I. Structure and Purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922 contains over twenty subsections. Each establishes different restrictions or obligations. Collectively, they regulate the conduct of both individual citizens and licensed dealers, with specific prohibitions tied to criminal history, age, geography, and status (e.g., military, law enforcement, noncitizen). Violations can result in serious criminal penalties, including felony charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924.

II. Key Provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922

A. Subsection (a): Interstate and Foreign Commerce Restrictions

• It is unlawful for any person, except a licensed dealer, manufacturer, or importer, to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms without a license (§ 922(a)(1)(A)).
• Prohibits knowingly shipping or transporting firearms in interstate commerce to or from any person not licensed, or receiving such shipments unless exempted (§ 922(a)(2)–(5)).

B. Subsection (b): Sales by Licensed Dealers

• Licensed dealers may not sell:
  • Handguns to persons under 21 years old.
  • Any firearm or ammunition to a person prohibited under § 922(d).
  • Firearms to residents of another state (with limited exceptions for long guns).
• Mandates recordkeeping and verification via the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).

C. Subsection (d): Transfers to Prohibited Persons

This is a crucial provision. It prohibits anyone from selling or transferring any firearm or ammunition to a person who:

• Is a felon.
• Is a fugitive from justice.
• Is an unlawful user of a controlled substance.
• Has been adjudicated as mentally defective or committed to a mental institution.
• Is an illegal alien, or non-immigrant without a proper visa exception.
• Has been dishonorably discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces.
• Has renounced U.S. citizenship.
• Is subject to a domestic violence restraining order.
• Has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

These categories are mirrored in § 922(g), which prohibits possession by the same groups.

D. Subsection (g): Possession by Prohibited Persons

This subsection criminalizes possession, not just acquisition. Any person who falls into the prohibited categories above and who possesses, ships, or receives a firearm or ammunition that has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce violates federal law. Courts broadly interpret the interstate commerce element; if the firearm crossed state lines at any point in its history, it satisfies the requirement.

Relevant case law:

• Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977): Interstate nexus is satisfied if the firearm previously traveled in commerce.

E. Subsection (h): Ammunition Possession by Prohibited Persons

Mirroring subsection (g), § 922(h) prohibits the receipt of ammunition by the same prohibited categories of individuals.

F. Subsections (i) and (j): Firearms with Obliterated Serial Numbers and Stolen Firearms

• § 922(i): Prohibits transportation across state lines of a firearm with an obliterated or altered serial number.
• § 922(j): Prohibits knowingly possessing or selling a stolen firearm that has moved in interstate commerce.

G. Subsection (k): Firearms with Removed Serial Numbers

Makes it unlawful to possess or receive a firearm that has had the serial number removed, altered, or obliterated.

H. Subsections (n) and (o): Indictment and Machine Guns

• § 922(n): Bars individuals under felony indictment from receiving firearms shipped in interstate commerce.

• § 922(o): Bans possession or transfer of machine guns manufactured after May 19, 1986, with limited law enforcement and government exceptions.

III. Constitutional and Practical Considerations

Federal courts have upheld § 922 against most constitutional challenges, particularly under the Commerce Clause and Second Amendment. However, Bruen v. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 597 U.S. ___ (2022), introduced a historical-tradition test for Second Amendment scrutiny. As a result, lower courts are reevaluating the constitutionality of some § 922 provisions, especially as applied to nonviolent felons or drug users.

For example:

• United States v. Daniels, 77 F.4th 337 (5th Cir. 2023), struck down § 922(g)(3)’s prohibition on possession by a marijuana user, applying Bruen.
• United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023), invalidated § 922(g)(8) (domestic violence restraining orders), later reversed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. ___ (2024).

Conclusion

18 U.S.C. § 922 is the cornerstone of federal firearms regulation, setting broad prohibitions on the possession and transfer of firearms and ammunition—especially across state lines and to prohibited persons. It interacts closely with § 924 (penalties) and § 925 (exceptions), forming a comprehensive statutory scheme. Courts and policymakers continue to evaluate its scope in light of evolving constitutional doctrine and public safety concerns.

There is a new move by the Department of Justice to implement regulations affecting gun possession.

