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United States v. Rentas: When “Trash” Almost Sank a Plea—And the IAC Claim That Followed

On 30 April 2026, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA) issued a per curiam opinion affirming the convictions and sentence in United States v. Rentas, No. 202500082. Lance Corporal Joshua J. Rentas had pleaded guilty at a general court-martial at Camp Foster, Okinawa, to four specifications of possessing child pornography and one specification of distributing child pornography under Article 134, UCMJ. The military judge sentenced him to a dishonorable discharge, 36 months of confinement, total forfeitures, and reduction to E-1. On appeal, Rentas raised two Grostefon issues: improvident pleas based on alleged pressure from counsel during a mid-providence recess, and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to retain a digital forensic expert. NMCCA rejected both. The opinion offers a textbook walk-through of how providence inquiries work, what an “inconsistency” actually means, and how Strickland prejudice plays out in the guilty-plea context. For service members and any military defense lawyer working a pretrial agreement, it is worth a careful read.

The Facts the Court Cared About

Rentas confessed to NCIS, consented to the search and seizure of his electronic devices, and submitted a “letter of apology” with his proposed plea agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, he pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography on two laptops, an iPhone, and an external hard drive, and to one distribution specification.

During the providence inquiry on Specification 2 (the external hard drive), Rentas told the military judge he had put the hard drive in “the trash can.” Trial counsel called for a recess. Eight minutes later the inquiry resumed. Rentas explained “trash” actually meant a desk drawer “full of a bunch of trash,” that he had transferred the data—including some of the child pornography files—from the hard drive onto a different laptop, and that he planned to eventually get rid of the hard drive. The military judge accepted the pleas and imposed the agreed-upon sentence.

After trial, Rentas filed a declaration alleging that during the recess his trial defense counsel and the trial counsel both told him to “stick to the script” or his plea deal would collapse and he would face “over 50 years of confinement.” NMCCA initially denied his motion to attach the declaration, then denied reconsideration, then on its own reconsidered again and granted the motion. Even with the declaration in the record, the appeal failed.

Issue One: The Providence Inquiry and the “Trash” Problem

The standard of review for accepting a guilty plea is abuse of discretion, with questions of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008). Under Article 45, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 910(h)(2), the military judge must reject a plea—or resolve the inconsistency—if the accused sets up matter inconsistent with the plea. The substantial basis test asks whether anything in the record raises a substantial question about the plea.

NMCCA held nothing in the record raised that question for Specification 2. The “trash” comment was not an inconsistency. Rentas explained the desk-drawer-full-of-trash meaning, admitted he transferred the files including the child pornography to another device, and never claimed he was not guilty or that he obtained the files inadvertently. The stipulation of fact had him admitting “exclusive dominion and control” of the hard drive. That is the opposite of an inconsistency. The court distinguished United States v. Hayes, 70 M.J. 454 (C.A.A.F. 2012), and United States v. Phillippe, 63 M.J. 307 (C.A.A.F. 2006): a military judge must dig deeper when the accused raises a possible defense, but mere mitigation or rationalization is not the same thing as a defense. See United States v. Shaw, 64 M.J. 460 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

The recess-pressure allegation got even shorter treatment. Rentas did not argue coercion. The court flatly stated that “it is reasonable for a defense counsel to inform a client of possible and foreseeable consequences if a military judge were to reject a guilty plea as improvident.” Telling a client what the maximum punishment looks like if the deal collapses is not improper pressure—it is candid lawyering. The court also pointed out that Rentas did not challenge providence as to Specifications 1, 3, 4, or 5, but asked that all five findings and the sentence be set aside. NMCCA was not biting.

For background on how the Care inquiry functions and how plea problems develop in the record, see our prior post: Guilty pleas under the UCMJ.

Issue Two: Ineffective Assistance and the Digital Forensic Expert

Rentas’s second claim was that trial defense counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a digital forensic expert who could have explained “the process by which files can be transferred from one device to another without the knowledge or intent of the user.” The court reviewed the claim de novo under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and the guilty-plea-specific prejudice standard from Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357 (2017): whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the accused would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

The opinion did two things that matter for any future Strickland claim in the plea context. First, it presumed reasonable tactical judgment. Rentas had already confessed to NCIS and consented to the searches that produced the devices. Against that record, declining to retain a digital forensic expert was a reasonable strategic call—and there is “significant” evidence to overcome before that presumption breaks. Second, it applied Suarez and Furth. A bare post-trial assertion that the accused would not have pleaded guilty is not enough. The court must look at contemporaneous evidence—the confession, the consent search, the apology letter, the stipulation of fact, the agreed sentence cap—because every appellant has an incentive to retroactively reframe the deal. United States v. Suarez, 86 M.J. 65 (C.A.A.F. 2025); United States v. Furth, 81 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2021).

The court added a sharp factual finding tucked in a footnote: it did not credit Rentas’s claim that he was unaware files would download onto the hard drive. With that credibility call, the prejudice analysis was over.

What This Opinion Teaches

Several practical points emerge. A providence inquiry is not a verbatim test. The military judge must resolve actual inconsistencies, not chase every mitigating word. Rationalization, minimization, and clarification do not invalidate a plea unless they negate an element or set up a defense. See our discussion of this principle: Providence shines down or upon.

Recess conversations between an accused and defense counsel about the consequences of an improvident plea are normal and lawful. Allegations of “pressure” must show coercion that overrides voluntariness, not just candor about exposure if the deal collapses. A post-trial declaration alone, even if attached to the record, rarely moves the needle when the contemporaneous record—confession, consent, stipulation, apology letter, plea agreement—uniformly supports the plea.

Ineffective-assistance claims in the plea context turn on whether the accused would have rejected the deal and gone to trial. That is an objective inquiry, anchored to the actual evidence of guilt, not to the appellate brief’s hindsight. When the Government has a confession, consensual search results, and a stipulation, the Lee prejudice showing is steep.

Digital forensic experts can be powerful tools in CSAM and computer-evidence cases. See United States v. Douangdara and our prior post: How a guilty plea can go wrong. But timing matters. The right place to litigate digital forensics is before the guilty plea, not after. Once an accused confesses, consents to searches, signs a stipulation, and pleads guilty, the appellate burden to undo the plea on a forensics theory becomes very heavy.

The Strategic Lesson Before You Sign a Plea Agreement

If digital forensics could exonerate or mitigate—if there is a real argument about automatic syncing, cloud backups, malware downloads, shared devices, or unintended file transfers—those arguments belong in pretrial motions, suppression litigation, expert assistance requests under R.C.M. 703(d), and pretrial negotiations. They lose nearly all their power once the providence inquiry is over and the plea is accepted. Rentas is the latest reminder that the leverage in a CSAM case is built before arraignment, not after sentencing.

How Cave & Freeburg Can Help

At Cave & Freeburg, our military defense lawyers handle Article 134 child pornography cases, NCIS, OSI, CID, and CGIS investigations, and the full range of pretrial and appellate work in courts-martial across every service. We litigate motions to suppress under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, secure expert assistance for digital forensics under R.C.M. 703(d), evaluate plea agreements with realistic exposure analysis, and—when the government’s case has real weaknesses—we contest at trial rather than settle. On appeal, we know how NMCCA, AFCCA, ACCA, the Coast Guard CCA, and CAAF handle providence challenges, Strickland claims under Suarez, Furth, and Lee, and post-trial declarations. If you face a child pornography investigation or charge under Article 134, UCMJ, or you have already been convicted and want a candid appellate assessment, contact Cave & Freeburg, LLP, today. Call (703) 298-9562 or (917) 701-8961 to speak confidentially with an experienced military defense counsel.

