DoD is starting to announce new policies that may go into effect because of the inquiry into Major Hasan. I expect two will cause some heartburn:

More restrictive policy regarding weapons on base, including in quarters. I expect there will an initial uptick in Second Amendment related complaints.

More access to medical and mental health records for commanders. While I understand the motivations for a policy of greater commander access, I expect this may have a dampening effect on people seeking help, unless there is some built in privilege to the disclosures.

There is still a stigma attached to people who seek mental health counseling, so there is a reluctance to get help, especially at an early stage when the help might do the most good. An effect is the suicide rate for people who didn’t seek help but who might of sought help if they knew their records were protected and they weren’t going to get court-martialed.

If the record disclosed that the reasonable remedy had been implemented in full, Appellant’s participation in and apparent acquiescence at trial to the remedy crafted and Appellant’s disavowal of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would end the inquiry. However, because the record does not disclose whether the remedy crafted by the military judge was actually implemented in full, under the facts of this case we devolve to the ordinary test whether unlawful command influence deprived Appellant of access to character witnesses. United States v. Gleason, 43 M.J. 69, 73 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (explaining the government’s burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defense access to witnesses was not impeded by unlawful command influence). We are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was not thus prejudiced. United States v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 151 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (finding beyond a reasonable doubt the correct quantum of proof applicable to issues of unlawful command influence). Accordingly, we overturn the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals.

The facts of this case are not uncommon. Commands routinely give no contact orders to an accused (but interestingly not their own witnesses). It is not unusual for a command to cast an accused adrift, make them an outcast, and directly or indirectly imply to others that supporting and helping the outcast will be viewed with disfavor.

Appellant moved to dismiss the charges and specifications against him on the ground that MSgt Bialcak’s orders and actions constituted unlawful command influence by creating a hostile environment that made it unlikely that Appellant’s colleagues would speak on his behalf.

The bottom line lesson of this case should be directed at SJA’s and trial counsel. They are the ones with the first and most effective opportunity to avoid UCI problems with potential witness interference. In each of these cases it is my view that the training, guidance, and assistance rendered the commander by the SJA office is defective. If the SJA is doing her job, her counsel should be out there in advance of a case, and specifically when a case comes up ensuring that the command is properly educated about interference with the defense. I attribute the continuing nature of this type of issue to a failure on the part of the SJA and trial counsel. At trial and on appeal everyone puts the burden on the defense to prove UCI. Why do we never put a burden on the SJA and TC to do something before UCI rears its ugly head? In the opinion CAAF refers to the MJ as, “the last sentinel,” so who is the first? It’s not the defense counsel, “it is a shared responsibility.” In this case all were quite happy to think about blaming the defense counsel because he didn’t object or object strongly enough. For example, in the dissenting opinion:

On the other hand, neither the military judge nor the defense counsel put the Government to the test.

Ergo, if you don’t challenge, then the government can get away with it. So the lesson to the defense is never ever agree that any “remedy” suggested by the military judge is sufficient.

The blogosphere critiques this opinion as poorly written and unneeded because the defense didn’t complain. So it’s all the defense fault. The blogosphere may be – technically – correct, but . . . Gosh, it’s always the defense fault. I for one believe this opinion could do a service by addressing a very common problem when an accused is charged. I doubt however that anything will be done training-wise.

United States v. Ellis. This is a case regarding a government expert testifying about rehabilitation potential in a sex case, using part (I emphasize part) of a psycho-sexual evaluation.

I’m a proponent of using psycho-sexual evaluations in sentencing. I take the position that failure to at least ask for assistance in that regard is IAC in child sexual abuse and child pornography cases. I have no problem with the prosecution using psycho-sexual testimony, assuming it is based on a legitimate evaluation and the defense has had a legitimate opportunity to have their own evaluation.

The flaw in Ellis is that the government expert never talked with the accused. The flaw isn’t related to the Static-99 or similar tests. All experts who do psycho-sexual evaluations (at least legitimate ones) will tell you that a personal interview and testing is critical to a proper evaluation using Static-99 or other instruments, and included in that testing is a polygraph. In this case the government expert did not have a critical part of the evaluation. IMHO this case is wrong, not as to the use of psycho-sexual evaluation testimony, but as to the adequacy of the foundation for that testimony.

Howard Bloom asks, What if Nidal Malik Hasan is Sane? Psychology Today blog.

Were they the insane acts of a man driven over the edge by the vicarious stress of war? By the strain of hearing horror stories from the traumatized veterans of battles in Iraq and Iran? No. Nidal Malik Hasan’s acts were in all probability very, very sane. But the roots of their sanity lie in a belief system that is alien to us. A belief system we have been fighting since at least 1993 when the first attempt on the World Center was made. That attempt was made by sane, rational, idealistic men. Men who believed in a compelling and widespread weltanschauung, a weltanschauung that wants to liberate the world.

Katherine van Wormer asks, The Hasan Shootings: Method, Madness, or Both?, Psychology Today blog.

Several theories have emerged to explain the psychiatrist’s seemingly crazed act. The first was that indeed Hasan was crazed, that he suddenly just cracked from the stress of listening to patients’ traumatic experiences in the Middle East and the knowledge that he would soon be shipped overseas himself. There was some thought given to the fact that he was suffering from secondary trauma. A second theory focuses on Hasan’s radical Muslim beliefs, his Palestinian heritage, and his reported connections with radical clerics who advocated terrorism. A third likens the rampage to workplace shootings by a disgruntled employee. In some ways, the mass shootings bear a resemblance to some of the mass shootings, usually done by disturbed, unpopular youths or unemployed middle aged men bent on revenge. Contagion is one possible explanation for the shootings haven’t seen in news reports but something that should be given consideration. A fourth theory also not mentioned in the news but with a certain plausibility is the suicide impulse, that by engaging in a menacing act such as a mass shooting, the person will almost certainly be killed, perhaps by the phenomenon known as suicide-by-cop, perhaps later by execution.