Application for Relief From Disabilities Imposed by Federal Laws With Respect to the Acquisition, Receipt, Transfer, Shipment, Transportation, or Possession of Firearms: A Proposed Rule by the Justice Department. FR Document: 2025-13765, 07/22/2025.

Summary of the Proposed Rule

1. Purpose and Scope

The Department of Justice (“the Department”) proposes formal criteria to govern applications under 18 U.S.C. 925(c)—which allows individuals otherwise prohibited under § 922(g) to seek restoration of firearm rights if they prove they are not likely to act dangerously and that granting relief would serve the public interest.

2. Delegation Shift

Previously, ATF administered relief under 28 CFR 478.144. On March 20, 2025, the DOJ rescinded ATF’s authority and reassumed sole responsibility, citing past inconsistent decisions and public safety concerns.

3. Structured Criteria

The proposed rule introduces a tiered-risk framework:

• Applicants with certain violent felony convictions are presumptively disqualified, unless they can demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances.”
• Two recidivism-free periods are established:
  • 10 years post‑supervision for serious violent offenses.
  • 5 years for other felonies.
• Even after these periods, relief is not guaranteed—it requires a factual showing of rehabilitation, character, and public safety considerations.

This represents a clear shift from the earlier “ad hoc” ATF evaluations that often granted relief to individuals with violent histories.

4. Application Process & Fees

• Applicants must submit a formal application (to be codified in new 28 CFR Part 107) detailing their legal history, character references, and documentation backing their request Department of Justice+1Federal Register+1.
• A $20 processing fee is proposed to recover first-year program costs ($20 million projected) based on an estimated 1 million applications. Indigent applicants can seek fee waivers Federal Register.

5. Public Input and Timeline

• A 90-day public comment period ends on October 20, 2025 Federal Register+1Department of Justice+1.
• The Department is specifically seeking input on:
  • Which offense categories should be presumptively disqualifying.
  • Optimal recidivism-free periods.
  • Federalism and economic impacts Federal Register+1Department of Justice+1.

Analysis

A. Consistency & Transparency

By codifying clear standards—defining presumptive categories, timelines, and evidentiary burdens—the DOJ enhances transparency and consistency in relief determinations. This framework replaces ATF’s prior discretionary and opaque review process, which documented cases granting relief to individuals with histories of homicide, sexual assault, and drug trafficking Congress.gov+7Federal Register+7Department of Justice+7.

B. Balancing Second Amendment Rights and Public Safety

The rule reinforces the constitutional premise that § 925(c) exists to allow law-abiding, rehabilitated individuals to regain rights, while safeguarding public safety by imposing structured, evidence-based thresholds. Risk-based timelines—10 years for violent crimes and 5 years for other offenses—align with criminological data on recidivism, especially among violent offenders Federal Register+1ATF+1.

C. Operational Viability

Processing an estimated 1 million applications annually demands significant resources. A self-sustaining $20 fee per application appears reasonable, with prospects for fee adjustments every two years. Provisions for fee waivers promote fairness for indigent applicants Federal Register+1Department of Justice+1.

D. Potential Consequences

• Presumptive disqualification may streamline processing but could over-penalize individuals with less serious offenses unless they can muster “extraordinary circumstances.”
• Requiring attorney general review and publication of approvals fosters accountability but may deter some applicants due to privacy concerns.
• The rule does not address state-law disabilities, meaning relief under federal law doesn’t override state-level prohibitions—maintaining federal-state consistency Department of Justice+1Federal Register+1.

E. Invitation for Stakeholder Input

By highlighting specific questions—offense categories, timelines, cost impacts—the DOJ is proactively inviting stakeholder participation. Legal professionals could help define which nonviolent felonies (e.g., drug possession, financial crimes) should be eligible sooner or presumptively excluded.

Conclusion

The proposed 2025 rule is a significant modernization of the firearms disability relief process. It codifies procedural guardrails to ensure second chances for rehabilitated individuals while upholding rigorous standards for public safety. Judges, practitioners, and stakeholders should closely examine:

1. Whether the 5/10-year thresholds align with rehabilitation science,
2. What qualifies as extraordinary circumstances, and
3. The balance between individualized review and due process transparency.