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Delta-8 THC and Article 112a, UCMJ: Why the Government Lost in United States v. Byrd

On 29 April 2026, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) handed down a clean win for the defense in United States v. Byrd, No. ACM S32814. The court reversed Airman Basic Chance J. Byrd’s conviction for wrongful use of delta-8 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC-8) under Article 112a, UCMJ, set aside his bad-conduct discharge, and dismissed the charge with prejudice. Even the Government conceded the conviction could not stand. For any service member charged with using delta-8 THC, hemp-derived CBD, or related cannabinoid products, this opinion matters. A military defense lawyer who understands the chemistry, the statutes, and the appellate standards can turn a “positive” urinalysis into a dismissed charge.

What Happened at Trial

A special court-martial at Minot Air Force Base convicted Byrd of one specification of wrongful use of a Schedule I controlled substance based on four urinalyses showing THC-8 (and not THC-9) in his system. The military judge sentenced him to a bad-conduct discharge and five months of confinement.

The Government’s expert, an Air Force Drug Testing Laboratory (AFDTL) forensic toxicologist, told members that THC-8 is a Schedule I controlled substance “depending on how it’s produced.” He explained the three production paths: isolation from marijuana (controlled), synthesis from small molecules (controlled), or isolation from hemp (not controlled). On cross, he conceded the urinalysis cannot identify the source. On redirect, he allowed that the THC-8 “could be” from a non-hemp source.

That “could be” was the entire case. And that is exactly why it failed.

The Statutory Problem the Government Could Not Solve

The 2018 Farm Bill amended the Controlled Substances Act to exempt tetrahydrocannabinols in hemp from Schedule I. Hemp means cannabis with a delta-9 THC concentration of 0.3% or less on a dry-weight basis. THC-8 derived from hemp—almost always made by chemically converting hemp-derived CBD—is therefore not a controlled substance under federal law. The AFDTL’s own forensic toxicologist testified outside the members’ presence that “almost all THC-8—99.99% of it” comes from hemp because isolating it from marijuana is economically pointless. The DEA itself has signaled that cannabinoids derived from hemp are not scheduled.

Because of that legal reality, every other military service charges THC-8 use under Article 92, UCMJ, as a violation of a punitive regulation or general order. The Army uses AR 600-85. The Navy and Marines use ALNAV 074/20. The Coast Guard uses COMDTINST 1000.10B. The Air Force’s own DAFMAN 44-197 paragraph 1.2.2.1 expressly prohibits hemp-derived products and warns that violations “may also” support Article 112a—but the AFDTL Legal Advisor specifically advised charging Article 92, not Article 112a, because the lab cannot prove the substance is scheduled.

The trial counsel ignored that advice. The court called it “the road less traveled by”—and reversed.

Legal and Factual Sufficiency: The Two Bites at the Apple

Judge Kubler’s opinion walks through the standards. For legal sufficiency under Robinson, the court asks whether any rational trier of fact could have found every element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government produced no evidence the THC-8 came from a non-hemp source. “Could be” does not clear the reasonable-doubt bar. No rational fact-finder could find the element of “controlled substance” satisfied.

For factual sufficiency under the post-2021 Article 66(d)(1)(B), UCMJ, the appellant must make a specific showing of a deficiency of proof to trigger review. Once triggered, the court weighs the evidence, gives appropriate deference to the trial court’s witness assessments, and may set aside the finding if it is clearly convinced the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The AFCCA was clearly convinced. The defense team made the right showing, and the appellate panel did the rest.

For background on how Congress narrowed factual sufficiency review for offenses on or after 1 January 2021, see our prior post: Congress Changed Factual Sufficiency Review — What That Means for Your Military Appeal.

The 12 November 2026 Change — Why This Window Matters Now

The court flagged something every service member and every military defense counsel needs to track. Effective 12 November 2026, the new statutory definition of “hemp” eliminates the carve-out for hemp-derived THC-8. The amended Section 297A of the Agricultural Marketing Act will measure total THC—not just delta-9 THC—at 0.3% on a dry-weight basis. After that date, the Byrd defense disappears for offenses committed under the new law. Until then, every Article 112a charge for THC-8 in the Air Force—and frankly across the services where commands try to push beyond their own punitive regulations—deserves close scrutiny.

What This Means If You Tested Positive for THC-8

Several practical takeaways stand out. First, a positive urinalysis for THC-8 with a negative THC-9 result is not a confession to using a Schedule I controlled substance. Second, the Government must affirmatively prove the source of the THC-8 was something other than hemp, and the laboratory testimony in Byrd shows how hard that is. Third, charging decisions matter: if your command charged Article 112a instead of Article 92, the charging document itself may be defective on these facts. Fourth, if you have already been convicted under Article 112a for THC-8 based on conduct before the November 2026 statutory change, an appeal raising legal and factual sufficiency under Byrd, Robinson, and Harvey should be on the table immediately.

How Cave & Freeburg Can Help

At Cave & Freeburg, our military defense lawyers handle Article 112a cases at every stage—command investigations, Article 32 preliminary hearings, special and general courts-martial, and appeals to the service Courts of Criminal Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. We have litigated drug urinalysis cases involving cannabinoid chemistry, AFDTL and Navy Drug Screening Laboratory protocols, and the legal-and-factual-sufficiency standards that decided Byrd. We know the AFDTL Legal Advisor’s guidance, the sister-service regulations, and the exact appellate playbook used to win Byrd-type challenges. If your case involves delta-8 THC, hemp-derived CBD, or any cannabinoid charged under Article 112a, contact Cave & Freeburg, LLP today. Call (703) 298-9562 or (917) 701-8961 for a confidential consultation with an experienced military defense counsel.

Your Court-Martial Appeal and the Date of Your Offense: Why It Matters More Than You Think

If you were convicted at a court-martial, one fact could shape your entire appeal: the date the alleged offense occurred. Not the date of your trial. Not the date you were sentenced. The date of the offense itself.

Congress changed the rules for military appeals in 2021. That change created two completely different systems — one for people whose alleged offenses happened before January 1, 2021, and one for people whose alleged offenses happened on or after that date. Which system applies to you can be the difference between an appeals court that automatically takes a hard look at whether the evidence really proved you guilty, and one that requires you to jump through extra hoops just to get that review started.

This post explains both systems in plain terms, tells you which cases matter, and explains why having experienced appellate counsel makes all the difference.

The Old System: The Appeals Court Had to Personally Convince Itself You Were Guilty

Before January 1, 2021, the rules were straightforward and relatively favorable to the accused. The appeals court — called the Court of Criminal Appeals, or CCA — had to review every conviction automatically. No request needed. No hoops to jump through.

The standard the court applied was simple: Am I personally convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this person is guilty? If the answer was no, the court could throw out the conviction — even if the panel at trial believed otherwise.

This gave the appeals court real power. It could look at everything fresh. It did not have to defer to the panel’s judgment. If the evidence was thin, contradicted, or just did not add up, the appeals court could say so and act on it.

The New System: You Have to Earn the Right to That Review

For offenses that occurred on or after January 1, 2021, Congress tightened the process considerably.

Under the new rules, the CCA does not automatically review whether the evidence was strong enough to convict you. You have to ask for that review, and you have to give the court a specific reason to look. The law calls this making “a specific showing of a deficiency in proof.” In plain terms, you cannot just say “I disagree with the verdict.” You have to point to something concrete — a gap in the evidence, a weakness in the government’s proof on a specific element of the offense, something that shows the conviction may not hold up under scrutiny.

Only after you clear that hurdle does the court actually weigh the evidence. And even then, the court gives some deference to what the trial court found. To overturn a conviction, the appeals court must be “clearly convinced” the guilty finding was against the weight of the evidence — still measured at proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but with a higher bar to clear before the court acts.

Which System Applies to You?

The answer depends on one thing: when did the alleged offense occur?

• Before January 1, 2021 — the old system applies. The CCA reviews your conviction automatically and must personally be convinced you are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
• On or after January 1, 2021 — the new system applies. You must assign the error, make the specific showing, and the court gives deference to the trial court’s findings.

