That the military judge “ruled prosecutors must show beyond a reasonable doubt that unlawful command influence hasn’t tainted the manslaughter case against a Camp Pendleton Marine accused of taking part in the 2005 slayings of 24 Iraqi civilians.” This means the defense was successful so far in showing sufficient evidence to shift the burden to the prosecution to prove no UCI.

Eight Marines were charged in the biggest criminal case against U.S. troops to arise from the Iraq war. Six have had charges dismissed, and one was acquitted. Whether the only remaining and perhaps highest-profile defendant stands trial may hinge on what happens this week in a military courtroom. Lawyers for Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich will ask a judge to dismiss charges against the former squad leader in a case involving the deaths of 24 Iraqi men, women and children in Hadithah in November 2005, arguing that a general who oversaw the case was improperly influenced by an aide. The defense argues Mattis was improperly influenced by Col. John Ewers, who investigated the killings and later became a top legal adviser to the general. Military policy prohibits Ewers from offering legal advice on Hadithah because he was also an investigator in the case.

North County Times reports:

Gen. James Mattis, one of the most revered generals in the Marine Corps, testified Monday that he was never improperly influenced when making decisions about the prosecutions of troops charged in the slayings of 24 civilians in Haditha, Iraq, in 2005. “I don’t recall a single time that anyone tried to influence me unlawfully,” Mattis testified in a Camp Pendleton courtroom where Haditha defendant Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich is seeking to have charges against him dismissed.

C.A.A.F. seems to have this definition, among several, of what clearly erroneous means.

At least one court has defined the clearly-erroneous standard by stating that it must be “more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must … strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.” Parts and Electric Motors Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988).

United States v. French, 38 M.J. 420, 425 (C.M.A. 1993).

This quote above came to me from an Article 32, UCMJ, hearing IO report. And

The standard of review for evidentiary rulings is whether the judge abused his discretion. The judge in this case did not. The abuse of discretion standard requires not that the judge was wrong, but rather was clearly wrong. As we have stated, it is not that the judge is maybe wrong or probably wrong, but rather “it must strike a cord of wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.”

United States v. Byrd, 60 M.J. 4, 12 (C.A.A.F. 2004).

Now just in case you thought they were getting a little carried away, riddle me this one.

Our senior Court provided us with a vivid sensory perception to apply to the reversal standard, when it stated: “It must be ‘more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must . . . strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.'” United States v. French, 38 M.J. 420, 425 (C.M.A. 1993)(quoting Parts and Electric Motors Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988)). The smell in this case is not that of old, dead fish, but rather it is the scent of the thick, foggy mist of musket fire that more than two and a quarter centuries ago drifted over the fields at Lexington and Concord.

United States v. Daniels, 58 M.J. 599, 620 (N-M.C.C.A. 2003)(Villamez, J., dissenting), see also United States v. Brinton, NMCM 200001971, 2002 CCA LEXIS 307, at *1 (N-M.C.C.A. Dec. 19, 2002).

Some cases are just more interesting to read.