule, as often occurs.) And see United States v. Yammine, 69 M.J. 70 (C.A.A.F. 2010), in regard to Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) and 414. ARTICLE: The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 575 (1990).

And don’t forget that even though evidence might initially be admissible under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b), you still need to have the judge balance admissibility under Mil. R. Evid. 403. See e.g. United States v. Ferguson, 29 M.J. 559 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989), pet. denied 32 M.J. 45 (C.M.A. 1990).

Here is a link to last years list.

Judge Ed Carnes for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Rodriguez, No. 08-16696, Dec. 22, 2010: This case poses the question of whether there is a vindictive judge or cowardly counsel exception to the contemporaneous objection rule. Unless there is such an exception, the only issue that the appellant is pressing on appeal is barred for failure to object because she cannot meet the requirements of the plain error rule. Disagreeing with the Second Circuit, we hold that the possibility a judge may be unhappy with an objection does not excuse the failure to make it.

H/tip to crimeandconsequences.com

On December 1, 2010, a new amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence takes effect. The rule concerns the admission of statements against interest under FRE 804(b)(3) has been amended so that the corroborating circumstances requirement for admission of a declaration against interest applies to statements against penal interest introduced by the government as well as those by the defendant in criminal cases. This requirement previously applied to statements introduced by the defendant.

See Mil. R. Evid. 1102. Thanks to FederalEvidenceReview for the reminder.

Under this Rule, then, it is clear that a party cannot impeach a witness through evidence that the witness has a prior misdemeanor conviction for a crime not involving dishonesty or false statement. But does a witness open the door for such impeachment by testifying that he only completed the Eleventh grade if the reason that he did not complete his high school education was the conviction? According to the recent opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama in Beemon v. State, 2010 WL 4380238 (Ala.Crim.App. 2010), the answer is “no.”

The prosecution had argued that the accused’s testimony had “opened the door.” The appeals court also rejected that basis for admission. Of interest though, for trial counsel, and for defense counsel to be looking out for, was this part of the court’s opinion.

the issue was blatantly interjected into the trial by the prosecution. The State cannot open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence based upon its own line of examination….

The case of United States v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 8, 2008) (Nos. 06-3088, 06-3089, 07-3016), noted by federalevidence.com, reminds us of this point.

Cross-examination might expose errors or inconsistencies in the chart. At which point the parties can refer to the original documents if necessary. Assuming the errors or inconsistencies are identified and cross-examined on the testimony is then judged as to its weight not admissibility.

1. Contemporaneous video’s and photos can provide vital evidence for both sides.

Nixon said he remembered Hasan because of “his stature and just how he composed himself — stoic.”

A video of this may have aided both sides. Was he stoic, or was that something else which might be relevant to a forensic health examiner. The demeanor certainly sounds damning. But could it be evidence or reflective of some other mental health disease or defect. For cases that happen on base or at a party or other event there is the potential for video and still photo evidence. Generally law enforcement doesn’t bother to collect it in most cases. As a defense counsel I’ve been able to use these contemporaneous photos to good effect. Defense counsel should always ask witnesses if there were photographs taken at an event. For example in the standard sexual assault case the event often starts at a party or a club. Digital cameras are ubiquitous and party-goers often take pictures. Those pictures may show the complaining witness or the accused at various times during the evening. If the issue is incapacitation, the complaining witness’ demeanor and actions, especially later in the evening, may be relevant. Or perhaps there’s a picture of the complaining witness kissing and cuddling with the accused on the couch, an event she denies, because it goes to a mistake or consent defense.

2. Eyewitness testimony is not as reliable as we believe. This is not a new topic. But we can see how eyewitnesses in stressful situations may not have an accurate, complete, or same memory of events. This raises a concern about post-event interviews of witnesses. The concern is how witnesses who are improperly interviewed may alter their memory to conform to facts learned from others. This is not necessarily deliberate but a psychological effect of being interviewed together with other witnesses or having their statement challenged by the investigator or being shown other statements by the investigator. There’s plenty of research on this. But here are the points from the AP article by Brown & Cracyk.

They have given similar accounts of how the rampage began, saying Hasan fired into a crowded waiting area and then walked around the building, shooting people as they hid under chairs and tables, pausing only to reload.