The date of your trial, sentencing, or appeal does not matter for this purpose. Only the offense date counts.

The Cases That Prove This Matters

United States v. Patterson, No. ACM 40426 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2024)

This is the clearest Air Force example of the old system working in an accused’s favor. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals set aside Staff Sergeant Patterson’s conviction because the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred during the dates alleged in the specification. The court applied the old standard — full, fresh review, no deference — because all the charged conduct predated January 1, 2021. The Government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, which confirmed that it could only review the Air Force court’s decision for legal errors, not second-guess the factual findings. The conviction stayed set aside.

That case traces the full chain: the Air Force appeals court has real power over pre-2021 convictions, and CAAF cannot override it on the facts.

United States v. Harvey, 85 M.J. 127 (C.A.A.F. 2024)

This is the leading case on how the new system works. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that under the post-2021 rules, the appeals court must first decide whether the appellant has made that specific showing of a deficiency in proof before it does anything else. If you clear that hurdle, the court weighs the evidence — but still gives deference to what the trial court found. The court cannot presume you are guilty. But you have to give it a concrete reason to look.

United States v. Csiti, 85 M.J. 414 (C.A.A.F. 2025)

This case settled a question that had been floating around: can the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces conduct its own factual sufficiency review? The answer is no. Under both the old and new systems, CAAF only reviews legal questions. Factual sufficiency — whether the evidence actually proved you guilty — lives entirely at the CCA level. Win it there, or you likely do not win it at all.

What About Charges That Span Both Sides of January 1, 2021?

Some cases involve charges that cover conduct both before and after the cutoff date–which lawyers call “bridge cases.” These situations are complicated, and the answer is not always obvious. Which standard applies can depend on how the charges are drafted, which specific findings are at issue, and how the appellate court decides to handle the split.

If your case involves charges from both sides of that date, you need counsel who understands both systems and can argue whichever standard gives you the best shot at relief.

Why This Matters for Your Appeal

The difference between the old and new systems is not a technicality. It is the difference between an appeals court that owes you a fresh look and one that starts with its hands somewhat tied. Getting this right — identifying which system applies, making the right showing under the right standard, and building the argument that gives the court a reason to act — is exactly the kind of work experienced military appellate counsel does.

Cave & Freeburg, LLP — We Are Actively Litigating These Issues Right Now

Cave & Freeburg currently represents Air Force, Army, and Navy-Marine Corps appellants in active appeals involving Article 66 factual sufficiency challenges — including cases turning on the pre- and post-2021 distinction and cases involving Article 120 convictions under the Mendoza framework.

If you or someone you know has a court-martial conviction and wants to know whether the appeals process could lead to a different result, contact us. We will tell you honestly what we see and what, if anything, can be done about it.

Cave & Freeburg, LLP — Military Defense and Appellate Lawyers www.court-martial.com | (703) 298-9562

However, once that deal is signed, the judge accepts it, and it is now on appeal, it is hard to get the appellate court to reduce the sentence that is actually adjudged so long as it is within the specified limits of the deal and does not contain any clause that violates public policy. United States v. Spencer from the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is one example of how the appeals court looks at the sentence appropriateness where there is a pretrial agreement.

The Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA) reviewed LCpl Spencer’s sentence de novo under the pre‑2023 version of Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ. That statute authorizes the service courts to approve only so much of the sentence as they find “correct in law and fact” and, on the whole record, “should be approved.” Congress removed this text when it overhauled military sentencing in the Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA, but the new regime applies only to offenses occurring on or after 27 January 2023, so the legacy standard controlled here.

Applying that standard, the court reiterated several long‑standing principles: (1) sentence appropriateness review is a matter of law that the court exercises independently; (2) the court must give the accused the punishment he deserves to ensure justice; and (3) it must individually assess both the gravity of the offense and the character of the offender. The court possesses wide latitude to mitigate a legally valid sentence, yet it may not dispense pure clemency—an executive, rather than judicial, function. United States v. Lane frames the de novo review mandate; Healy and Snelling stress individualized proportionality; and Nerad distinguishes sentence tailoring from clemency.

Key facts

Spencer pled guilty, under a negotiated plea agreement, to stealing merchandise from a Marine Corps Exchange on four occasions over eight days. After an initial theft with a fellow Marine, he returned three more times—twice on the same day—to take high‑value items ranging from clothing to electronics. He deliberately circumvented store security and kept the goods for personal use. The agreement left the military judge free to adjudge, but not obligated to impose, a bad‑conduct discharge; it also capped confinement. The judge recommended suspending confinement—but not the discharge—in light of Spencer’s post‑offense reform efforts. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence.

Analysis

• Legal ceiling. The adjudged punishment neither exceeded the presidential maximums under Article 56(a) nor breached the confinement and punitive‑discharge limits the plea agreement imposed. Reviewing courts will not disturb a sentence that remains within both the UCMJ ceiling and the bargained‑for cap.
• Standard‑of‑review discipline. By invoking Lane and its progeny, the panel correctly treated sentence appropriateness as a question of law—distinct from factual or legal sufficiency—and reviewed it without deference to the trial court’s discretion. The judges therefore asked the right question: “Does this appellant deserve this sentence on this record?”
• Individualized proportionality. The panel weighed Spencer’s repetitive, escalating thefts, the deliberate evasion of security, and the significant value of the property against the mitigating evidence of rehabilitation. That balanced assessment comported with the individualized‑justice mandate of Snelling and Healy.
• Clemency vs. justice. Nerad cautions that Article 66 power must operate under an articulable legal standard, not raw equity. The court honored that boundary by declining to grant outright clemency; instead, it verified that the punishment matched the misconduct and the plea‑agreement expectations.
• Plea‑agreement deference. The panel emphasized that Spencer freely negotiated the agreement and reaped its benefits. Echoing NMCCA precedent in Avellaneda, the court prudently refrained from “second‑guessing” the bargained sentence absent legal error or manifest injustice. Findlaw

Conclusion

The NMCCA performed a textbook Article 66 sentence‑appropriateness review: it applied the correct legal standard, conducted a fact‑intensive proportionality analysis, respected the limits of judicial power, and declined to intrude upon the negotiated plea framework. Given Spencer’s serial thefts and the agreement’s caps, the panel reasonably concluded that the approved sentence was lawful, just, and not unduly severe.

The review is based on Csady v. Ashworth, but it is equally applicable when federal courts examine habeas corpus petitions from military prisoners under 28 U.S.C. 2241.

I. Overview and Holding

The opinion addresses whether a federal district court may collaterally review the military court-martial conviction of Csady, a service member who was not subject to punitive discharge or confinement. The court concludes that it lacks authority to do so, reaffirming the traditional deference owed to the military justice system and the narrow scope of permissible collateral review by Article III courts.

II. The Military Justice System: Structure and Independence

1. Constitutional Basis:
   
   The military justice system operates under Article I of the Constitution (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14), giving Congress authority to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”
   
   See Ortiz v. United States, 585 U.S. 427 (2018); Santucci v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 66 F.4th 844, 852 (10th Cir. 2023).
2. Comprehensive Review Mechanism:
   
   The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) establishes a multi-tiered appellate process. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140–41 (1953) (plurality opinion).
   • Trial courts: summary, special, and general courts-martial (Willenbring v. United States, 559 F.3d 225, 227 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009)).
   • Intermediate appeals: Service-specific Courts of Criminal Appeals (CCAs) (10 U.S.C. § 866).
   • Discretionary review: The Judge Advocate General may refer cases to a CCA (10 U.S.C. § 869).
   • Final military review: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) (10 U.S.C. § 867).
   • Ultimate review: U.S. Supreme Court by certiorari (28 U.S.C. § 1259).
3. Non-Automatic Review in Non-Punitive Cases:
   
   In cases like Csady’s—where there is no confinement or punitive discharge—automatic appellate review is not available, and discretionary review by the Judge Advocate General and subsequent appellate bodies is limited.
   