Analysis of How the DOJ’s Proposed 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) Rule Affects Servicemembers Convicted at Court-Martial

The Department of Justice’s 2025 proposed rulemaking regarding relief from federal firearm disabilities under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) carries significant implications for former servicemembers convicted at court-martial and subsequently subject to firearm prohibitions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Although court-martial convictions originate in the military justice system (under the Uniform Code of Military Justice), such convictions are treated as felony convictions for federal purposes if they resulted in imprisonment exceeding one year, even if they arise outside the Article III court structure (see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20); U.S. v. Grant, 753 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2014)).

I. Impact on Court-Martialed Veterans and Former Servicemembers

A. Presumptive Disqualification for Violent Convictions

Under the proposed rule, former servicemembers convicted at court-martial of violent offenses—such as sexual assault (Article 120, UCMJ), aggravated assault (Article 128), or manslaughter (Article 119)—will face presumptive ineligibility for restoration of firearm rights unless they demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances.” This likely imposes a higher burden than that faced under prior ATF-administered reviews, which lacked uniform criteria and occasionally granted relief even to individuals with egregious military criminal histories.

Examples of common military-specific offenses that could trigger presumptive denial:

• Article 118–119: Murder or manslaughter
• Article 120–120b: Sexual assault, abusive sexual contact
• Article 128: Aggravated assault or domestic violence
• Article 134 (Assimilative Crimes): Civilian felony equivalents prosecuted under UCMJ

B. Recidivism-Free Waiting Periods

For servicemembers convicted of nonviolent felonies—such as larceny (Article 121), drug offenses (Article 112a), or unauthorized weapon possession (Article 134)—the DOJ proposes a 5-year minimum waiting period post-supervision. For more serious violent offenses, the waiting period is 10 years. These timelines begin after release from confinement, parole, or probation, and presuppose no subsequent disqualifying conduct.

Given the rehabilitative focus of the military’s correctional programs and parole system (e.g., DoD Clemency and Parole Board), many former servicemembers could qualify under the 5-year track, especially for drug-related or nonviolent general orders violations.

C. Increased Burden of Proof

The rule imposes a rigorous evidentiary burden, requiring applicants to demonstrate:

• Full rehabilitation
• Positive post-conviction conduct
• That relief is not contrary to public safety or the public interest

For court-martialed individuals, this would likely necessitate documentation from military corrections officials, performance reviews during parole/supervision, letters of reference from commanders or employers, and potentially service records reflecting honorable conduct after the offense.

This formalizes what was previously a non-standardized process, thereby reducing discretion and increasing procedural regularity—but potentially limiting relief for deserving individuals who lack sufficient documentation or legal support.

II. Procedural and Administrative Effects

A. Loss of ATF Jurisdiction

The transfer of § 925(c) authority from ATF to DOJ removes a historically military-engaged agency (ATF has routinely dealt with veterans, military surplus, and related licensing) and replaces it with DOJ—a more centralized, security-driven entity. This may reduce institutional sensitivity to the unique rehabilitative aspects of military justice and veteran reintegration, unless DOJ incorporates DoD correctional data into its evaluation criteria.

B. Application Costs and Access to Relief

The proposed $20 application fee (with waiver provisions) appears nominal but may still present a barrier to indigent veterans or former servicemembers discharged under other-than-honorable conditions who may lack post-service support. The application will require sophisticated legal and evidentiary preparation, likely necessitating legal counsel—raising concerns of equity and access.

C. Lack of Deference to Military Character Evidence

Unlike clemency or discharge upgrade boards, the DOJ’s process does not explicitly credit military service or valorous conduct. This may undercut meritorious applications by decorated veterans who have otherwise shown post-service rehabilitation and continued contribution to their communities.

III. Recommendations and Legal Considerations

1. Stakeholder Engagement: The military legal community, including Judge Advocates, veteran service organizations, and military defense practitioners, should submit comments during the public review period to advocate for:

   • Recognition of rehabilitative programs within DoD corrections.
   • Appropriate weighting of military-specific factors (e.g., combat exposure, PTSD).
   • Deference to military parole and clemency determinations.

2. Due Process Advocacy: Former servicemembers may raise due process or equal protection challenges if the DOJ’s criteria result in de facto exclusion of military applicants compared to similarly situated civilians.

