The review is based on Csady v. Ashworth, but it is equally applicable when federal courts examine habeas corpus petitions from military prisoners under 28 U.S.C. 2241.

I. Overview and Holding

The opinion addresses whether a federal district court may collaterally review the military court-martial conviction of Csady, a service member who was not subject to punitive discharge or confinement. The court concludes that it lacks authority to do so, reaffirming the traditional deference owed to the military justice system and the narrow scope of permissible collateral review by Article III courts.

II. The Military Justice System: Structure and Independence

1. Constitutional Basis:
   
   The military justice system operates under Article I of the Constitution (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14), giving Congress authority to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”
   
   See Ortiz v. United States, 585 U.S. 427 (2018); Santucci v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 66 F.4th 844, 852 (10th Cir. 2023).
2. Comprehensive Review Mechanism:
   
   The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) establishes a multi-tiered appellate process. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140–41 (1953) (plurality opinion).
   • Trial courts: summary, special, and general courts-martial (Willenbring v. United States, 559 F.3d 225, 227 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009)).
   • Intermediate appeals: Service-specific Courts of Criminal Appeals (CCAs) (10 U.S.C. § 866).
   • Discretionary review: The Judge Advocate General may refer cases to a CCA (10 U.S.C. § 869).
   • Final military review: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) (10 U.S.C. § 867).
   • Ultimate review: U.S. Supreme Court by certiorari (28 U.S.C. § 1259).
3. Non-Automatic Review in Non-Punitive Cases:
   
   In cases like Csady’s—where there is no confinement or punitive discharge—automatic appellate review is not available, and discretionary review by the Judge Advocate General and subsequent appellate bodies is limited.
   
   See 10 U.S.C. §§ 869(d), 867.

III. Scope of Collateral Review by Federal District Courts

1. Presumption Against Civil Review:
   
   The Supreme Court has long held that civil courts lack authority to review military court decisions absent jurisdictional or fundamental defects. See Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 177 (1886); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746–48 (1975).
2. Schlesinger Exception:
   
   Federal courts may intervene if the court-martial judgment is void due to a fundamental defect, including lack of jurisdiction or egregious legal error. This review must consider both:
   • The nature of the alleged defect, and
   • The gravity of the harm, evaluated with deference to the military system. Schlesinger, 420 U.S. at 753.
3. Burns Exception (Habeas Context Only):
   
   In Burns v. Wilson, the Court recognized a narrow habeas-based exception permitting collateral review where the military failed to provide full and fair consideration of constitutional claims.
   
   However, courts are not to reweigh evidence unless claims were ignored or unaddressed. See Burns, 346 U.S. at 142–44.
4. Dodson Factors (Non-Jurisdictional Habeas Review):
   
   Under Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1990), courts apply a four-part test to assess if a habeas claim merits review:Substantial constitutional claim;Pure legal issue, not factual dispute;No overriding military interest against review;Inadequate military consideration or improper legal standard.See also Santucci, 66 F.4th at 856; Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
5. Application to Non-Habeas Claims:
   
   While Burns and Dodson primarily apply to habeas cases, courts have occasionally used them in evaluating non-habeas collateral attacks as part of a threshold analysis for voidness under Schlesinger.
   
   See Allen v. U.S. Air Force, 603 F.3d 423, 431 (8th Cir. 2010); Yongo v. United States, No. 5:10-cv-220, 2013 WL 2285341, at *6 (E.D.N.C. May 23, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Yongo v. McHugh, 540 F. App’x 237 (4th Cir. 2013).

IV. Application to Csady’s Case

• No Punitive Discharge or Confinement: Csady’s case does not meet the threshold for automatic military appellate review under 10 U.S.C. § 866.
• Non-Custodial Petitioner: Because he is not in custody, the Burns-based habeas exception does not apply.
• No Void Judgment: Csady fails to demonstrate a jurisdictional or fundamental defect under Schlesinger, and cannot satisfy even the Burns or Dodson thresholds for constitutional violation.
• Respect for Military Finality: The court emphasizes that Article III courts are not forums of appellate review over courts-martial, echoing a consistent jurisprudential theme. See Santucci, 66 F.4th at 853; Burns, 346 U.S. at 140.

V. Legal and Policy Implications

This opinion reinforces:

• The insulation of military adjudications from civilian judicial review,
• The integrity and autonomy of the Article I military justice system,
• And the principle of comity between the military and civilian branches of federal judicial power.

It reflects a careful balancing of constitutional rights with military discipline and expertise, upholding the notion that military courts must remain the primary guardians of justice for service members, absent clear constitutional transgressions.

Conclusion

The opinion stands as a compelling reaffirmation of longstanding Supreme Court and circuit precedent limiting federal district court review of military court decisions. Without evidence of jurisdictional voidness, a breakdown in procedural fairness, or a significant constitutional issue wrongly decided, collateral review remains foreclosed. The motion to dismiss was therefore properly granted.

The general standard of review for a government certificate for review under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is governed by Article 67(a)(2), UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(2)), which grants the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) jurisdiction to review decisions of the service courts of criminal appeals (CCAs) upon certification by the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the respective service.

