I have no way of knowing whether LtC Terry Lakin authorized the use of his image to sell tax advice, bridge loans, auto liability insurance, and whatever other advertising attaches itself to his photo over at WorldNetDaily (hover mouse anywhere over the photo at WND for maximum advertising effect). Nonetheless, I think this image, as much as any other, points out how this honorable, but confused, soldier has become the tool of [select a name].

Of course when viewed in MSIE you can see what the doctor ordered.

If LTC Lakin has done this deliberately, then he has created a problem for himself with the Joint Ethics Regulation, an enforceable order. On this however I doubt LTC Lakin has any specific fault. He’s likely being taken advantage of. But I wonder how he thought all of this might play out.

DoD employees may not state or imply an endorsement of a non-Federal entity, event, product, service, or enterprise. DoD employees may not use or allow their titles, positions, or organization names to suggest official endorsement or preferential treatment of any non-Federal entity except organizations in subsection 3-210.

Emphasis added to this quote from a SOCO briefing.

•DoD Directive 1344.1,Wearing of the Uniform. (1) Not allowed in connection with private employment or commercial interests; (2) Not allowed when an inference of official sponsorship may be drawn; and (3) Not allowed when wearing would bring discredit on the Armed Forces. (4) Applies to active duty, reserve and retired members. (5) Each Service also has separate regulations with similar wording: –Army – AR 670-1

The above is from the discussion of the political question doctrine. The sole use of the word embarrassment is here:

A reported threat by a senior Army officer to “Taser” another officer on trial for challenging Barack Obama’s eligibility to be president could be a serious “command influence” issue that could taint the case, according to an expert.

Here is the Greeley Gazette article referred to:

A former Captain in the Judge Advocate General’s office sent a letter to Lt. Col. Lakin’s Commanding Officer calling for an investigation after the Army threatened to taser him once the hearing was over. . . . Hemenway told the Gazette “We posted on our website rules for proper decorum in the courtroom for supporters of Lt. Col. Lakin to observe; apparently we should have sent a copy of the rules to the prosecution as well.”

A former command sergeant major at Walter Reed Army Medical Center fired for allegedly faking his record and wearing unauthorized awards and decorations faces military discipline for a series of bold deceptions that span several years and multiple commands, according to the charges against him.

World News Daily has a piece on LTC Lakin’s OER issue. The piece seems to accept without question or fact-check the allegation that the, “Army convicted me without trial.” It would seem a proper journalistic analysis would review the actual report (still publically unavailable) and review in comparison to AR 623-3 .

An Army officer who has chosen to stake his career on a demand that Barack Obama document his eligibility to be president is charging that the Army has convicted him without a trial.

The National Law Journal has a short piece on the litigation in California by the Log Cabin Republicans challenging the DADT. Maybe the case will be resolved on a standing issue vice the merits.

Finally, Freeborne continued to assert that the Log Cabin Republicans lacked standing to pursue the claim. “Mr. Woods gave short shrift to the subject for obvious reasons: Log Cabin cannot identify a single member who has the right to challenge the policy in his or her own right,” Freeborne said. Neither of the individuals claiming to be Log Cabin Republican members has identified himself as a Republican, he said, and both failed to pay dues. During trial, Woods introduced several officers of Log Cabin Republican who vouched for their membership.

A posting at A Natural Born Citizen . . . Orly? appears to indicate that one of Orly Taitz’s blogs has been taken over – I think by aliens. Oh man what a pun. She does have some blather, but apparently repetitious of some of the events in the Lakin case.

During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress established different oaths for the enlisted men and officers of the Continental Army:

Enlisted: The first oath, voted on 14 June 1775 as part of the act creating the Continental Army, read: “I _____ have, this day, voluntarily enlisted myself, as a soldier, in the American continental army, for one year, unless sooner discharged: And I do bind myself to conform, in all instances, to such rules and regulations, as are, or shall be, established for the government of the said Army.” The original wording was effectively replaced by Section 3, Article 1, of the Articles of War approved by Congress on 20 September 1776, which specified that the oath of enlistment read: “I _____ swear (or affirm as the case may be) to be trued to the United States of America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies opposers whatsoever; and to observe and obey the orders of the Continental Congress, and the orders of the Generals and officers set over me by them.”

Officers: Continental Congress passed two versions of this oath of office, applied to military and civilian national officers. The first, on 21 October 1776, read: “I _____, do acknowledge the Thirteen United States of America, namely, New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be free, independent, and sovereign states, and declare, that the people thereof owe no allegiance or obedience to George the third, king of Great Britain; and I renounce, refuse and abjure any allegiance or obedience to him; and I do swear that I will, to the utmost of my power, support, maintain, and defend the said United States against the said king, George the third, and his heirs and successors, and his and their abettors, assistants and adherents; and will serve the said United States in the office of _____, which I now hold, and in any other office which I may hereafter hold by their appointment, or under their authority, with fidelity and honour, and according to the best of my skill and understanding. So help me God.” The revised version, voted 3 February 1778, read “I, _____ do acknowledge the United States of America to be free, independent and sovereign states, and declare that the people thereof owe no allegiance or obedience, to George the third, king of Great Britain; and I renounce, refuse and abjure any allegiance or obedience to him: and I do swear (or affirm) that I will, to the utmost of my power, support, maintain and defend the said United States, against the said king George the third and his heirs and successors, and his and their abettors, assistants and adherents, and will serve the said United States in the office of _____ which I now hold, with fidelity, according to the best of my skill and understanding. So help me God.”