   See 10 U.S.C. §§ 869(d), 867.

III. Scope of Collateral Review by Federal District Courts

1. Presumption Against Civil Review:
   
   The Supreme Court has long held that civil courts lack authority to review military court decisions absent jurisdictional or fundamental defects. See Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 177 (1886); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746–48 (1975).
2. Schlesinger Exception:
   
   Federal courts may intervene if the court-martial judgment is void due to a fundamental defect, including lack of jurisdiction or egregious legal error. This review must consider both:
   • The nature of the alleged defect, and
   • The gravity of the harm, evaluated with deference to the military system. Schlesinger, 420 U.S. at 753.
3. Burns Exception (Habeas Context Only):
   
   In Burns v. Wilson, the Court recognized a narrow habeas-based exception permitting collateral review where the military failed to provide full and fair consideration of constitutional claims.
   
   However, courts are not to reweigh evidence unless claims were ignored or unaddressed. See Burns, 346 U.S. at 142–44.
4. Dodson Factors (Non-Jurisdictional Habeas Review):
   
   Under Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1990), courts apply a four-part test to assess if a habeas claim merits review:Substantial constitutional claim;Pure legal issue, not factual dispute;No overriding military interest against review;Inadequate military consideration or improper legal standard.See also Santucci, 66 F.4th at 856; Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
5. Application to Non-Habeas Claims:
   
   While Burns and Dodson primarily apply to habeas cases, courts have occasionally used them in evaluating non-habeas collateral attacks as part of a threshold analysis for voidness under Schlesinger.
   
   See Allen v. U.S. Air Force, 603 F.3d 423, 431 (8th Cir. 2010); Yongo v. United States, No. 5:10-cv-220, 2013 WL 2285341, at *6 (E.D.N.C. May 23, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Yongo v. McHugh, 540 F. App’x 237 (4th Cir. 2013).

IV. Application to Csady’s Case

• No Punitive Discharge or Confinement: Csady’s case does not meet the threshold for automatic military appellate review under 10 U.S.C. § 866.
• Non-Custodial Petitioner: Because he is not in custody, the Burns-based habeas exception does not apply.
• No Void Judgment: Csady fails to demonstrate a jurisdictional or fundamental defect under Schlesinger, and cannot satisfy even the Burns or Dodson thresholds for constitutional violation.
• Respect for Military Finality: The court emphasizes that Article III courts are not forums of appellate review over courts-martial, echoing a consistent jurisprudential theme. See Santucci, 66 F.4th at 853; Burns, 346 U.S. at 140.

V. Legal and Policy Implications

This opinion reinforces:

• The insulation of military adjudications from civilian judicial review,
• The integrity and autonomy of the Article I military justice system,
• And the principle of comity between the military and civilian branches of federal judicial power.

It reflects a careful balancing of constitutional rights with military discipline and expertise, upholding the notion that military courts must remain the primary guardians of justice for service members, absent clear constitutional transgressions.

Conclusion

The opinion stands as a compelling reaffirmation of longstanding Supreme Court and circuit precedent limiting federal district court review of military court decisions. Without evidence of jurisdictional voidness, a breakdown in procedural fairness, or a significant constitutional issue wrongly decided, collateral review remains foreclosed. The motion to dismiss was therefore properly granted.

The appellant, a specialist in the U.S. Army, was charged with multiple sexual assault offenses and a false official statement. During voir dire at his court-martial, he challenged the selection of Sergeant First Class (SFC) Bravo as a panel member, arguing actual and implied bias based on SFC Bravo’s statements regarding soldiers who retain civilian defense counsel. The military judge denied the challenges, and SFC Bravo participated in the panel that convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed the conviction. However, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) reviewed the case and determined that while the military judge did not abuse discretion regarding actual bias, SFC Bravo’s responses during voir dire created a close case of implied bias. Under the liberal grant mandate, which requires excusing panel members in close cases to maintain public confidence in the fairness of military justice, CAAF held that the military judge erred. Consequently, the CAAF reversed the CCA’s judgment.

This case is a good primer for military defense counsel.

1. Actual Bias
The court holds that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the challenge for actual bias. Military judges are given “great deference” in these determinations, as they are best positioned to assess the demeanor and credibility of potential panel members during voir dire. In this case, despite the absence of explicit findings on SFC Bravo’s demeanor and credibility, the military judge’s decision was based on Bravo’s assurance of fairness. The precedent cases (United States v. Youngblood and United States v. Terry) support the conclusion that a military judge’s assessment of a panel member’s sincerity carries substantial weight. Since there is no evidence in the record that significantly undermines the military judge’s ruling, the appellate court finds no abuse of discretion.

Analysis

The court’s reasoning is grounded in established military jurisprudence, which prioritizes the firsthand observations of the trial judge during voir dire. The deference given to the military judge aligns with prior case law, reinforcing the principle that appellate courts should not overturn a trial judge’s credibility determinations absent clear error.

However, the absence of explicit findings on demeanor could be seen as a weakness in the ruling. While precedent acknowledges that implicit credibility findings are permissible, a more detailed record would have strengthened the decision’s defensibility on appeal. Nonetheless, the ruling underscores the judiciary’s trust in trial-level assessments of impartiality, absent compelling contradictory evidence.

2. Implied Bias Determination

1.  Failure to Explain Implied Bias Reasoning – The military judge did not distinguish between actual and implied bias and failed to provide a clear record of legal analysis.
2. Mistaken View of Facts – The judge incorrectly concluded that SFC Bravo only noted an “outside perception” of civilian defense counsel, whereas Bravo actually expressed a personal belief.
3. Lack of Proper Inquiry – The judge did not sufficiently probe SFC Bravo’s potentially prejudicial views or clarify his statements.
4. Failure to Instruct or Rehabilitate – Unlike United States v. Napolitano, where a biased panel member was properly educated on the law and recanted their views, no such effort was made here.
5. Inadequate Rehabilitation – SFC Bravo’s assertions of impartiality were in response to leading questions, and he never recanted his belief that hiring civilian counsel was “unusual.” 

Because the military judge did not apply the liberal grant mandate, the court concludes that the failure to excuse SFC Bravo undermines the fairness of the court-martial panel.

Legal and Analytical Evaluation

The appellate court’s ruling reinforces the principle that implied bias is assessed based on how an objective observer would perceive fairness in the proceedings. This decision is grounded in case law (Keago, Clay, Rogers) and highlights several key legal considerations:

1.  Distinction Between Actual and Implied Bias – The military judge conflated the two standards, which require separate legal analyses. While actual bias focuses on subjective impartiality, implied bias is about public confidence in the fairness of the system. The judge’s failure to recognize this distinction weakened his ruling.
2. Liberal Grant Mandate – Military judges must err on the side of excusing panel members in “close cases” to preserve the integrity of courts-martial. The failure to do so constitutes reversible error (Keago, 84 M.J. at 375).
3. Insufficient Inquiry and Rehabilitation – The judge’s failure to clarify or challenge SFC Bravo’s statements left room for doubt about his impartiality. The absence of proper judicial questioning and instructional guidance meant that potential biases remained unaddressed. Unlike in Napolitano, where rehabilitation was successful, the lack of intervention here allowed bias to persist.
4. Impact on the Fairness of the Court-Martial – The ruling emphasizes that SFC Bravo’s views could have led an objective observer to doubt the impartiality of the panel. This is critical because military justice requires heightened scrutiny to ensure fairness and avoid even the appearance of impropriety.

Conclusion

The appellate court’s decision is well-reasoned and aligns with military legal principles regarding voir dire and panel member impartiality. The ruling highlights the necessity of a clear record, proper legal analysis, and the liberal grant mandate in implied bias cases. The military judge’s failure to excuse SFC Bravo constitutes reversible error, underscoring the importance of procedural rigor in ensuring fair trials in courts-martal.

