Collateral consequences

Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. R. 119 (2009).

ABSTRACT: In the 2009–2010 term, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide if it matters whether a criminal defense lawyer correctly counsels a client about the fact that the client faces deportation as a result of a guilty plea. Under prevailing constitutional norms in almost every jurisdiction, a lawyer does not have a duty to tell her client about many serious but “collateral” consequences of a guilty plea. Yet, in every jurisdiction that has considered the issue, that very same lawyer will run afoul of her duties if she affirmatively misrepresents a collateral consequence—every jurisdiction, that is, except Kentucky. The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently held that when there is no duty to warn about a consequence because it is collateral, misadvice about that same consequence is not a constitutional violation. The collision of the collateral-consequences rule, which imposes no duty to warn, and the affirmative-misadvice exception, which imposes a duty to give accurate advice where a lawyer chooses to warn, leads to a perverse incentive structure that signals to defense lawyers (as well as to prosecutors and judges) that it is safest to say nothing at all about “collateral” matters. The Kentucky approach that the Supreme Court will review is equally troubling; it allows false information with no sanction or remedy. A cluttered and contradictory jurisprudence of informational rights in the guilty-plea process sits at this intersection of the collateral-consequences rule and affirmative-misadvice exception. So-called collateral consequences often overshadow the direct penal sentences in criminal cases. In addition to deportation, courts categorize many other severe consequences as collateral, including involuntary civil commitment, sex-offender registration, and loss of the right to vote, to obtain professional licenses, and to receive public housing and benefits. These consequences touch upon every important area of a convicted person’s life—for the rest of his or her life. They also matter enormously in the United States, which has more than 600,000 individuals exiting the prison system and millions more getting criminal records each year. These individuals enter a society that is struggling to find ways to integrate them despite facing considerable obstacles. The constitutional rule has not caught up to the current reality of the effect of these consequences on defendants, their families, and their communities. The Supreme Court has the opportunity to overcome the mythical divide between direct and collateral consequences and to protect the constitutional and ethical values which underlie a defendant’s right to decide whether to plead guilty based on full knowledge of the material consequences. The Court will consider important issues of professional responsibility, ethics, transparency, and the right to information in the guilty-plea process. This Article exposes the problems with the majority and Kentucky approaches. It argues that only a constitutional mandate that requires a complete and full informational disclosure about the serious collateral consequences of guilty pleas will avoid the problematic incentive structures we have now.

I did not see a reference to Denedo.

Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1317 (2009). Padilla v. Kentucky [link is to SCOTUSWiki] was argued at the U.S. Supreme Court 13 October 2009, the decision is pending.