Because counsel must inform a client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation, Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter not addressed here.

So, to what extent does Padilla impact Denedo? Here is the SCOTUSWiki link to the Supreme Court litigation in Denedo. Here is a link to Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2008). Here is a link to United States v. Denedo, in which N-MCCA denied Denedo relief again.

Justice Stevens writes for the court, with Justice Alito writing in concurrence with the judgment for himself and Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Scalia writes in dissent for himself and Justice Thomas.

In this post conviction proceeding, Padilla claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but also told him that he“‘did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.’” 253 S. W. 3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). Padilla relied on his counsel’s erroneous ad-vice when he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made his deportation virtually mandatory. He alleges that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had not received incorrect advice from his attorney. We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. ___ (2009), to decide whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla’s counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country. We agree with Padilla that constitutionally competent counsel would have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter that we do not address. . . [C]hanges to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, some-times the most important part7—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes. . . The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.

Slip op. at 9.

So, what else shall we see in the opinion? That if the advice is given it must be right? More later.

ABSTRACT: In the 2009–2010 term, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide if it matters whether a criminal defense lawyer correctly counsels a client about the fact that the client faces deportation as a result of a guilty plea. Under prevailing constitutional norms in almost every jurisdiction, a lawyer does not have a duty to tell her client about many serious but “collateral” consequences of a guilty plea. Yet, in every jurisdiction that has considered the issue, that very same lawyer will run afoul of her duties if she affirmatively misrepresents a collateral consequence—every jurisdiction, that is, except Kentucky. The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently held that when there is no duty to warn about a consequence because it is collateral, misadvice about that same consequence is not a constitutional violation. The collision of the collateral-consequences rule, which imposes no duty to warn, and the affirmative-misadvice exception, which imposes a duty to give accurate advice where a lawyer chooses to warn, leads to a perverse incentive structure that signals to defense lawyers (as well as to prosecutors and judges) that it is safest to say nothing at all about “collateral” matters. The Kentucky approach that the Supreme Court will review is equally troubling; it allows false information with no sanction or remedy. A cluttered and contradictory jurisprudence of informational rights in the guilty-plea process sits at this intersection of the collateral-consequences rule and affirmative-misadvice exception. So-called collateral consequences often overshadow the direct penal sentences in criminal cases. In addition to deportation, courts categorize many other severe consequences as collateral, including involuntary civil commitment, sex-offender registration, and loss of the right to vote, to obtain professional licenses, and to receive public housing and benefits. These consequences touch upon every important area of a convicted person’s life—for the rest of his or her life. They also matter enormously in the United States, which has more than 600,000 individuals exiting the prison system and millions more getting criminal records each year. These individuals enter a society that is struggling to find ways to integrate them despite facing considerable obstacles. The constitutional rule has not caught up to the current reality of the effect of these consequences on defendants, their families, and their communities. The Supreme Court has the opportunity to overcome the mythical divide between direct and collateral consequences and to protect the constitutional and ethical values which underlie a defendant’s right to decide whether to plead guilty based on full knowledge of the material consequences. The Court will consider important issues of professional responsibility, ethics, transparency, and the right to information in the guilty-plea process. This Article exposes the problems with the majority and Kentucky approaches. It argues that only a constitutional mandate that requires a complete and full informational disclosure about the serious collateral consequences of guilty pleas will avoid the problematic incentive structures we have now.

I did not see a reference to Denedo.

Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1317 (2009). Padilla v. Kentucky [link is to SCOTUSWiki] was argued at the U.S. Supreme Court 13 October 2009, the decision is pending.