Do you have this issue at trial or on appeal. The military defense counsel at Cave & Freeburg, LLP, have the knowledge and experience to analyse your jury / Members problem.

The general standard of review for a government certificate for review under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is governed by Article 67(a)(2), UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(2)), which grants the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) jurisdiction to review decisions of the service courts of criminal appeals (CCAs) upon certification by the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the respective service.

Standard of Review for Government-Certified Issues

1. De Novo Review for Legal Issues:
   • CAAF generally applies a de novo standard of review when considering legal issues presented under a certificate for review. This applies to questions of statutory interpretation, constitutional law, and other legal determinations made by the lower courts.
   • See United States v. Wilkins, 71 M.J. 410 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (“Questions of law are reviewed de novo.”).
2. Deference to Factual Findings:
   • When the case involves factual determinations by the service courts of criminal appeals (CCAs), CAAF generally applies a clearly erroneous standard. The court gives deference to the lower courts’ factual findings unless they are unsupported by the record or clearly erroneous.
   • See United States v. Burris, 78 M.J. 280 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (“We will not overturn the factual determinations of the lower court unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record.”).
3. Abuse of Discretion for Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings:
   • When reviewing matters involving procedural decisions, evidentiary rulings, or discretionary rulings by the trial court (such as rulings on expert witnesses, sentencing decisions, or admission of evidence), CAAF applies an abuse of discretion standard.
   • See United States v. Feliciano, 76 M.J. 237 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (holding that evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Limitations on CAAF’s Review Authority

• CAAF’s review is limited to the specific issues certified by the JAG unless the accused also files a petition for review on separate issues under Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ.
• If the CCA’s decision is based on independent grounds not related to the certified issue, CAAF may decline to rule on the issue.
• CAAF does not generally reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment on witness credibility unless there is a legal deficiency.

Precedents from CAAF Regarding Government Certificates of Review

• United States v. Upham, 66 M.J. 83 (C.A.A.F. 2008): CAAF’s authority under a government certificate of review is limited to the specific issues certified by the JAG.
• United States v. Adams, 63 M.J. 223 (C.A.A.F. 2006): The lower court’s ruling will generally be upheld unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”
• United States v. Jones, 78 M.J. 37 (C.A.A.F. 2018): When a case presents a mixed question of law and fact, the legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, while the factual findings are reviewed for clear error.

Conclusion

When CAAF reviews a case under a government certificate of review, it generally applies:

• De novo review for pure legal questions.
• Clearly erroneous standard for factual determinations.
• Abuse of discretion standard for procedural and evidentiary matters.

An important issue in such “appeals” is whether the prosecution is asking CAAF to find new facts or reinterpret the facts–its complex, and something we as military defense lawyers are familiar with.

A key appellate case supporting the proposition that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) does not generally reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment on witness credibility unless there is a legal deficiency is United States v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

Rule from Wheeler (2017)

In United States v. Wheeler, CAAF reaffirmed that it does not engage in reweighing evidence or making independent determinations of witness credibility, stating:

“It is the duty of the factfinder, not this Court, to determine the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence presented at trial. We will not disturb such findings unless there is a clear legal error or the findings are unsupported by the record.”

— United States v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

Other Supporting Cases

• United States v. Rosario, 76 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2017):
  • Held that CAAF does not reassess credibility determinations unless there is a legal deficiency, noting that the fact-finder’s determinations are given great deference unless unsupported by the record.
• United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456 (C.A.A.F. 2007):
  • Stated that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence but rather assess whether the court below had a basis in law and fact for its conclusions.
• United States v. Satterly, 74 M.J. 544 (C.A.A.F. 2015):
  • Affirmed that CAAF does not second-guess factual findings or witness credibility assessments unless they are “clearly erroneous” or based on incorrect legal standards.

Conclusion

CAAF follows the principle that credibility determinations and factual findings rest with the factfinder (trial court or CCA), and appellate review is limited to assessing whether there was a legal deficiency, such as insufficiency of evidence, misapplication of law, or due process violation. The case of United States v. Wheeler, along with Rosario and Beatty, directly supports this appellate principle.

A most interesting questions is what can CAAF review and how may it do that when a CCA has dismissed a charge because it is not factually sufficient to support a finding of guilty–stated another way, the appeals court is saying the person should not have been found guilty. The Government likes to certify these cases because it doesn’t like the result.

When the certified issue relates to a Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) finding of factual insufficiency, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) applies a deferential standard of review and does not reassess the factual sufficiency of the case de novo. Instead, its review is limited to determining whether the CCA applied the correct legal standard and whether its decision is clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record.

Standard of Review for a CCA’s Factual Insufficiency Determination

Under Article 66(d), UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 866(d)), CCAs are required to conduct a factual sufficiency review by independently weighing the evidence and determining whether the conviction is correct beyond a reasonable doubt. If a CCA finds the evidence factually insufficient and sets aside a conviction, CAAF’s review of that decision is highly deferential.

• United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394 (C.A.A.F. 2002):
  • CAAF does not have the authority to review a CCA’s factual sufficiency determination de novo. Instead, it reviews whether the CCA applied the correct legal standard and whether its factual determination is clearly erroneous.
  • “Once the Court of Criminal Appeals determines that the evidence is factually insufficient, we are bound by that determination absent clear error or application of an erroneous legal standard.”
• United States v. Smith, 76 M.J. 524 (C.A.A.F. 2017):
  • Reaffirmed that CAAF does not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility when reviewing a CCA’s factual sufficiency determination.
  • “The Courts of Criminal Appeals have unique fact-finding powers under Article 66, UCMJ, which we do not disturb unless their decision is clearly erroneous or based on a misapplication of the law.”
• United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138 (C.A.A.F. 2010):
  • Held that CAAF’s review of a CCA’s factual sufficiency determination is limited to ensuring that the CCA applied the correct standard under Article 66, UCMJ, and does not substitute its own judgment for that of the CCA.

Key Points About CAAF’s Standard of Review in Certified Cases Involving Factual Insufficiency

1. Highly Deferential Standard:
   • CAAF does not reassess factual sufficiency but only reviews whether the CCA applied the correct legal standard.
2. Clearly Erroneous Review:
   • CAAF will only reverse a CCA’s finding of factual insufficiency if it is clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record (Washington, Smith).
3. Legal Standard Review:
   • If a CCA misapplies Article 66(d), UCMJ, or fails to properly conduct a factual sufficiency review, CAAF can intervene (Nerad).

Conclusion

If a government certificate for review challenges a CCA’s factual insufficiency determination, CAAF does not reweigh the evidence but only ensures the CCA applied the correct legal standard and that its decision was not clearly erroneous. This principle has been upheld in Washington, Smith, and Nerad.

Would you like a case-specific analysis or further discussion on a particular aspect–contact the military defense lawyers at Cave & Freeburg, LLP, and we’ll see if we can help.

When deciding what a word or term in a statute means, the rule of statutory interpretation is to give the word or term its plain and ordinary meaning. This is known as the plain meaning rule. If the word or term is clear and unambiguous, then the court will not look beyond the text of the statute to determine its meaning. The principal rule is well known to military defense counsel as they prepare a case for trial.

If a word or term is ambiguous, then the court may use other tools of statutory interpretation to determine its meaning. These tools include:

• Looking at the context of the word or term in the statute. This means considering the other words and phrases in the statute, as well as the overall purpose of the statute.
• Considering the legislative history of the statute. This includes looking at the bill drafts, committee reports, and other materials that were created during the legislative process.
• Considering relevant case law. This includes looking at how other courts have interpreted similar words and terms in other statutes.

The court will use these tools to interpret the ambiguous word or term in a way consistent with the statute’s overall purpose. Readers should also be aware of Scalia & Garner’s excellent book–Reading the Law, for deep dives into the rules and their complexities. As military defense counsel, we have a copy handy on our bookshelf.

