Major John Henry Gee was the commandant of the Confederate prison at Salisbury, North Carolina from 1864 until 1865. During his tenure, thousands of Union prisoners of war died of starvation and diseases or were shot when attempting to escape. Shortly after the end of hostilities, Major Gee was arrested, charged with two counts of violations of the laws of war and brought before a military commission to be tried. The trial of Major Gee is one of the first recorded trials for war crimes and a rare early example of domestic prosecution of an enemy fellow-national for what was effectively an international crime, in a war in which his side had been vanquished. Unlike the war crimes trial of Henry Wirz, commandant of Andersonville prison during the American Civil War, little attention has been paid to this important precedent.

Msr. Mettraux is described as:

Defence Counsel before international criminal tribunals, member of the Journal’s Editorial Committee and author most recently of The Law of Command Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

In a court martial trial that concluded after a panel’s deliberations stretched into the early hours of Saturday morning at Andrews Joint Base, a local Airman First Class was found not guilty of the charges brought against him. As ABC 7 News reported last week, the charges were brought against A1C Marvin Skipper, Jr., after he fell asleep a second time while on security duty–even though doctors had ordered that he not be placed on that type of duty for medical reasons. Skipper, Jr., an Iraq war veteran with an exemplary record, first fell asleep while on security duty in May 2008. Although he was baffled at why this had happened, Skipper, 28, agreed to receive an Article 15 . . . But he also immediately sought medical treatment. And doctors diagnosed him with sleep apnea. After two surgeries failed to correct the problem, doctors ordered that he not be deployed, drive government vehicles, or carry a gun. A medical discharge was in process. But after acknowledging the document citing his medical condition, base command placed Skipper back on security duty again in April (emphasis added). And he fell asleep again.

This one goes in the why did they do that category. Watch to see if a report shows up in the Capital Flyer the base paper.

Queerty.com asks:

Did Dan Choi Violate Military Law By Wearing His Uniform After He Was Discharged?

I think the answer is probably yes that he may have violated a federal statute. But as a practical matter this ought to remain an interesting question and nothing more. Sounds like he would raise an affirmative defense of mistake as to whether he was still “a member,” whether believable or not. See, 10 U. S. Code 771.

Except as otherwise provided by law, no person except a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, as the case may be, may wear— (1) the uniform, or a distinctive part of the uniform, of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps; or (2) a uniform any part of which is similar to a distinctive part of the uniform of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps.

Interestingly no reference to the Coast Guard or the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service or NOAA. See, Article 2(8), UCMJ, 10 U. S. Code 802(8).

The guardian.co.uk has this book review:

The blackest hearts: War crimes in Iraq. In March 2006, four US soldiers, strung out after months in the deadly battleground south of Baghdad, hatched a plan: to carry out one of the worst war crimes ever committed in Iraq. This is an edited extract from Black Hearts: One Platoon’s Descent Into Madness In Iraq’s Triangle Of Death, by Jim Frederick, published on 6 August by Macmillan[.]

The Marines website has this new liberty policy:

All service members assigned to Marine Corps Bases Japan/III Marine Expeditionary Force in pay grades E3 and below, and all red card holders, must have a liberty buddy for off-base liberty.

You remember discussion of the CSI effect in criminal trials. Well here’s a new piece on the impact of “Lie to Me” a TV show which claims to teach people how to detect liars.

Timothy R. Levine, Kim B. Serota, Hillary C. Shulman (in press). The Impact of Lie to Me on Viewers’ Actual Ability to Detect Deception Communication Research first published on June 17, 2010 doi:10.1177/0093650210362686 The new television series Lie to Me portrays a social scientist solving crimes through his ability to read nonverbal communication. Promotional materials claim the content is based on actual science. Participants (N = 108) watched an episode of Lie to Me, a different drama, or no program and then judged a series of honest and deceptive interviews. Lie to Me viewers were no better at distinguishing truths from lies but were more likely than control participants to misidentify honest interviewees as deceptive. Watching Lie to Me decreases truth bias thereby increasing suspicion of others while at the same time reducing deception detection ability. Hat tip to Karen Franklin.

And to Deception Blog.

This report is consistent with research that shows police officers are no better at detecting liars than the average person, and no different to tossing a coin. See e.g., Meissner & Kassin, “He’s guilty!”: Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 Law & Human Behavior 469 (2002); Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, “I’d Know a False Confession if I Saw One”: A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators, 29(2) Law & Human Behavior 211 (2005); Max Mizner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2557 (2008)

Fort Hood massacre suspect Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan sought to have some of his patients prosecuted for war crimes based on statements they made during psychiatric sessions with him, a captain who served on the base said Monday. (emphasis added) Other psychiatrists complained to superiors that Hasan’s actions violated doctor-patient confidentiality, Capt. Shannon Meehan told The Dallas Morning News.

Now here’s an odd comment.

Hasan may have been legally justified in reporting what patients disclosed, said Patrick McLain, a Dallas lawyer who specializes in military defense work and is not involved in the Hasan case. But it’s impossible to be sure without knowing exactly what they said, he added.

Military Rule of Evidence 513 is the rule of privilege for court-martial. Prior to court-martial psychiatrists would be bound by their state and government ethics rules on patient-psychiatrist privilege. Normally those rules prohibit release of information about past crimes. Yes, there is an issue about a requirement to disclose future crimes.

(a) General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential communication made between the patient and a psychotherapist or an assistant to the psychotherapist, in a case arising under the UCMJ, if such communication was made for the purpose of facilitating diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s mental or emotional condition.

There is also common-sense command imperative reason not to be disclosing what was said in a psychiatric confessional – trust. The military is having enough problems providing adequate, competent, timely mental health care to personnel. On top of that, those with mental health problems continually fight the stigma associated with having mental health problems. It wasn’t until recently that the rules were changed for security clearances allowing people with mental health problems like combat related PTSD to be still considered for security clearances. So I’m not sure the military would want to make a habit of allowing it’s mental health providers to disclose information.

Now there are eight exceptions to Mil. R. Evid. 513.

1. The patient is not dead so that wouldn’t apply.

2. The patient is not accused of spouse, child abuse or neglect. Although I could see a creative prosecutor arguing that if the “war crime” is against a child in Iraq, then this exception applies.

3. When federal, state, law or regulation require. The prosecution would want to be sure the regulatory exception doesn’t swallow the rule.

4. When the person believes the patient is a danger to self or others. But this would not apply to past crimes, unless clearly intertwined with exception 5. So for example the patient talks about how they did x, y, z, and how they will do it that way again first chance they get.

5. If the disclosure clearly contemplates as future crime.

6. When necessary to protect military property, personnel, security, or military mission.

7. When an accused first offers mental health evidence at trial.

8. When constitutionally required. This is a rule for the defense in cases in which the mental health of a witness is relevant to a case and production of records is necessary to ensure an accused’s constitutional rights.