Standard of Review for Government-Certified Issues

1. De Novo Review for Legal Issues:
   • CAAF generally applies a de novo standard of review when considering legal issues presented under a certificate for review. This applies to questions of statutory interpretation, constitutional law, and other legal determinations made by the lower courts.
   • See United States v. Wilkins, 71 M.J. 410 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (“Questions of law are reviewed de novo.”).
2. Deference to Factual Findings:
   • When the case involves factual determinations by the service courts of criminal appeals (CCAs), CAAF generally applies a clearly erroneous standard. The court gives deference to the lower courts’ factual findings unless they are unsupported by the record or clearly erroneous.
   • See United States v. Burris, 78 M.J. 280 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (“We will not overturn the factual determinations of the lower court unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record.”).
3. Abuse of Discretion for Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings:
   • When reviewing matters involving procedural decisions, evidentiary rulings, or discretionary rulings by the trial court (such as rulings on expert witnesses, sentencing decisions, or admission of evidence), CAAF applies an abuse of discretion standard.
   • See United States v. Feliciano, 76 M.J. 237 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (holding that evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Limitations on CAAF’s Review Authority

• CAAF’s review is limited to the specific issues certified by the JAG unless the accused also files a petition for review on separate issues under Article 67(a)(3), UCMJ.
• If the CCA’s decision is based on independent grounds not related to the certified issue, CAAF may decline to rule on the issue.
• CAAF does not generally reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment on witness credibility unless there is a legal deficiency.

Precedents from CAAF Regarding Government Certificates of Review

• United States v. Upham, 66 M.J. 83 (C.A.A.F. 2008): CAAF’s authority under a government certificate of review is limited to the specific issues certified by the JAG.
• United States v. Adams, 63 M.J. 223 (C.A.A.F. 2006): The lower court’s ruling will generally be upheld unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”
• United States v. Jones, 78 M.J. 37 (C.A.A.F. 2018): When a case presents a mixed question of law and fact, the legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, while the factual findings are reviewed for clear error.

Conclusion

When CAAF reviews a case under a government certificate of review, it generally applies:

• De novo review for pure legal questions.
• Clearly erroneous standard for factual determinations.
• Abuse of discretion standard for procedural and evidentiary matters.

An important issue in such “appeals” is whether the prosecution is asking CAAF to find new facts or reinterpret the facts–its complex, and something we as military defense lawyers are familiar with.

A key appellate case supporting the proposition that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) does not generally reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment on witness credibility unless there is a legal deficiency is United States v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

Rule from Wheeler (2017)

In United States v. Wheeler, CAAF reaffirmed that it does not engage in reweighing evidence or making independent determinations of witness credibility, stating:

“It is the duty of the factfinder, not this Court, to determine the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence presented at trial. We will not disturb such findings unless there is a clear legal error or the findings are unsupported by the record.”

— United States v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

Other Supporting Cases

• United States v. Rosario, 76 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2017):
  • Held that CAAF does not reassess credibility determinations unless there is a legal deficiency, noting that the fact-finder’s determinations are given great deference unless unsupported by the record.
• United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456 (C.A.A.F. 2007):
  • Stated that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence but rather assess whether the court below had a basis in law and fact for its conclusions.
• United States v. Satterly, 74 M.J. 544 (C.A.A.F. 2015):
  • Affirmed that CAAF does not second-guess factual findings or witness credibility assessments unless they are “clearly erroneous” or based on incorrect legal standards.

Conclusion

CAAF follows the principle that credibility determinations and factual findings rest with the factfinder (trial court or CCA), and appellate review is limited to assessing whether there was a legal deficiency, such as insufficiency of evidence, misapplication of law, or due process violation. The case of United States v. Wheeler, along with Rosario and Beatty, directly supports this appellate principle.

A most interesting questions is what can CAAF review and how may it do that when a CCA has dismissed a charge because it is not factually sufficient to support a finding of guilty–stated another way, the appeals court is saying the person should not have been found guilty. The Government likes to certify these cases because it doesn’t like the result.

When the certified issue relates to a Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) finding of factual insufficiency, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) applies a deferential standard of review and does not reassess the factual sufficiency of the case de novo. Instead, its review is limited to determining whether the CCA applied the correct legal standard and whether its decision is clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record.

Standard of Review for a CCA’s Factual Insufficiency Determination

Under Article 66(d), UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 866(d)), CCAs are required to conduct a factual sufficiency review by independently weighing the evidence and determining whether the conviction is correct beyond a reasonable doubt. If a CCA finds the evidence factually insufficient and sets aside a conviction, CAAF’s review of that decision is highly deferential.

• United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394 (C.A.A.F. 2002):
  • CAAF does not have the authority to review a CCA’s factual sufficiency determination de novo. Instead, it reviews whether the CCA applied the correct legal standard and whether its factual determination is clearly erroneous.
  • “Once the Court of Criminal Appeals determines that the evidence is factually insufficient, we are bound by that determination absent clear error or application of an erroneous legal standard.”
• United States v. Smith, 76 M.J. 524 (C.A.A.F. 2017):
  • Reaffirmed that CAAF does not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility when reviewing a CCA’s factual sufficiency determination.
  • “The Courts of Criminal Appeals have unique fact-finding powers under Article 66, UCMJ, which we do not disturb unless their decision is clearly erroneous or based on a misapplication of the law.”
• United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138 (C.A.A.F. 2010):
  • Held that CAAF’s review of a CCA’s factual sufficiency determination is limited to ensuring that the CCA applied the correct standard under Article 66, UCMJ, and does not substitute its own judgment for that of the CCA.

Key Points About CAAF’s Standard of Review in Certified Cases Involving Factual Insufficiency

1. Highly Deferential Standard:
   • CAAF does not reassess factual sufficiency but only reviews whether the CCA applied the correct legal standard.
2. Clearly Erroneous Review:
   • CAAF will only reverse a CCA’s finding of factual insufficiency if it is clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record (Washington, Smith).
3. Legal Standard Review:
   • If a CCA misapplies Article 66(d), UCMJ, or fails to properly conduct a factual sufficiency review, CAAF can intervene (Nerad).

Conclusion

If a government certificate for review challenges a CCA’s factual insufficiency determination, CAAF does not reweigh the evidence but only ensures the CCA applied the correct legal standard and that its decision was not clearly erroneous. This principle has been upheld in Washington, Smith, and Nerad.