3. State-Level Interaction: Even if federal rights are restored under § 925(c), state laws may continue to bar firearm possession. Servicemembers must evaluate both federal and state-specific disability relief (e.g., under state firearm restoration statutes or civil rights restoration laws).

IV. Conclusion

The DOJ’s proposed rule under § 925(c) imposes a structured but more restrictive framework that could have a chilling effect on court-martialed servicemembers seeking to regain firearm rights—especially those convicted of offenses with violent elements. While the proposal enhances transparency and standardization, it does not yet accommodate the distinctive nature of military justice, DoD correctional rehabilitation, or the transitional needs of veterans. Legal advocates should take the opportunity to influence the rule’s final shape to ensure that former servicemembers are not disproportionately or unjustly excluded from meaningful relief.

In principle, we accept that certain “wholly unconstitutional” convictions can be collaterally attacked and disqualified for consideration during sentencing. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). But, when available, the collateral attack remedy would not be offered on the ground that the invalid UCMJ conviction rested on something other than the “laws of … the United States” as that phrase appears in Code § 19.2-295.1. Instead, the invalid UCMJ conviction would be excluded from trial, if at all, because it violated a higher law of the United States: the Federal Constitution. In any event, we need not address Oliver’s hypothesis further. He does not raise on appeal any constitutional objections in contest of his UCMJ convictions.

Or, can an OTH in lieu of trial by court-martial (Chapter 10) be a basis to revoke a state probation, as in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Lopez, No. 2008-SC-000308-DG (Ky. 27 August 2009).

While serving in the United States Army in Iraq, the Army charged Tommy Lopez with violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by viewing child pornography on a computer. At that time, Lopez was also on probation imposed by a Kentucky circuit court for the offense of criminal attempt to commit first-degree sexual abuse. In lieu of trial by court-martial for the child pornography charge, Lopez sought and received a voluntary discharge from the Army. Following the voluntary discharge and his return to Kentucky, the circuit court revoked Lopez’s probation for the pornography charges. The main question before us, which is a matter of first impression in Kentucky, is whether a violation of the UCMJ is an “offense” for which a Kentucky court may revoke probation. We hold that revocation is permissible if the violation of military law subjects the violator to a fine or imprisonment.

The Kentucky Supreme Court says yes, because all the court need know for a probation revocation is that additional misconduct happened. The “admission” of guilt inherent in a Chapter 10 request is sufficient to establish a basis for misconduct. Interestingly the subject was charged under Article 92, UCMJ, even though the underlying offenses involved CP.

Our holding should not be construed to mean that a trial court must revoke probation each time a person on probation serving in the armed forces violates a military law. Rather, we simply hold that under Kentucky law, a trial court may revoke probation if a person on probation serving in the armed forces violates military law and the possible punishment for that violation includes a fine or imprisonment. We are confident that trial courts of this Commonwealth will exercise properly their inherent discretion to determine when revocation is appropriate. Any rare instances in which a trial court abuses its discretion may be corrected on appeal. Given the nature of Lopez’s military offense in this case and the close relationship that offense bears to the Kentucky offense for which he was placed on probation, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Lopez’s probation.

So, would Kentucky also include punishment imposed at an Article 15, UCMJ, hearing? Or by summary court-martial?

Or how about this case, also from Virginia – Turner v. Commonwealth, 568 S.E. 2d 468 (2002). We are frequently asked whether a special or general conviction is a felony.

Barry Turner (defendant) was convicted by a jury for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. In proof of the predicate prior felony, the Commonwealth relied upon the earlier conviction of defendant by general court-martial for “Housebreaking,” in violation of Article 130, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 930. Finding the prior offense constituted a felony, we affirm the conviction. However, because the crime was not a “violent felony” contemplated by statute, we reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing. Testifying for the Commonwealth at the related hearing, Thomas J. Lambert, “legal and hearing services officer for the Virginia Department of State Police,” explained, without objection, that military “offenses,” “rules of evidence” and “the like” are “set out” in the “Rules of Courts-Martial,” “the regulatory authority based upon Title 10 of the United States Code,” the UCMJ. Lambert noted that military justice does not identify offenses as felonies or misdemeanors, but jurisdictional distinctions between a “general” and “special” court-martial differentiate crimes by tribunal. A general court-martial, “the … military equivalent of a jury,” “may award any punishment … up to and including the death penalty” and “dishonorable discharge,” while penalties before a “special court-martial” are limited to “[s]ix months confinement,” loss of pay, and “bad conduct discharge.”