But have they? Later in the article the writers tell us that:

Only one witness has testified he saw two weapons. Others have said they saw one weapon, but descriptions about the gun have varied.

News reports on this have also varied. A minor difference you say. Maybe.

I’m not convinced as is Mr. McCarthy that this was a deliberate cover-up by the Army. Rather a silly mistake. That Soldier should have been ordered to turn over his cellphone as potential evidence. Once that is done the evidence can be put on an ECD by CID and retained as evidence. Sure the Soldier will be inconvenienced for a short while. But there are very good software programs and tools available to forensic computer examiners to quickly retrieve and preserve such “computer” evidence from the cellphone sim-card or SD card.

“Now what I want is, Facts.. . . Stick to Facts Sir!” (Charles Dickens, Hard Times, p. 1, Oxford World’s Classics, 1998.)

Evidence may be admissible under Mil. R. Evid. 803(8) as an exception to the hearsay rule. Prof. Colin Miller reminds us that the exception is intended to cover recorded facts, not opinions.

And, like its federal counterpart, [Mil. R. Evid.] 901(b)(4) provides that By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule: (4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. – Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.

Prof. Miller cites to United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000). Note that in the case cited the counsel had failed to object and preserve the objection.

There are (typically) several evidentiary/admissibility issues that frequently come up when the prosecution wants to admit emails (or text messages). My experience generally is that someone, usually the witness or law enforcement have selectively provided an email which is then cut-and-pasted for the “relevant” part by law enforcement. Usually law enforcement does not ask the witness to provide the full email or text string. That cherry-picked email or text message is then emailed to the trial counsel, the trial counsel prints out the email, and the trial counsel offers the item, the trial counsel also failing to recover the full email or text string. By the time you get to court there are issues of whether the email string or text string is available because of the passage of time. Trial counsel don’t seem to blush at this failure to preserve potential evidence.

1. Completeness under Mil. R. Evid. 106. The defense should always require production and discovery of the whole email or text chain where it is obvious that the proffered exhibit is a part of a chain. Why, well because other parts of the email chain may set up a contradiction or help to explain what is being offered. So for example NCIS supplies the trial counsel with an email from the complaining witness in which the accused says, “OK, I did it.” But what they don’t supply is the other parts of the email in which the accused also explains, “I did it because you told me I could.” It would seem to me that a portion of an email or text message is unreliable. That the message can only become reliable once the whole string is produced. The whole string being part of “the circumstances.”

2. Completeness under Mil. R. Evid. 304(h)(2).

Completeness. If only part of an alleged admission or confession is introduced against the accused, the defense, by cross-examination or otherwise, may introduce the remaining portions of the statement.

And don’t forget about United States v. Rodriguez, 56 M.J. 336 (C.A.A.F. 2002), and United States v. Gilbride, 56 M.J. 428 (C.A.A.F. 2002) on the general issue of completeness under Mil. R. Evid. 304(h)(2).

3. Who is the witness. The trial counsel who printed out the piece of evidence that is typically being introduced. You can tell because their name is blazoned on the top of the document courtesy of Outlook print functions.

Take a look at United States v. Taylor, 61 M.J. 157 (C.A.A.F. ); United States v. Johnson, ACM 34889, 2004 LEXIS 133 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App. May 21, 2004).

Federal Rule of Evidence 605 provides that The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point. Conversely, Federal Rule of Evidence 614(b) provides that “[t]he court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party,” and Federal Rule of Evidence 614(c) provides that Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is not present. In other words, a party does not need to object to judicial testimony to preserve the point for appeal, but a party does need to object to judicial interrogation to preserve the point for appeal (although the party can object outside the presence of the jury). Does this make sense? Let’s consider the recent opinion of the First Circuit in United States v. Santana-Perez, 2010 WL 3491143 (1st Cir. 2010).

And here is how Professor Miller concludes the practical question of what to do rather than what’s the rule.