Would you like a case-specific analysis or further discussion on a particular aspect–contact the military defense lawyers at Cave & Freeburg, LLP, and we’ll see if we can help.

1. Court-Martial Defense:

A court-martial is a serious matter that can result in a dishonorable discharge, imprisonment, and a ruined career. Cave & Freeburg, LLP brings decades of combined experience to your defense. Their attorneys have a deep understanding of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and extensive experience navigating the complexities of court-martial trials and appeals. They will:

• Analyze your case: They meticulously examine the charges, evidence, and potential violations of your rights.
• Develop a strong defense strategy: This may involve challenging the evidence, negotiating a plea bargain, or building a case for dismissal.
• Represent you throughout the process: From pre-trial motions to hearings and the trial itself, they will be your relentless advocate.
• Fight for the best possible outcome: Their goal is to secure an acquittal, dismissal of charges, or a reduction in punishment.

2. Non-judicial Punishment (NJP) (Article 15):

Even an NJP, often considered a lesser penalty, can have significant consequences for your career. This is so even though an NJP is not a conviction. There are many civilian employers who are not aware of that distinction and think you have a “conviction.” Also, we now live in a military culture where there is little to zero tolerance for “defects.” The days when the purpose of NJP was to hold someone accountable but also allow them the chance to recover and go on to a better career are mostly gone. Nowadays, that first NJP can result in administrative discharge and a black mark on your military service. As military defense counsel, Cave & Freeburg, LLP can help you navigate this process by:

• Advising you of your rights: Explaining your options under the UCMJ and at an NJP proceeding.
• Negotiating with the command: They can work towards a more favorable outcome, potentially reducing the severity of punishment.
• Preparing a strong response: They will help you craft a compelling response to the allegations, mitigating the potential impact on your record.

3. Administrative Discharge Proceedings:

Facing an administrative discharge, or for officers a board of inquiry, is stressful and uncertain. Cave & Freeburg, LLP can guide you through this process by:

• Understanding the grounds for discharge: There are various reasons for administrative discharge, and they will ensure you understand the specific allegations against you.
• Fighting for a more favorable characterization: The discharge characterization (honorable, under honorable conditions, etc.) significantly impacts future opportunities. They will strive for the most positive characterization possible.
• Exploring all options: In some cases, they may be able to negotiate a retention in service or pursue other avenues to protect your career.

4. Military Justice Matters Beyond Court-Martial:

Cave & Freeburg, LLP’s expertise extends beyond court-martial defense. They can assist with a variety of other legal issues faced by service members, including:

• Line of duty investigations: If injured on duty, they can ensure you receive proper benefits and representation during investigations.
• Security clearance issues: Security clearances are vital for many military careers. They can help you navigate security clearance suspension or revocation proceedings.
• Military separation boards: They can guide you through the separation board process and fight for a fair outcome.

The Cave & Freeburg, LLP Advantage:

• Extensive Experience: With over 43 years of combined experience, they have a proven record of success in complex military legal matters.
• Nationwide & International Reach: They represent clients stationed across the U.S. and overseas, ensuring accessibility regardless of location.
• Relentless Advocacy: They are dedicated to protecting your rights and fighting for the best possible outcome in your case.
• Free Consultation: They offer a free consultation to discuss your situation and explore your legal options.

Taking Action:

Don’t face military legal challenges alone. Contact the military defense lawyers at Cave & Freeburg, LLP today. Their experience allows them to prepare and guide you through the legal process and fight for your rights. We have represented clients from E-1 through O-9. In representing these clients we have looked for creative ways to favorably resolve the issues and get a positive result. Because our loyalty is to the client only, we don’t have to worry about what our uniformed supervisors or colleagues think of our work, strategy, or willingness to appropriately challenge authority. We are not looking over our shoulders to see how our representation might affect our next promotion or assignment–you are the only person we are responsible to. Over the years we have reviewed thousands of law enforcement investigations, FAP reports, and records of trial. With our unwavering dedication and proven track record, you can be confident that you have a strong advocate in your corner.

He had been convicted and sentenced to 14 years of confinement.

We raised many issues during his appeal. The Army Court found a serious error by the military judge in denying the defense presenting evidence of other sexual acts of the alleged victim. This issue usually comes up in a Military Rule of Evidence 412 motion. Here, the military judge botched it.

Basically the rule prohibits witnesses or cross-examination about prior sexual behavior of the alleged victim. However, there are exceptions: (1) the evidence shows someone else did it or caused physical injuries. For example, consensual sex–any sexual penetration–can cause physical injury to the vagina, so the alleged victim having had sex with another person the day before the alleged assault could be admissible as an exception; (2) because the conduct is what is called res gestae (all part of the same acts or events); (3) when the Constitution requires it. For example, to present evidence of mistake of fact as to consent, or significant attacks on the credibility of the alleged victim. As military defense lawyers, we have a lot of experience litigating these issues and also have experts who can assist in presenting the case.

The Army court touched on other issues in connection with how the prosecutor and special victim’s counsel conducted the case.

Because the error was so prejudicial, the charges have been dismissed. The next step is whether the prosecution will appeal or whether there will be a new trial.

Retrials are difficult. As military defense counsel, we have done retrials. All the prior discovery, evidence, and witnesses have to be gathered up so that both sides can prepare for trial. Because retrials are difficult, the Army has created a specialized organization at Fort Leavenworth to work on these cases.

Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), military defendants have the right to be represented by counsel at trial. If a defendant believes that their defense counsel provided them with ineffective assistance, they can raise this claim on appeal. The standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a court-martial is the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1984.

Under the Strickland test, the defendant must show that their counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Deficient performance means that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and prejudice means that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

If a military defendant successfully raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the remedy will depend on the specific circumstances of the case. The remedy could include a new trial, a reduction in sentence, or some other form of relief.