It is important to note that the rules of statutory interpretation are complex and no single rule can be applied to all cases. Courts will often weigh different factors when interpreting a statute, including the plain meaning of the text, the context of the statute, the legislative history of the statute, and relevant case law.

A specific case-–United States v. Cabuhat

Over the last few years, Congress has made life difficult for military defense counsel, actually all lawyers practicting military justice, because of the numerous changes to the definition of what is or is not a crime.

Before a description of Cabuhat, what does (Google) Bard say The phrase “in the presence of” means in the same place as and close enough to be seen or heard. It can be used to describe a physical presence, such as when you are sitting in a room with someone.’

Cabuhat, assigned to the 86th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Ramstein, Germany, was sentenced to 30 years confinement in June 2021. He plead guilty to SA of a child, wrongfully photographing the child, and viewing and possessing CP.

Cabuhat was arrested in 2021 after an Air Force Office OSI investigation. Cabuhat SA a child on many times and had photographed the person during the abuse. He also had a large collection of CP.

Cabuhat pleaded guilty to all charges in June 2021. The military judge sentenced him to 30 years (to be served at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, KS), a dishonorable discharge, reduction to E-1, and mandatory SOR.

The central issue in the case is the meaning of “in the prescence of.” This can be important when the parties are separated and are communicating via Skype, WhatsApp, FaceTime or similar application.

There are two major roadblocks: (1) having the record of trial delivered to and docketed with the Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, or Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals and (2) the workload of the military appellate defense counsel. The roadblocks are, in my opinion, the Service Judge Advocate General’s fault in not assigning enough people to complete post-trial actions or work on the appeal promptly.

Immediately after the trial, there has to be a formal Entry of Judgment–which usually takes 30-45 days to complete. Then, the Government must prepare a full trial record forwarded to the appellate court and the military appellate defense lawyers who will work on the appeal. Here is where most of the delay can happen. These records take time to prepare–and too often, the Government takes an unreasonably long to do this. Records can take six to two years to get to the appellate court before the appellate defense counsel can get to work, and a decision comes from the court. We have a case right now where it took 412 days. The Navy-Marine Corps just decided on a case that took about ten years.

What can be done to unblock or avoid this inertia on the part of the Government? Too often, I think the local command doesn’t care. In their minds, the case is done, and the person has been convicted and jailed.

With this in mind, I have a protocol to follow, which, if it works, will get the case to the court quicker, and if not, either sentence credit or dismissal. Dismissal is what happened in the Navy case mentioned above. The most common result is sentence credit, which can be a month or several months.

If I am the civilian appellate defense counsel, my protocol has several stages starting immediately after the trial. This is the best opportunity to get results. If we are hired at this time, we would also begin evaluating the case for likely success on appeal and, if so, what issues to bring up to the court. We have not always been hired to do the entire appeal at this time, but there is a benefit to the client in being prepared to deal with the military lawyers.

After the initial involvement, the following stages for action are 90 days, then 150 days after the trial’s finish. Various filings can be made to the Government lawyer’s supervisors and ultimately to the court of criminal appeals. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 66 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and various regulations provide the right to a speedy review of a conviction by a court of appeal. Based on the Supreme Court case of Barker v. Wingo, the courts evaluate whether there has been unreasonable delay. The appellant to show the delay is unexplained or unreasonable. Do you know if the delay is egregious? There are various reasons that the courts consider “acceptable.” And, there always is the issue of what prejudice the appellant has suffered. Part of the analysis is about what the person did to exert or claim a speedy review. That’s where my protocol comes in. Military appellate courts have said that even if there is no due process violation, they still have some discretion to adjudge additional confinement credit without a “showing of prejudice.”

Currently, a military jury (called a Panel of Members) must have eight members in a general court-martial (12 if it’s a death penalty case) and four in a special court-martial. Article 29. Three-fourths of the members must vote for a finding of guilty. Article 52.

That is the current law in the military, but it is being challenged. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has several cases on the issue of unanimous verdicts, which will be decided this term. If the court decides in favor of unanimous verdicts, then the Government will likely appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court (or vice-versa).

What should the military defense counsel being doing now at trial? One step is easy, but there may be other steps that should be considered.

Step One: file a motion with the trial judge that the members should be instructed that they must have a unanimous vote for any finding of guilty. Most military are already doing this. The military judge will almost certainly deny the motion, but you have put the issue on the record for appeal. Because the voting is a constitutional issue, an Appellant whose case is still under review might benefit from a favorable change in the law while the case is still on appeal.

The Supreme Court has previously held that an appellant might benefit from the change in the law. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) has followed that rule in, for example, United States v. Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154 (C.A.A.F. 2008). There is some suggestion that the retroactivity principle need not always apply–this is fact specific and adds uncertainty. Your military appellate defense lawyer is able to help navigate this problem. CAAF has looked at the issue in United States v. St. Blanc, 70 M.J. 424 (C.A.A.F. 2012) in relation to what remedy to apply.

But,

Step Two. It seems to me that there is an earlier point in the trial where the military defense lawyer needs to object to the nonunanimous verdict rule. At the arraignment, the judge advises the accused of their forum rights–officer members, officer-enlisted members, or judge alone. Here the judge tells the accused about the voting requirement. Perhaps, at this stage, the military defense counsel should object and ask the accused to be advised that the voting will be unanimous. The judge will not do that because, again, under current law, she doesn’t have to.

Why Step Two?

Forum choice is always difficult–some cases are usually best tried by a judge alone most others should be a jury (members) trial. What we don’t know is whether a case that might be best by judge alone would be better as a jury (members) trial if a unanimous verdict is required. It’s a combination of numbers and intuition about who the members are. Some of us more experienced military defense counsel are familiar with the old numbers game of how many members to have on the jury.

So, one of the new issues we’ve been raising has been the denial of a proper forum choice based on the judge’s initial forum and voting advice. This becomes important on appeal where the accused has elected trial by judge alone but would have elected members if the voting had to be unanimous for guilt. It’s rather simple–it might be easier to convince one member to vote not guilty than three.

At Cave & Freeburg, LLP, we try to be creative and thoughtful about your defense and consider all options that might work in your favor.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches of our property, including cell phones. In Riley, the Supreme Court properly required a search warrant for (CID, OSI, CGIS, and NCIS) intrusions into seized cellphones. The court has acknowledged that people have a privacy right against Government intrusion without a warrant based on probable cause. As we know, there is an awful lot of personal data that is kept on the cellphone, and that can be retrieved with forensic tools.

In Lattin, the issue was a fishing expedition through the Appellant’s cellphone. The trial transcript shows that the OSI agent believed she had the right to search everything in the cellphone because it had been seized after the execution of a commander’s search and seizure authorization. With that general warrant concept in her mind she scrolled through a lot of information on the Appellant’s phone that wasn’t related to the reason for the search in the beginning. The OSI agent did not believe there were any limits based on her training and experience. Both the AFCCA and CAAF have ruled that the search was unlawful but that it was excused because there would be no future deterrent effect to OSI committing further unlawful searches. The court partly relied on Mil. R. Evid. 311, which wrongly summarizes the law post-Herring that was reinforced in Davis.

Shortly after Lattin comes Shields, another cellphone search case. The case presents dueling experts where, as you would expect, the Government expert was arguably given more “credibility” than the defense expert. When DCFL or government computer forensic “experts,” tell you they used the best and most current methods, you should not always believe that. Shields is a case where the DCFL used bad methods that ended up creating a fishing expedition. The court seemed to agree that the method wasn’t the best, but–it was good enough for government work.

In each case, the investigators were looking for texts, images, or data for a specific date or short time period. Forensic experts–good ones–will tell you that using proper methods readily available in the Atom or Cellebrite applications can make it relatively easy to create a narrow or focused search for items within a specified time period. Then, once the data is extracted for that time period, additional search criteria can narrow the data to that which is relevant to the reasons for the search. This, of course, is a little more time-consuming than a general search which, in light of Shields and Lattin, they might get away with.