You can see more of the history of U.S. military oaths at the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

I thought I’d use this case as a way to refresh ourselves on how a defense counsel should approach an Article 32, UCMJ, hearing regardless of the accused or the charges. (I HAVE CREATED A LTC LAKIN PAGE here – which I will update as a relevant event happens or I have time.)

Cooper dominated the combative interview, demanding answers from Lakin, telling his lawyer, Paul Rolf Jensen, to let his client answer and then forging ahead with his own arguments. “I submitted Article 138 [requests],” he said. “It was the only way I could research the issue. I was asking and begging my leadership for guidance on how to address this issue.

It’s my understanding that he has been given guidance on the issue: he received a written response to his Article 138, UCMJ, complaint (an answer which he didn’t like and doesn’t agree with), and he was formally counseled (on the standard Army counseling form) of what his obligations were and the consequences of not following orders (again, not the answer he wants). At this point he has to follow orders, or he could have submitted a resignation request (which would possibly refused, that’s true).

Cooper argued that Lakin previously had taken orders from many officers without demanding their birth verification, and Jensen explained that was because the Constitutions sets the specific requirement for the president, not military officers.

Sorry, don’t see the distinction at all. This is an all or nothing issue. Either all orders issued by the President to all the armed forces are legal or they are not. Sorry LTC, can’t pick and choose on this one. Whether or not the certifications of President Obama as president and the fact that the Congress of the United States treats with him as President is irrelevant to the charges pending against LTC Lakin. At least one observer in the Washington Post implies that the LTC Lakin case may really be all about fundraising: David Weigel, “A good day for the birthers,” WPBlog 7 May 2010.

The filing of charges, however, may be part of the still-unrevealed strategy Lakin and his legal counselors are pursuing.

I found a humorous note in the article. The writer points out a typo in the charge sheet.

n support of Operation Enduring Freedom with the 32nd Calvary (sic) Regiment, 101st Airbor

The writer appropriately ‘sics’ the typo. In doing so the writer perhaps highlights what might be LTC Lakin’s calvary.

Any strategy appears to be a political one, not a legal one at this stage. At best his public statements and reasons for his misconduct might in the future be squeezed into R.C.M. 1001 as extenuation or mitigation evidence. As we know, the accused’s right to bring up matters in his sworn or unsworn statement is very broad. See e.g. United States v. Grill. Whether the reasoning is compelling enough to reduce a sentence, as opposed to aggravating a sentence, will have to be determined by the fact-finder.

Note also this point from Grill:

In United States v. Rosato, 32 MJ 93, 96 (1991), we observed that an accused’s right to make an unsworn statement “is a valuable right . . . [that has] long been recognized by military custom” and that has been “generally considered unrestricted.” We also noted that the right was not wholly unrestricted and that it would be inappropriate, for example, for an unsworn statement to include matter that was “gratuitously disrespectful toward superiors or the court [or] a form of insubordination or defiance of authority.” Under the Manual and Rosato, the right to make a statement in allocution is not wholly unfettered, but if there are abuses, they should be addressed in the context of the statements made in specific cases. The mere fact that a statement in allocution might contain matter that would be inadmissible if offered as sworn testimony does not, by itself, provide a basis for constraining the right of allocution. If, in the future, the Manual’s traditional, largely unfettered right of allocution should lead to a plethora of mini-trials, the President has the authority to provide appropriate guidance in the Manual for Courts-Martial. Under the present rules, however, as we noted in Partyka, 30 MJ at 246, “[S]o long as this valuable right is granted by the Manual for Courts-Martial, we shall not allow it to be undercut or eroded.” See also United States v. Martinsmith, 41 MJ 343, 349 (1995) (right to make unsworn statement “considered an important right at military law, whose curtailment is not to be lightly countenanced”).

The WND article goes on in reference to an earlier birther case of a reservist:

“Rather than contesting the suit,” Day wrote, “the Army took the highly peculiar step of revoking the major’s deployment order, suggesting that the Pentagon generals are not entirely confident that they can demonstrate the legitimacy of their purported commander in chief. “The Pentagon’s decision to back down rather than risk exposing Obama’s birth records to the public means that every single American soldier, sailor, pilot and Marine now holds a ‘get out of war free’ card.”

To some extent this has been true in several cases. However, the prosecution of LTC Lakin illustrates that a person refusing legitimate orders does in fact risk a court-martial and that prior “highly peculiar” results are in fact the outlier. Perhaps the WND position of a get out card has motivated the Army to take a firm position to ensure military personnel are made aware of the risks of refusing deployment orders. The WND article goes on:

“In the (Uniform Code of Military Justice), just as you would expect, criminal defendants have the process of the court, for subpoenas and depositions under the rules that are prescribed,” Jensen said.

Um, has WND read the current version of R.C.M. 405, 701, 703, and applicable case law? WND will get a surprise when it reads about depositions in the military. It does happen that I (and DMLS at least) believe that the current R.C.M. on depositions is inconsistent with and unconstitutionally restrictive of Article 49, UCMJ. So a part of me is rooting for LTC Lakin as a way to possibly get the appellate courts to invalidate the unconstitutional restrictions on Article 49, UCMJ — actually, this reminds me to post something about a defense approach to Article 49, UCMJ and R.C.M. 703. I’ll have to break out some prior deposition notices and a motion from several years ago – case ended with a PTA.

I found a humorous note in the article. The writer points out a typo in the charge sheet.

“in support of Operation Enduring Freedom with the 32nd Calvary (sic) Regiment, 101st Airborne”

The writer correctly ‘sics’ the typo. In doing so the writer perhaps highlights what might be LTC Lakin’s calvary.