The appeals court will review claims of IAC de novo. United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J. 353, 362 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (To establish that ineffective assistance of counsel occurred, an appellant must prove both that the defense counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency caused prejudice. United States v. Captain, 75 M.J. 99, 103 (C.A.A.F. 2016). You should be aware that appellate courts strongly presume the counsel gave reasonable professional assistance. Also, you must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [deficient performance] the result of the proceeding would have been different.” See United States v. Cueto, 82 M.J. 323, 327 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

Your military appellate defense counsel can argue the cumulative effect of various errors when those errors aren’t necessarily significant. Also, in Cueto, the court said that

Perhaps in a rare case an attorney’s overall performance could be deficient even though the attorney did not make specific errors. See, e.g., People v. Raosto, 50 A.D.3d 508, 509, 856 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that a defense counsel’s overall performance was deficient where the defense counsel “displayed general carelessness and inattention throughout the trial,” “appeared to be confused,” and was generally unsuccessful in cross-examining witnesses). But such cases usually would arise only when “the defendant can point to a long series of questionable omissions by counsel” that “were not simply the product of human fallibility, but the result of a lack of conscientious effort.” Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.10(c) (4th ed. 2015).

Ineffectiveness claims can relate to pretrial preparations and advice on guilty plea negotiations, for action or inaction during trial, and for actions or inactions during the sentencing case.

United States v. Scott United States v. Scott, 2018 CCA LEXIS 522 (A.C.C.A., Oct. 30, 2018) aff’d 61 M.J. 79 (C.A.A.F. 2021), is an example of alleged military defense counsel failure during sentencing. But the courts decided the accused was not prejudiced based on the conduct of which convicted and other mitigating evidence in the record.

It is important to note that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a complex legal issue. Anyone facing a court-martial should consult with an experienced military defense attorney to discuss their legal options.

Coram nobis appeals are generally limited to situations where there is newly discovered evidence that was not available at the time of trial or sentencing or where there was a fundamental error in the original trial that has since been revealed. The appeal aims to correct errors that would have changed the outcome of the case if they had been known at the time of the original trial.

The jurisdiction for coram nobis appeals varies depending on the jurisdiction where the original conviction occurred. In some states, the appeals are filed in the same court that originally heard the case, while in other states, they are filed in a higher court. In federal court, coram nobis appeals are filed in the same court that originally heard the case, and the jurisdiction is determined by the location of that court. In courts-martial, a coram nobis petition is usually filed with the court of criminal appeals.

It’s worth noting that coram nobis appeals are generally considered to be a rare and extraordinary remedy, and they can be difficult to win.

Several factors are important.

• How soon after the conviction was final on appeal did the information become known?
• Once known, how quickly did you file a coram nobis petition?
• How significant is the evidence that it significantly impacted the fairness of the trial and verdict?

In civil law, there is a doctrine of laches. Courts will not hear a case if the person has waited too long to take legal action. While not a complete analogy–

Laches is a legal doctrine that bars a claim if it is brought too late, to the extent that the delay has prejudiced the opposing party. It is based on the idea that a person who unreasonably delays bringing a claim can be penalized since the delay may cause undue prejudice to the other party.

In order for laches to apply, the following elements must generally be present:

1. The party asserting the claim has unreasonably delayed in bringing it.
2. The delay has caused prejudice to the opposing party, such as by making it more difficult for them to defend against the claim or by causing them to rely on the belief that the claim would not be asserted.
3. The opposing party has acted in good faith during the period of delay.

Laches is commonly used as a defense in civil lawsuits, particularly in cases involving breach of contract, property disputes, and patent infringement. It is often raised when a plaintiff has waited an unreasonable amount of time to bring a claim, and the defendant has suffered harm as a result.

It’s worth noting that the application of laches can vary depending on the specific facts of the case and the jurisdiction in which the case is being heard. You can see then why criminal cases and their appeals can adopt the same analysis.

Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F. 2008) is an example of where the court decided that a claim of IAC was subject to coram nobis. That result is driven by the specific facts of the case.

Note that a petition for coram nobis is not the same as a petition for a new trial based on legal errors at the trial. Although like coram, the CAAF has said in United States v. Hull, 70 M.J. 145 (C.A.A.F. 2010), that “requests for a new trial, and thus rehearings and reopenings of trial proceedings, are generally disfavored, and are granted only if a manifest injustice would result absent a new trial, rehearing, or reopening based on proffered newly discovered evidence.”

It’s important to consult with an experienced military defense attorney to determine whether a coram nobis appeal is viable in a particular case.

1. If a victim testifies on sentencing–the rules of evidence apply the same as any other witness. Article 6b does not waive the rules of evidence when a victim testifies in sentencing. (Note, the victim gave both sworn and unsworn statements.) Failure to follow the rules (even without defense objection) gets the defense and government, and court to agree there was an error and to get a new sentencing hearing.[1]

2. It is NEVER EVER a good idea for an accused (or one of his witnesses)[2] to impeach the verdict. Gone are the days when we could legally seek reconsideration of the findings, even through sentencing. The legitimate tactic at the time was to present the accused’s version of events through his unsworn and then argue that the members may wish to reconsider the findings.

While impeaching the verdict is prohibited it is usually not a good idea to poke a finger in the eye of the members who have just convicted you and now are giving a sentence.

Although an accused is provided a wide berth in the content of his unsworn statement, there are certain limits in what matters he may raise before the sentencing authority. United States v. Grill, 48 M.J. 131 (C.A.A.F. 1998). Specifically, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has recognized that an accused is generally prohibited from impeaching the findings of the factfinder.

United States v. Porter, No. ARMY 20110470, 2013 CCA LEXIS 946, at *8 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2013). Note, Porter arose from TC arguing that the accused had failed to impeach the verdict, “Appellant now complains that trial counsel’s repeated comments during a sentencing argument that appellant never denied the assault during his unsworn statement was improper argument. We agree.”