These are matters–the law of the Fourth Amendment and issues of particularity and scope and cellphone or computer forensics that your military defense counsel needs to know about.

A jokester might suggest that the MCIO theme song might be ‘Scrolling Down the River on a Sunny Afternoon.’

If you do have leisure time on the river, you might take Digital Rummaging with you to read along the way.

Attorney Cave of Cave & Freeburg, LLP, is co-counsel in a petition for certiorari to be filed in Lattin v. United States.

Give us a call if you want to talk about representation by Cave & Freeburg, LLP as your military defense counsel.

Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), military defendants have the right to be represented by counsel at trial. If a defendant believes that their defense counsel provided them with ineffective assistance, they can raise this claim on appeal. The standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a court-martial is the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1984.

Under the Strickland test, the defendant must show that their counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Deficient performance means that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and prejudice means that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

If a military defendant successfully raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the remedy will depend on the specific circumstances of the case. The remedy could include a new trial, a reduction in sentence, or some other form of relief.

The appeals court will review claims of IAC de novo. United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J. 353, 362 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (To establish that ineffective assistance of counsel occurred, an appellant must prove both that the defense counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency caused prejudice. United States v. Captain, 75 M.J. 99, 103 (C.A.A.F. 2016). You should be aware that appellate courts strongly presume the counsel gave reasonable professional assistance. Also, you must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [deficient performance] the result of the proceeding would have been different.” See United States v. Cueto, 82 M.J. 323, 327 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

Your military appellate defense counsel can argue the cumulative effect of various errors when those errors aren’t necessarily significant. Also, in Cueto, the court said that

Perhaps in a rare case an attorney’s overall performance could be deficient even though the attorney did not make specific errors. See, e.g., People v. Raosto, 50 A.D.3d 508, 509, 856 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that a defense counsel’s overall performance was deficient where the defense counsel “displayed general carelessness and inattention throughout the trial,” “appeared to be confused,” and was generally unsuccessful in cross-examining witnesses). But such cases usually would arise only when “the defendant can point to a long series of questionable omissions by counsel” that “were not simply the product of human fallibility, but the result of a lack of conscientious effort.” Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.10(c) (4th ed. 2015).

Ineffectiveness claims can relate to pretrial preparations and advice on guilty plea negotiations, for action or inaction during trial, and for actions or inactions during the sentencing case.

United States v. Scott United States v. Scott, 2018 CCA LEXIS 522 (A.C.C.A., Oct. 30, 2018) aff’d 61 M.J. 79 (C.A.A.F. 2021), is an example of alleged military defense counsel failure during sentencing. But the courts decided the accused was not prejudiced based on the conduct of which convicted and other mitigating evidence in the record.

It is important to note that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a complex legal issue. Anyone facing a court-martial should consult with an experienced military defense attorney to discuss their legal options.

Coram nobis appeals are generally limited to situations where there is newly discovered evidence that was not available at the time of trial or sentencing or where there was a fundamental error in the original trial that has since been revealed. The appeal aims to correct errors that would have changed the outcome of the case if they had been known at the time of the original trial.

The jurisdiction for coram nobis appeals varies depending on the jurisdiction where the original conviction occurred. In some states, the appeals are filed in the same court that originally heard the case, while in other states, they are filed in a higher court. In federal court, coram nobis appeals are filed in the same court that originally heard the case, and the jurisdiction is determined by the location of that court. In courts-martial, a coram nobis petition is usually filed with the court of criminal appeals.

It’s worth noting that coram nobis appeals are generally considered to be a rare and extraordinary remedy, and they can be difficult to win.

Several factors are important.

• How soon after the conviction was final on appeal did the information become known?
• Once known, how quickly did you file a coram nobis petition?
• How significant is the evidence that it significantly impacted the fairness of the trial and verdict?

In civil law, there is a doctrine of laches. Courts will not hear a case if the person has waited too long to take legal action. While not a complete analogy–

Laches is a legal doctrine that bars a claim if it is brought too late, to the extent that the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. It is based on the idea that a person who unreasonably delays bringing a claim can be penalized since the delay may cause undue prejudice to the other party.

In order for laches to apply, the following elements must generally be present:

1. The party asserting the claim has unreasonably delayed in bringing it.
2. The delay has caused prejudice to the opposing party, such as by making it more difficult for them to defend against the claim or by causing them to rely on the belief that the claim would not be asserted.
3. The opposing party has acted in good faith during the period of delay.

Laches is commonly used as a defense in civil lawsuits, particularly in cases involving breach of contract, property disputes, and patent infringement. It is often raised when a plaintiff has waited an unreasonable amount of time to bring a claim, and the defendant has suffered harm as a result.

It’s worth noting that the application of laches can vary depending on the specific facts of the case and the jurisdiction in which the case is being heard. You can see then why criminal cases and their appeals can adopt the same analysis.

Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2008) is an example of where the court decided that a claim of IAC was subject to coram nobis. That result is driven by the specific facts of the case.

Note that a petition for coram nobis is not the same as a petition for a new trial based on legal errors at the trial. Although like coram, the CAAF has said in United States v. Hull, 70 M.J. 145 (C.A.A.F. 2010), that “requests for a new trial, and thus rehearings and reopenings of trial proceedings, are generally disfavored, and are granted only if a manifest injustice would result absent a new trial, rehearing, or reopening based on proffered newly discovered evidence.”

It’s important to consult with an experienced military defense attorney to determine whether a coram nobis appeal is viable in a particular case.

In a recent case, we had that happen. Unlike uniformed defense counsel, we immediately filed a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition to prevent the second trial. In Murillo, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals has agreed that (1) the court has jurisdiction to hear a Writ petition on this issue and (2) the military judge erred in declaring a mistrial. Thus, the court has dismissed the charges. (As of 5 Feb., we do have to wait to see if the prosecution will appeal that decision.)

The Double Jeopardy Clause‘s whole concept is to protect the accused from a second or subsequent trial on the same charges. The trial itself is what is prohibited. The case is United States v. Murillo, No. 202200132 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2023) (unpub.). The Double Jeopardy Clause is in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, which says, “No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . ” The bar against double jeopardy comes from English common law, possibly from Roman law. See F. Ward, Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1477 (1989). Ward points out that a double jeopardy challenge can be waived by a pretrial agreement because of a Supreme Court decision in United States v. Broce. The author suggests that the military judge should include in their inquiry about whether a waiver is knowing and intentional and whether the defendant understands that waiving the right to trial as part of a plea agreement is also waiving the double jeopardy claim.

Unfortunately, the military lawyers in the Cabrera case did not do what we would have done. In Cabrera, the military defense counsel properly objected to the second trial but then allowed the second trial to continue without taking any further action to protect his constitutional right to be protected from double jeopardy. They should have filed a Writ and Motion for a Stay of Proceedings pending the resolution of the Writ Petition. That’s what we did in Murillo. Cabrera was convicted and sentenced to confinement. It was on appeal, years later, that the issue of Double Jeopardy was decided in his favor and the charges dismissed. While that decision was being made, Cabrera was in confinement for several years. The case is United States v. Cabrera, __ M.J. ___, 2023 CCA LEXIS 37 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2023). See also United States v. Cabrera, 80 M.J. 374 (C.A.A.F. 2020); United States v. Cabrera, No. 201800327, 2020 CCA LEXIS 155 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. May 12, 2020). (As of 5 Feb., we do have to wait to see if the prosecution will appeal that decision.)

NOTE: The Double Jeopardy Clause does NOT prohibit the state and the military from prosecuting you for the same offense(s). This concept comes from the Dual Sovereign Doctrine.