Note that the conviction happened before the increase from six to 12 months confinement potential at special court-martial.

Defendant next contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Because his purchase of the offending weapon . . . and “the term `felony’ was never discussed throughout the Army Court Martial,” defendant maintains “there was reasonable doubt as to whether or not [he] was a convicted felon.” We find his argument without merit.

Or how about, In re Inquiry Concerning Judge Robertson, 596 S.E. 2d. 2 (2004).

This matter comes before the Court on the recommendation of the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) that Charles T. Robertson II, Chief Magistrate Judge for the Magistrate Court of Cherokee County, be removed from office because Judge Robertson is ineligible to hold any elected judicial position as a result of his statutory disqualification and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Having reviewed the record of the JQC inquiry, we conclude that Judge Charles T. Robertson II has acted in a manner detrimental to the judiciary and order that he be immediately removed from the bench.

in February 2001, a complaint was filed with the JQC alleging that Judge Robertson’s two general court martials and convictions under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) constituted felony convictions involving crimes of moral turpitude affecting his eligibility to hold public office. See OCGA § 21-2-8. After conducting an investigation the JQC determined that the factual allegations of the complaint were correct and brought formal charges against Judge Robertson on November 12, 2002 to “determine whether he has violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in that he has been previously convicted of crimes that would constitute felonies under Georgia law and thus render Judge Robertson unqualified to serve as Chief Magistrate of the Magistrate Court of Cherokee County.” At the formal hearing held in August of 2003, the JQC and Judge Robertson stipulated, inter alia, that he engaged in the alleged conduct and been subject to military convictions and discipline but that he never received notification that lost his right to vote, to serve on a jury, or to own a firearm, and that he exercised some or all of these rights. He also stipulated that in 1994, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records denied his request for a review of his bad conduct discharge and reaffirmed that the gravity of the charged offenses warranted trial by court-martial and authorized dishonorable discharge, confinement for two years and total pay forfeiture. The JQC issued its findings and recommendations in which it determined by clear and convincing evidence that although the UCMJ does not specifically categorize crimes as felony or misdemeanor, and regardless of the actual sentence imposed, Judge Robertson’s two general court-martial convictions that could have been punished for imprisonment for at least 12 months constituted offenses that are analogous to a felony. See United States v. Moore, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 687, 695-696 (1955) (“[w]e entertain no doubt that an offense serious enough to bear the stigma of a dishonorable discharge possesses the seriousness of felony, and as well bears a heavy content of moral turpitude. We cannot approve of any sort of view which minimizes the gravity of offenses merely because they are of `a military nature’ “). The JQC also found that under Georgia law the military offenses at issue met the statutory definition of a felony as “a crime punishable by death, imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for more than 12 months.” OCGA § 16-1-3(5). It further determined that Judge Robertson’s conviction for the wrongful sale of military property and his conviction for wrongful possession of methamphetamines amounted to crimes involving moral turpitude.

Or how about Disalvatore v. Police Officers’ Education & Training Commission, 753 A. 2d 309 (2000).

Paul F. DiSalvatore petitions for review of the July 1, 1999 order of the Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Commission (Commission) that adopted Hearing Examiner John M. Shugars’ decision denying DiSalvatore certification and revoking his approval to attend police recruit training with the Philadelphia Police Department due to his April 8, 1992 conviction of aggravated assault under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The key issue before us is whether the Commission erred in determining that DiSalvatore’s conviction constituted a “disqualifying criminal offense” such that he is precluded from becoming a municipal police officer. A “disqualifying criminal offense” is defined as “[a] criminal offense for which more than 1 year in prison can be imposed as punishment”. For the reasons that follow, we are compelled to affirm the Commission’s order.

The point of reporting these few cases is to reinforce the complexity of answering a clients questions about the consequences or collateral effects of his or her conviction at court-martial, or in Kentucky, of an OTHIL.