[1] There may have been a get-out for the prosecution, but it was likely not raised at trial or on appeal–else the court would have addressed it.

[2] See, e.g., United States v. Westcott, ACM 39936, 2022 CCA LEXIS 156 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2022) (unpub.) rev. denied 82 M.J. 438 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

A statement is not hearsay if: 1. The declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement. 2. The declarant testified under oath at a prior “hearing” or “or proceeding.” 3. The prior statement is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was given under penalty of perjury at the former “hearing” or “other proceeding.”

So, let’s say that a witness answers a question during the Article 32, UCMJ, investigation, and then refuses to answer the same question at a subsequent trial? Does his answer at the Article 32, UCMJ investigation constitute a prior inconsistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(A)? Well, an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation is certainly an “other proceeding” and/or “hearing.” So, according to the recent opinion of the Second Circuit in United States v. Truman, 2012 WL 3023804 (2nd Cir. 2012), the answer is likely “yes.”

In Truman, the Second Circuit, wrote that to the extent that its prior opinions

did not specifically address this issue,…we now join all of our sister courts that have addressed the question in holding that where, as here, a witness who testifies under oath and is subject to cross-examination in a prior state court proceeding explicitly refuses to answer the same questions at trial, the refusal to answer is inconsistent with his prior testimony and the prior testimony is admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). (emphasis added)

So, what are some other ways prior Article 32, UCMJ, investigation testimony might be used to impeach a witness at trial?

Check out, Damatta-Olivera, 37 M.J. 474, 478 (C.M.A. 1993).

“an inconsistency is logically essential for this method of impeachment, whether testimony is inconsistent with a prior statement is not limited to diametrically opposed answers but may be found as well in evasive answers, inability to recall, silence, or changes of position.”

See also, United States v. Meghadi, 60 M.J. 438, 444 (C.A.A.F. 2005) citing to United States v. Ureta, 44 M.J. 290, 298 (C.A.A.F. 1996); United States v. Button, 34 M.J. 139, 140 (C.M.A. 1992). And,

A decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. In this case, the military judge erred when he apparently determined that a failure to remember facts contained in a prior statement cannot be inconsistent with in-court testimony that differs from those facts. This Court, in Damatta-Olivera, 37 M.J. at 478 and United States v. Meghdadi, 60 M.J. 438, 444 (C.A.A.F. 2005), has noted that an inconsistency, for purposes of M.R.E. 613, may be found “not only in diametrically opposed answers,” but also in “inability to recall,” Damatta-Olivera, 37 M.J. at 478, or equivocation.Meghdadi, 60 M.J. at 444.

United States v. Harrow, 65 M.J. 190, 199 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

and United States v. Meghdadi, 60 M.J. 438, 444 (C.A.A.F. 2005), has noted that an inconsistency, for purposes of M.R.E. 613, may be found “not only in diametrically opposed answers,” but also in “inability to recall,” Damatta-Olivera, 37 M.J. at 478, or equivocation. Meghdadi, 60 M.J. at 444.

h/t Prof. Colin Miller.

Cargill, a federal public defender, was perturbed by a rarely discussed U.S. court rule that critics say conflicts with the presumption of judicial openness. In the Western District of Virginia, as in many other U.S. court districts, a probation officer makes a secret sentencing recommendation to the judge. Cargill accidentally saw the probation officer’s recommendation for his client. The report was “misleading and inaccurate,” Cargill wrote in a protest letter. (Emphasis added.)

Here is a link to the full article in the Roanoke (VA) Times.

Probation officers work for the court, for judges — not for the defense or the prosecution, Conrad said. Any facts the probation officer turns up are supposed to be in the report shared with the defendant and the lawyers, Conrad said. The sentencing recommendation is supposed to be the probation officer’s interpretation of the facts. People accused of a crime have a constitutional right to face their accusers, but that’s at trial, for a judgment of guilt or innocence, Conrad said.

Remember, CAAF has held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not apply at sentencing, but that Fifth Amendment due process does. See United States v. McDonald, 55 M.J. 173 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

The appellant raised eight errors through counsel and an additional six in accordance with United States v. Grostefon.

One assignment of error warrants discussion, but no relief. Specifically, appellant alleges that the military judge erred by failing to properly instruct the panel regarding appellant’s right during mutual combat to exercise self-defense when the force used against him escalated. Today we find that any error by the military judge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm the findings and sentence.

First some basics:

A military judge is required to instruct the members on special (affirmative) defenses “in issue.” Rule for Courts-Martial [hereinafter R.C.M.] 920(e)(3). A matter is “in issue” when “‘some evidence, without regard to its source or credibility, has been admitted upon which members might rely if they choose.’” United States v. Lewis, 65 M.J. 85, 87 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (quoting R.C.M. 920(e) Discussion, and United States v. Gillenwater, 43 M.J. 10, 13 (C.A.A.F. 1995)).

I would add that this is a sua sponte duty.

[T]he military judge has a duty to instruct the factfinders on it, regardless of defense theories or requests. Any doubt whether the evidence is sufficient to require an instruction should be resolved in favor of the accused.

United States v. Steinruck, 11 M.J. 322, 324 (C.M.A. 1981).

[A]n affirmative defense is not waived by a mere failure to request it.

United States v. Buckley, 35 M.J. 262, 265 (C.M.A. 1992), citing to United States v. Taylor, 26 M.J. 127, 129 (C.M.A. 1988).