Should you be facing court-martial and the charges are dismissed during the trial, please contact us to discuss your options if there is a potential that the prosecution will make a second attempt to prosecute you on the same charges.

mljucmj@court-martial.com for related appellate issues nathan.freeburg@freeburglitigation.com for representation in a second trial

See also, https://connectingvets.radio.com/articles/retired-army-general-james-grazioplene-stand-trial-rape-charges-army-dismissed

https://taskandpurpose.com/news/retired-army-general-rape-charges

Retired Army Maj. Gen. James Grazioplene on Wednesday admitted to sexually abusing his then-teenage daughter in the 1980s, in exchange for a suspension of his sentence. His daughter, Jennifer Elmore, turned 49 on Wednesday. Grazioplene pleaded guilty in a Prince William County, Virginia, circuit court to aggravated sexual battery. He has been in jail for approximately 18 months. He was expected to be released on Wednesday and will serve 20 years of probation, according to Elmore’s lawyer, Ryan Guilds.”

The case will be familiar to military justice practitioners.

Retired Maj. Gen. James Grazioplene, 69, faced an Article 32 hearing on charges he had repeatedly raped his daughter at various military postings in the United States and Germany in the 1980s. The military charges were dropped due to statute of limitations issues within the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

His case was affected by CAAF’s decision in Mangahas and others. The U. S. Supreme Ct did not have a chance to rule on CAAF’s Mangahas decision, but the military statute of limitations is pending before the Supreme Court in two cases. Here is a link to SCOTUSBlog on United States v. Briggs, consolidated with United States v. Collins. In the process it is expected that the Supreme Court will take on the issue of whether Coker v. Georgia really does apply to the military. SCOTUSBlog opines that “it will be interesting to see whether any of the justices demonstrate an appetite for the constitutional issue, or whether they think the statutory interpretation questions are dispositive.” I wonder if the Supreme Court will follow the doctrine of Constitutional avoidance–the usual practice of avoiding constitutional issues if the case can be resolved on a non-constitutional ground?

The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.

Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

This matter is a pro se petition for habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Because Petitioner is confined at the United States Disciplinary Barracks in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, this matter was transferred to this Court from the District of North Dakota. Petitioner seeks to set aside his 2012 conviction by general court-martial, based on the holdings in United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2016) and United States v. Hukill, 76 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2017). Petitioner, a former active duty member of the United States Air Force, was tried in September 2012 by general court-martial at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. Contrary to his pleas, Petitioner was convicted of one specification of rape, three specifications of aggravated sexual assault, and one specification of forcible sodomy, in violation of Articles 120 and 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 925. Petitioner was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for twelve years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a reduction to the grade of E-1. On March 1, 2013, the convening authority approved the sentence.

Factually it’s a sexual assault case common to our practice.

The conviction and sentence was affirmed through the normal military appellate process. After Hills was decided Coleman filed a coram nobis with AFCCA which was denied and CAAF summarily denied the writ-appeal petition.

In USDC Coleman sought retroactive application of Hills and Hukill.

The DC court states the rule

Petitioner’s conviction is final, and his current habeas case is before the Court on collateral review. When a decision results in a new rule, “that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review,” but “[a]s to convictions that are already final . . . the rule applies only in limited circumstances.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (citation omitted).

The first exception to non-retroactivity is for new substantive rules which may be applied retroactively. Coleman loses on this basis.

A more limited exception for procedural rules is one that is a “watershed [change] to rules of criminal procedure” which implicate both the accuracy and “the fundamental fairness” of the criminal proceeding. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-15. To qualify as a watershed rule, it must meet two requirements: First, the rule must be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction; second, the rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding. Coleman loses on this basis also.

As appellate counsel know, USDC Kansas and the 10th sees the bulk of military collateral challenges. The law in the circuit is very deferential to the results of a military conviction and appeal.

Note, an accused may not automatically get credit for time spent in civilian jail–that needs to be litigated at trial. See United States v. Harris, __ M.J. ___, 2019 CAAF LEXIS 361 (C.A.A.F. 2019).

Which brings us to United States v. Howell, NMCCA, 2019. On appeal, Howell argued that the prosecution wrongly argued to nullify his pretrial confinement credit.

Note: trial defense counsel did not object at trial! So, the NMCCA reviewed for plain error. Slip op. at 10. See United States v. Halpin, 71 M.J. 477, 479 (C.A.A.F. 2013); United States v. Pabelona, 76 M.J. 9, 11 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

The NMCCA cited United States v. Balboa, 33 M.J. 304 (C.M.A. 1991) for the proposition that the sentencing authority may consider pretrial confinement as mitigation or aggravation. Slip op. at 13. Ultimately the NMCCA found no error and gave no relief. But again, trial defense counsel had not objected.

Based on our superior court’s holding in Balboa, we cannot say that it was plain error for the trial counsel to argue that the members should increase their sentence to confinement for the express purpose of nullifying the Allen credit determined by the military judge in order, ostensibly, to permit the appellant to complete five years of treatment. Notwithstanding the C.A.A.F.’s language in Balboa, however, we would not condone a trial counsel’s effort to “appeal” a military judge’s Allen or Article 13 credit determination to members. Our holding might be different in a case where the issue was properly preserved for appeal.

In Balboa, Senior Judge Everett observed:

It seems curious (and more than coincidental) that the confinement adjudged was “68 days, plus 12 months”—not 14 months or 15 months—when the court-martial members knew that their announced sentence to confinement would be reduced by precisely 68 days. This Court does not need an appellate crystal ball to discern the real likelihood that, as a practical result of the members’ action, appellant has been denied the legally required credit for his pretrial confinement.

Balboa, 33 M.J. at 307-08 (Everett, S.J., concurring).

It would seem that the current law may now be that while an accused should get credit for PTC, it is not required if the sentencing authority doesn’t think it appropriate. We’ll have to see if the issue comes up again similar to the facts of Howell with a defense counsel objection. I would imagine Navy TCAP will make much ado about Howell and you may well see the issue again.

So, consider,

• Asking the MJ not to advise the members of any pretrial confinement credit?
• Move in-limine to prohibit TC arguing for nullification? Note, Howell is a retrial case. So it’s possible that there will be significant PTC in any retrial case. My other concern is that the advice to members about PTC gives them information or guidance on what the prior trial adjudged–something not raised in Howell.
• Object!

In Gamble v. U.S., the court will consider whether to overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that “[n]o person shall … be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb.” The common understanding of this awkwardly written clause is that a person may not be tried twice for the same offense. But despite the absolute-sounding nature of the constitutional text, the Supreme Court has ruled for well over a century that the clause allows “separate sovereigns” to each try a single defendant for what sure sounds like the “same offense.”

This case is before us for a fourth time. The petitioner, a former service member, seeks extraordinary relief from this court in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis or, in the alternative, in the nature of a writ of audita querela, under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The petitioner avers that his appellate defense counsel were ineffective in representing him by failing to raise as error Military Rule Of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.)413, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2005 ed.) issues raised at trial. Alternatively, he asserts that even if his appellate defense counsel were not ineffective and no writ of error coram nobis should issue, a writ of audita querela should issue to prevent continued enforcement of his conviction—and the resulting sex offender registration requirements—in light of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces’s (CAAF) decision in United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2016). The petitioner claims Hills should apply retroactively to his case.

Burleson v. United States, No. 200700143, 2018 CCA LEXIS 87, at *1-2 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2018).

Audita querela is a latin term meaning “the complaint having been heard.” A defendant can seek a rehearing of a decided matter due to the newly discovered evidence or newly existing legal defenses, through a writ of audita querela. A writ of audita querela attacks a judgment that becomes incorrect later because of circumstances that arose after the judgment was issued.

A general discussion of the “writ” is from Caleb J. Fountain, Audita Querela, and the Limits of Federal Nonretroactivity. 70 NYU ANN. SURV. AM LAW 203 (2014).