The typical waiver is that the accused will “waive all waivable motions.” This seems something of an oxymoron. The provision is consistent with the idea that all nonjurisdictional motions are waived on a guilty plea unless there is a conditional waiver. The court cites United States v. Bradley, 68 M.J. 279 (C.A.A.F. 2010)

This is an area potentially ripe for IAC in pretrial negotiations and advice. In this case,

Originally, it appears that the defense counsel thought the motion for appointment of the expert consultant was not waived because the military judge had already ruled on the motion. To the contrary, the military judge opined that the “impact of this provision, even though I’ve already ruled on the motion, is that your client is waiving appellate consideration of the correctness of my decision.” The defense counsel then stated, “[F]or whatever reason, the defense decided not to ask for reconsideration of the motion, we waived any future motions and I believe that’s the position the defense is going to take.” The military judge went on to clarify the provision as he found that there was no clear meeting of the minds on the interpretation. The defense counsel then unequivocally stated on the record, with the appellant’s concurrence, “if a motion that’s already been made and ruled upon is then thereafter waivable, then we waive.” The military judge further clarified by stating, “So even if the provision applies to the motion that I denied, and it means that you are giving up appellate consideration of my ruling on that motion, you still want to go forward with your pretrial agreement?” The appellant responded, “Yes, sir.”

In this case the defense had litigated a motion which the judge denied. Subsequently the accused signed a PTA and plead guilty.

There has been no allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel and the issue of the expert consultant was not even mentioned in post-trial submissions.

If the defense counsel was “originally” confused, was the meaning and effect of the term communicated? Was the accused properly advised prior to the Article 39(a), UCMJ, hearing?

Here is a timely article from the ABA about this important topic (thanks to Sentencing Law & Policy for the link).

Ellis & Bussert, Stemming the Tide of Postconviction Waivers, 25 (1) Crim. Justice, Spring 2010, ABA.

Over the last several years, waiver of a defendant’s appellate and postconviction rights has become a standard feature of plea agreements in federal cases. While courts uphold a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of rights, these waivers are not without limits. This article suggests areas about which defense counsel should be aware in order to afford clients the greatest opportunity for postconviction relief. In particular, we explore ethical constraints on defense counsel’s ability to advise clients and to shield themselves from ineffective assistance claims, as well as constraints on prosecutors’ ability to demand such waivers or to shield themselves from prosecutorial misconduct claims.

Among their cautions about the use of waivers, they make three recommendations to defense counsel.

First, defense counsel should be assertive in seeking revisions to plea agreements that preserve a client’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. Counsel must make clear to the government that notwithstanding a guilty plea, the client retains the right to file a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (and AEDPA) that challenges the constitutional quality of trial or appellate counsel’s representation not merely representation as it concerns counsel’s advice and performance related to entry of the guilty plea—the consideration on which courts ordinarily focus. Second, to the extent that the proposed plea agreement includes the common refrain that the “defendant also acknowledges his complete satisfaction with the representation and advice received from his undersigned attorney,” counsel should compel the government to add “though his attorney could not, and did not, advise him in this regard.” If the government balks as to either, counsel is obliged to raise the points on the record so that the issue(s) is preserved. Finally, where the foregoing steps have not been taken or the record is silent as to the same, counsel in postconviction proceedings seeking to advance an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should point out that the defendant was deprived of counsel, contrary to the protections of the Sixth Amendment, as to that portion of a plea agreement, thereby rendering that portion of the agreement unenforceable.

The piece concludes:

While we recognize that there exists a systemic interest in finality and minimizing meritless claims, the appeal and postconviction waivers that have crept into the federal plea negotiation process require diligent attention. Justice is not served by impediments to valid claims that would otherwise afford relief. Defense counsel, in particular, are obliged to voice ethical considerations that can and should prevent the government from foreclosing available avenues and to ensure that every client’s relinquishment of rights is knowing and voluntary.