So in Stanley,

At the close of evidence on findings the military judge gave extensive instructions, including self-defense and defense of another. Based on the evidence presented at trial, appellant now claims that the military judge should have instructed on two additional theories. First, the military judge should have instructed the panel that a mutual combatant has the right to escalate violence under certain circumstances without losing the right to self-defense. Second, the military judge should have instructed the panel that some mutual combatants may be unable to withdraw, and therefore retain their right to self-defense.

The court appears to distinguish Lewis and Gillenwater because a clear distinction is

the fact that none of appellant’s three defense counsel objected to the instructions given, nor asked for any additional instructions.

Basically the court concludes that no amount of additional instructions on self-defense would have lead to an acquittal because the evidence was so overwhelming. That’s essentially the Van Arsdall harmless beyond reasonable doubt issue. See United States v. Roberts, 69 M.J. 23 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

As to affirmative waiver of instructions, usually to LIO’s, see e.g., United States v. Duncan, 36 M.J. 668 (N.M.C.M.R. 1991); United States v. Strachan, 35 M.J. 362, 364 (C.M.A. 1992) (Instructions on lesser-included offenses are required unless affirmatively waived by the defense); United States v. Moore, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 696, 31 C.M.R. 282 (1962)(defense counsel affirmatively indicated his desire to withdraw his request for the instruction and, thereby, waived the instruction). But see, United States v. Taylor, 26 M.J. 127 (CMA 1988)(passive waiver); and United States v. Miergrimado, No. NMCCA 200501128 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2007), rejecting application of United States v. Waldron, 9 M.J. 811 (N.M.C.M.R. 1980), aff’d, 11 M.J. 36 (C.M.A. 1981), allowing the defense to choose whether to go all or nothing.

And, like its federal counterpart, [Mil. R. Evid.] 901(b)(4) provides that By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule: (4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. – Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.

Prof. Miller cites to United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000). Note that in the case cited the counsel had failed to object and preserve the objection.

There are (typically) several evidentiary/admissibility issues that frequently come up when the prosecution wants to admit emails (or text messages). My experience generally is that someone, usually the witness or law enforcement have selectively provided an email which is then cut-and-pasted for the “relevant” part by law enforcement. Usually law enforcement does not ask the witness to provide the full email or text string. That cherry-picked email or text message is then emailed to the trial counsel, the trial counsel prints out the email, and the trial counsel offers the item, the trial counsel also failing to recover the full email or text string. By the time you get to court there are issues of whether the email string or text string is available because of the passage of time. Trial counsel don’t seem to blush at this failure to preserve potential evidence.

1. Completeness under Mil. R. Evid. 106. The defense should always require production and discovery of the whole email or text chain where it is obvious that the proffered exhibit is a part of a chain. Why, well because other parts of the email chain may set up a contradiction or help to explain what is being offered. So for example NCIS supplies the trial counsel with an email from the complaining witness in which the accused says, “OK, I did it.” But what they don’t supply is the other parts of the email in which the accused also explains, “I did it because you told me I could.” It would seem to me that a portion of an email or text message is unreliable. That the message can only become reliable once the whole string is produced. The whole string being part of “the circumstances.”

2. Completeness under Mil. R. Evid. 304(h)(2).

Completeness. If only part of an alleged admission or confession is introduced against the accused, the defense, by cross-examination or otherwise, may introduce the remaining portions of the statement.

And don’t forget about United States v. Rodriguez, 56 M.J. 336 (C.A.A.F. 2002), and United States v. Gilbride, 56 M.J. 428 (C.A.A.F. 2002) on the general issue of completeness under Mil. R. Evid. 304(h)(2).

3. Who is the witness. The trial counsel who printed out the piece of evidence that is typically being introduced. You can tell because their name is blazoned on the top of the document courtesy of Outlook print functions.

Take a look at United States v. Taylor, 61 M.J. 157 (C.A.A.F. ); United States v. Johnson, ACM 34889, 2004 LEXIS 133 (A. F. Ct. Crim. App. May 21, 2004).

In thinking about why the case would be delayed to 3 November 2010 there were all kinds of ideas floating around, some ideas being of a conspiratorial nature. I had missed the piece noted by Reality Check (thanks!). Anyway, I thought the first place to go would be be docket – but first a digression on the piece of reporting Reality Check caught.

The military judge did delay the start of the trial for a month to give the defense more time to ask the court of appeals for help. (WUSA9 — http://goo.gl/Am1Q)

Based on additional chatter out there it seems the judge was doing what’s not uncommon in military cases and giving the defense a one time pass. (There has in fact been a lot of criticism from some over the years about paternalism toward an accused in military courts. Some of us view this as a desire for fairness.) My initial thought, now wrong, was that the judge would not delay the trial because of the defense’s tardy actions. But the delay makes sense.

We are all used to asking for a delay in a case. Rule One (of a list of Rule One’s) is to have a really good reason for delay. The reason here (incorporating some additional chatter) does not seem compelling. “We’ve had some attorney-client dissension in the camp doesn’t sound terribly compelling (and I paraphrase),” until you go back to the paternalism thought. I’ve seen where a judge will give the accused a break when there’s a sense the counsel aren’t up to snuff. In fact there is an appellate argument that you don’t make the client suffer for the sins of the lawyer. See e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 24 M.J. 323, 324 (C.M.A. 1987) ([W]e do not wish to make [an] appellant suffer for the omissions of the lawyer.). When you get a delay and you’ve had a less than persuasive reason for asking for delay it is not uncommon for the judge or court to admonish that you are getting a one and only. CAAF uses the language, “and absent extraordinary circumstances, no further extension of time will be granted in this case,” (bolded and underlined in the Journal), for almost all delay grants.

So why pick 3 November 2010. OK, here is a link to the docket.

You will see that 3 November appears to be the first open space on Judge Lind’s docket and that she wouldn’t be free until maybe December after that. Coincidentally this will give ACCA sufficient time to deny LTC Lakin’s writ petition. At which point I suppose the APF can direct their distrust toward the judges at ACCA and include them in the conspiracy against LTC Lakin?