If a judge is testifying and a party objects, I could see the judge feeling that his integrity had been attacked. It seems to me, however, that the judge would mostly feel that his competence had been attacked and not that he was favoring one side over the other. And, of course, if the judge were indeed testifying, it would be clear that he made a mistake, and the trial could move on. But, if a judge engages in overly aggressive interrogation and a party objects, it is hard to see how the judge could take the objection as anything but the party calling his integrity into question. Moreover, because it is not a black and white issue like judicial testimony, it is easy to see the objection having lingering effects. I thus don’t see why an objection to judicial interrogation is required by an objection to judicial testimony is not.

Rodriguez and Gilbride deal with Mil. R. Evid. 304(h)(2) rule of completeness. Mil. R. Evid. 304(h)(2) is a longstanding rule of completeness pertaining to confessions introduced against an accused. See, United States v. Rodriguez, 56 M.J. 336, 341-42 (C.A.A.F. 2002), the rule applies to oral as well as written statements. United States v. Gilbride, 56 M.J. 425 (C.A.A.F. 2002). This is a different rule than Mil. R. Evid. 106.

In deciding the military judge erred in his application of Mil. R. Evid. 304(h)(2), NMCCA identified six non-exclusive factors to consider on the issue.

In deciding whether the military judge abused his discretion, the following non-exhaustive list of factors can be gleaned from Rodriguez: (1) Has the prosecution attempted to “pick out the incriminating words in the statement or discussion and put them in evidence while at the same time excluding the remainder of the statement or conversation, in which the appellant sought to explain the incriminating passages”? (2) Is the appellant’s subsequent statement separate and unrelated from the subject matter of the original confession, or is it part of or the product of the same transaction or course of action? (3) What is the elapsed time between the two statements, and were they made at different places and to a different set of persons? (4) Was the second statement made at the specific request of the appellant or the Government? (5) Was the defense invoking the rule of completeness as a matter of fairness, or merely attempting to present evidence of a defense without subjecting the appellant to cross-examination? (6) Did the appellant engage in a “pattern of deception with a variety of persons, and then argue that belated candor in a different setting justifies the introduction of otherwise inadmissible hearsay”?

The NMCCA took great pains to distinguish their ruling as “on the facts of this case.” Thus distinguishing the case from Rodriquez and Harvey. This being a non-constitutional error NMCCA evaluated the impact of the military judge’s error for prejudice.

After weighing the Kerr factors, we find that the Government has failed to demonstrate that the error did not have a substantial influence on the findings. On the contrary, we find that the exclusion of the initial statement, coupled with the admission of a “supplement” to that statement, substantially mislead the members as to the appellant’s actual admissions. Under these facts, while the 30 November 2008 statement may not have been necessary to reach an understanding as to what the appellant was saying in the 26 January 2009 statement, what the members would have understood based on the truncated 26 January statement standing alone was misleading. We therefore set aside the findings of guilty for aggravated sexual assault, Charge II, Specification 1.

The conviction of aggravated sexual assault was set-aside with the direction to hold a sentence rehearing if the CA decides not to pursue a new trial on the sexual assault charge.

United States v. Erickson, ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir. July 12, 2010).

In conspiracy to distribute controlled substances prosecution, physician-defendant could not assert that the medical records of his patients were subject to a doctor-patient privilege because the federal courts do not recognize this privilege under FRE 501, in United States v. Bek, 493 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. July 6, 2007) (No. 05-4198)

It is easy to overlook that the a physician-patient confidential communications privilege is not recognized in the trial of federal question matters. As adopted by Congress, the Federal Rules of Evidence fail to explicitly allow for this privilege.

I have done several posts on this blog (here, here, here, here, here, and here) about the inaccuracy of regular and cross-racial eyewitness identifications and whether expert testimony about this inaccuracy should be allowed. In a recent post, I noted that “My general sense is that most courts allow such expert testimony although a decent number of courts, such as the Eleventh Circuit and Minnesota courts, preclude it.” That post addressed a recent opinion in which the Supreme Court of Utah reversed past precedent and allow for the admission of expert testimony on the inaccuracy of eyewitness identifications. This post addresses a recent opinion, State v. Young, 2010 WL 1286933 (La. 2010), in which the Supreme Court of Louisiana adhered to prior precedent and refused to allow for the admission of expert testimony on the inaccuracy of eyewitness identifications.