Here is a FayObserver.com piece which documents some of the history of this case, including Michelle Theer’s abortive efforts to get a new trial.

According to court documents, witnesses for the prosecution repeatedly testified that Theer did not cooperate with the investigation and a prosecutor told the jury in closing arguments that Theer invoked her right to a lawyer when a co-defendant was arrested. U.S. District Court Judge Terrence W. Boyle dismissed that case Wednesday, ruling it included “no genuine issue of material fact.” Boyle also denied a certificate of appealability, which would be needed for Theer to file her case in a federal appellate court. Diamond was a staff sergeant on Fort Bragg when he was convicted in August 2001 of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole and demoted to private.

In the appeal that was denied earlier this year, Diamond’s lawyers argued that he did not receive a fair trial because his lawyers . . . were paid in part by Michelle Theer. . . . In May, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that Brewer and Mitchell were unaware that they were paid by Michelle Theer and, therefore, no conflict of interest existed.

Here is a link to the first ACCA decision in United States v. Diamond, 65 M.J. 876 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2007). The case was a very complete look at co-conspirators and admission of co-conspirator statements.

On 23 January 2009, CAAF took the following action.

No. 08-0365/AR. U.S. v. John M. DIAMOND. CCA 20010761. Review granted on the following issue: WHETHER THE NAMED CO-CONSPIRATOR, MICHELLE THEER, PAID APPELLANT’S CIVILIAN DEFENSE COUNSEL RETAINER AND, IF SO, WHETHER THIS CONFLICT OF INTEREST WAS DISCLOSED TO THE COURT. The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for remand to the Army Court of Criminal Appeals for further appellate inquiry on the granted issue. Thereafter, Article 67, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2000), shall apply. [See also ORDERS GRANTING PETITION FOR REVIEW this date.]

United States v. Diamond, 67 M.J. 247 (C.A.A.F. 2009).

Here is a link to the second ACCA decision in United States v. Diamond, ARMY 20010761, 2010 CCA LEXIS 66 (A. Ct. Crim. App. May 26, 2010, on remand to treat the conflict of interest issue.

No. 10-0668/AF. U.S. v. Jerrod D. NUTT. CCA S31600. Review granted on the following issues: WHETHER, UNDER MELENDEZ-DIAZ v. MASACHUSETTS, 129 S.CT. 2527 (2009), THE ADMISSION OF THE DRUG TESTING REPORT VIOLATES APPELLANT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE. WHETHER TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF THE DRUG LABORATORY REPORT AT TRIAL FORFEITED THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ISSUE, AND, IF SO, DID ADMISSION OF THE DRUG TESTING REPORT CONSTITUTE PLAIN ERROR? WHETHER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE WAS SATISFIED BY TESTIMONY FROM DR. TURNER. IF DR. TURNER’S TESTIMONY DID NOT ITSELF SATISFY THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, WAS THE INTRODUCTION OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE NEVERTHELESS HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE IF HE WAS QUALIFIED AS, AND TESTIFIED AS, AN EXPERT UNDER M.R.E. 703? No. 10-0461/NA. U.S. v. Joseph A. SWEENEY. CCA 200900468. Review granted on the following issues: WHETHER, IN LIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN MELENDEZ-DIAZ v. MASSACHUSETTS, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S.CT. 2527 (2009), THE ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE NAVY DRUG SCREENING LABORATORY URINALYSIS DOCUMENTS VIOLATED APPELLANT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM. WHETHER TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL’S OBJECTION TO THE DRUG LABORATORY REPORT CONSTITUTED A VALIDCRAWFORD OBJECTION. IF NOT, THEN WHETHER TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL WAIVED OR FORFEITED THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ISSUE, AND, IF FORFEITED, WHETHER ADMISSION OF THE REPORT CONSTITUTED PLAIN ERROR.

In support of the motion for leave to file writ-appeal petition out of time, Denedo’s counsel explained that he “erroneously believed that this case was governed by Rule 19(a)(1)(B),” which provides sixty days from the date of the decision at the CCA for filing a petition for review with this court. Appellate defense counsel requests this court suspend Rule 19(e) pursuant to our authority under C.A.A.F. Rule 33, which states “[f]or good cause shown, the Court may suspend any of these rules in a particular case, on application of a party or on its own motion, and may order proceedings in accordance with its direction.” In our view, neither the fact of the previous Supreme Court review of Denedo’s case, nor the Padilla case are relevant to our analysis as to whether there was good cause for a late filing. Counsel’s claim that he erroneously believed that this court imposed a sixty day deadline for the appeal of writ-appeal petitions does not provide us with the requisite good cause for suspending the deadline for filing a writ-appeal. Accordingly, it is ordered that Appellant’s motion for leave to file a writ-appeal petition out of time is hereby denied, and that Appellee’s motion to file an answer to the writ-appeal petition, motion to file untimely answer to Appellant’s motion for leave to file the writ-appeal out of time, and motion to withdraw are denied as moot.

As for the rules changes, a big (and quite welcome, in my opinion) change is the new system in which nearly all CAAF pleadings are eligible for electronic filing. Be sure to redact privacy/sensitive information from such filings, as final briefs will be placed on CAAF’s webpage, starting this term. Other changes make the already small needle’s eye to SCOTUS more microscopic for military appeals. While CAAF judges previously granted review of all appeals in which the appellant was serving 30 years or more in confinement, that is no longer the policy. Furthermore, for cases that come back to CAAF after a remand to the CCAs, CAAF will no longer automatically grant review of the case.

Are we getting closer to PACER or some PACER like access for court filings in the same manner as in federal courts? If so, it would be nice to be more than a glacial pacer toward that goal.

No. 10-6010/CG. U. S., Appellant v. ANDREW L. DALY, Appellee. CCA 001-62-10. Notice is hereby given that a certificate for review of the decision of the United States Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals was filed under Rule 22 on this date on the following issues: WHETHER THE COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYIING THE STANDARD OF FAIR NOTICE, AS OPPOSED TO MISTAKE OF LAW, IN AFFIRMING THE MILITARY JUDGE’S FINDING THAT, UNDER COAST GUARD REGULATIONS, THE ACCUSED WOULD NOT HAVE KNOWN HIS CONDUCT WAS CRIMINAL AND THEREFORE HE COULD NOT BE PUNISHED UNDE ARTICLE 134, UCMJ. WHETHER THE COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE MILITARY JUDGE’S RULING THAT THE ACCUSED LACKED NOTICE OF THE CRIMINALITY OF HIS CONDUCT UNDER ARTICLE 134, UCMJ, WHERE COAST GUARD REGULATIONS STATE THAT RESOLUTION OF THE CHARGED MISCONDUCT IS “NORMALLY ADMINISTRATIVE.” WHETHER THE COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE MILITARY JUDGE’S ORDER DISMISSING THE CHARGE AND SPECIFICATIONS, WHERE THE MILITARY JUDGE DENIED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND FAILED TO HOLD AN EVIDENTARY HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACCUSED ACTUALLY RELIED ON COAST GUARD REGULATIONS BEFORE COMMITTING THE CHARGED MISCONDUCT.

Nerad gets a remand to AFCCA for the court to clarify it’s ruling.

On first review ACCA had set-aside two specifications regarding a falsification of a sick-slip under Article 123, UCMJ. But ACCA then affirmed two specifications thought to be closely related to the dismissed specifications. CAAF dismissed the two specifications and said that:

By dismissing those specifications, our superior court rang the death knell of the “closely-related offense” doctrine. United States v. Morton, 69 M.J. 12, 13 (C.A.A.F. 2010). Also as part of their decision, our superior court returned the record of trial to The Judge Advocate General for remand to this court for sentence reassessment.

Actually what CAAF said was:

The granted issue tests the continuing vitality, of the so-called “closely related offense” doctrine. In light of the abiding principle of fair notice to an accused, we hold that this doctrine, as currently relied upon by appellate courts in upholding guilty pleas in the military justice system, is no longer viable.

Here is the link to United States v. Morton, 68 M.J. 12 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

The original ACCA opinion is at United States v. Morton, No. 20060458, 2008 CCA LEXIS 615, at *10-*11 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2008)

CAAF agreed with ACCA that changing the information on a sick slip is not an offense under Artilce 123, UCMJ. The issue was substitution of a false official statement offense under Article 107, UCMJ.

Oooops, here’s what ACCA first said about the charge and the evidence on which the prosecution held an Article 32, UCMJ, investigation, had a legal review, went to trial on, the parties agreed to a guilty plea on, and the military judge accepted. (Which indicates the relevance of reading this case to trial practice.)

We accept the government concession that appellant’s acts of altering an individual sick slip cannot support her convictions of forgery in violation of Article 123, UCMJ. See United States v. Young, 21 C.M.R. 431, 432 (A.B.R. 1956) [citing to United States v. Strand, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 297; 20 C.M.R. 13 (1955)] (holding that a sick slip has no legal efficacy); United States v. Sher, 21 C.M.R. 371 (A.B.R. 1956) (finding no regulation making a sick slip either binding or enforceable and concluding such an instrument does not give an accused a right to avoid duty); see generally United States v. Abbey, 63 M.J. 631, 634 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (Commenting that “the nature and use of sick slips are basically the same now as when Sher and Young were decided in 1956.”). [n.1]

Young and Sher are in the red books. Some of us remember the red books as practical research tools now made (apparently) redundant by computer research. Here’s my LEXIS search term “”sick slip” or siq or “sick in quarters.”” I used SIQ because that’s what the chit and practice is called in the Department of the Navy. Each of the cases cited by ACCA showed up in some fashion in a list of 22 cases. The first Morton decision was in September 2008. In April 2008, ACCA decided United States v. Guilette II, ARMY 20051539, 2008 CCA LEXIS 545 (A. Ct. Crim. App. April 24, 2008). The appellant in Guilette II was also charged with forging a sick slip while stationed at Fort Sill, OK. Two different jurisdictions, all the parties were different. Most odd.

The current Manual for Courts-Martial, para. 48.c.(6), states:

The alteration must effect a material change in the legal tenor of the writing. Thus, an alteration which apparently increases, diminishes, or discharges any obligation is material.

But apparently this doesn’t include the legal obligation to show up for duty? The Appendix doesn’t have any explanation other than a note that the paragraph is based on para. 202, MCM (1969). But the new explanation is not duplicative.

The 2003 Benchbook doesn’t address this particular issue and doesn’t reference any caselaw.

Paragraph 202 of the 1969 manual states:

The 1969 Manual doesn’t have the Analysis sections that subsequent manuals have. So what are we left with? The 1984 manual is no help. The analysis from 1984 is that found in the 2008 manual.

I think the bottom line to us all here is a reminder of the need to conduct research into caselaw. An Article and it’s explanation may seem straightforward on its face but the appellate courts add their interpretation. In the case of an SIQ chit, the appellate courts are consistent in finding the document doesn’t qualify under Article 123, UCMJ. In two cases at the trial level it appears everyone got it wrong.

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n.1. Also most odd. Abbey is correctly cited by ACCA and is available in LEXIS. However, when I went to link to the opinion on CAAF’s website in the 2006 opinions I could not find Abbey. The citations stop at 63 M.J. 478 and then take up with 64 M.J. 1. A search of the CAAF website shows ‘no matches found’ for this case.